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THE

DUBLIN REVIEW

A QUARTERLY AND CRITICAL JOURNAL

Edited by ALGAR THOROLD

OCTOBER, 1931

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The Dublin Review

OCTOBER, 1931

No. 379

ART. I.—“HUMANISING” AMERICA

I WAS wandering one afternoon in a large city of the North-west of the United States. The long winter had begun ; it was very cold ; a thin coating of snow hid whatever colours might have once decorated the landscape ; the air was thin and bone-dry. I was hurrying to the never failing and never varying seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit generated by the central heating of my apartment. As I slid past an automobile, itself dodging in and out of a ceaseless stream of cars skidding on the icy roads, I caught sight of a poster inviting me, as a member of the public, to listen to a lecture on Humanism. Glad of any refuge, I entered the building. It was the local Y.M.C.A. centre.

I had heard of the “New Humanism” before. I had in fact read much of the work of its twin apostles, Messrs. Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. Brought up myself according to the educational ideals of what now seemed an earlier generation, an education which rested on a triple foundation—belief in God and religion, a reverence for *literae humaniores*, an acceptance of discipline for discipline’s sake—I had felt drawn to these apostles, who seemed to stand for such old-fashioned ideas. True, I was a little puzzled by the fact that men who preached poise and moderation, harmony and balance, were bold enough to call their gospel by the resounding title, the “New Humanism”. It was curious, I reflected as I took my seat in the vaguely Gothic hall, that it was left to the age of science to make humanism a god or a gospel. Historians, pondering on the movements of men, had called this age or that humanist, either in contrast to a religious age, or because the greatest minds of that age had succeeded in living a truly balanced human life, but it was left to the nineteenth century, when humanity was waging a losing war against the forces of determinism and mechanism, to worship itself under the name of Humanity, and now,

in the twentieth century, it was the United States, in which mass-production and standardisation had triumphed over the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities that make men men, that was giving birth to a philosophy called by no less a title than the “New Humanism”. I knew I was being a little unfair to Babbitt and More, for their Humanism had nothing in common with that of Comte, but after a few minutes of the lecture I knew that I was not being unfair to their disciples.

The lecturer was a University professor of some distinction, with a reputation, so I was told, more than local. He did not look like a Humanist, in the sense in which Mr. Chesterton looks like a Humanist, but he did look like a man who would call himself a Humanist. Small, wizened, stooping, short-sighted, high-voiced, he smilingly blinked at his audience, and, speaking in a singsong, with studied hesitation and no notes, he was the nearest thing to an eccentric Oxford don I had ever seen outside Oxford. It felt quite like home. He told us in the measured tones of a scientifically weighed judgment that Humanism was not so arrogant as to deny the existence of God. It merely did without him. Humanism realized that up till now God had not apparently busied himself with the affairs of this world. Humanism intended to accept the fact ; it gave up the pretence that God helped man, and acted up to the truth that man alone helped man. Should God wish to take up actively the part that religion assigned to him, he would certainly be accepted by the Humanists as one of themselves. Remembering that I was in a building devoted to the activities of young Christians—a work to which I had myself been lately induced to contribute—I looked around at my fellow listeners, expecting resentful, angry, or at least puzzled looks : instead I noticed satisfied smiles. I had to presume that the Christians were away, and that the audience was composed of strangers like myself, seeking shelter from the cold. The professor rambled on, defending the practice of the pleasanter Christian virtues and solving all cases of conscience in terms of the greatest quantity of pleasure derivable for all parties. I was curious to discover on what metaphysic

he based his choice. He was not a hedonist, for he told us that pleasure depended on the higher values, but he seemed unwilling to reveal why he thought them higher, though he did tell us in an aside that he saw no reason why a chance concurrence of electrons should not in time produce *Hamlet*. I was startled out of a reverie by the realization that the professor was telling us that there lived in that very town a man who, in his considered opinion, should be numbered among the wisest, the best-informed, the most delicately balanced minds of the age. This fellow citizen was the real founder of the new religion, and this city was his Jerusalem. Had it not been for the illness of his body, he, the founder, would have spoken to us himself. I had never before had the privilege of listening to a real prophet, and I was naturally eager to do something about it. Impatiently waiting for the end, I left as a healthy-looking young Christian flapper thanked the professor for his talk and hoped that we had all enjoyed ourselves. "I know I did," she assured us with a beaming smile.

I hastened to the library to read the works of our prophet. I discovered some volumes of sermons, delivered in a truly catholic spirit in the local theatre, where I had recently seen a play which a Christian might have enjoyed, but which would surely have caused many a blush to suffuse the face of a nicely poised Humanist. Alas, after a glance at the sermons I realized that I should not find much wisdom, though a good deal of the professor's discourse. They were but a rehash of Spencerian agnosticism, Strauss' biblical criticism, and much journalistic ethics. I was not tempted to come into closer contact with my fellow-citizen and prophet.

I relate that afternoon's adventure because it shows far better than many essays the way the thoughts of the philosophical and religious leaders filter down to the people for whom they are meant. And be it noted that the process of filtering was only beginning. The speaker was an academic professor of real distinction in his own field; the audience were mostly students at the State University. The lecture was a travesty of the Humanism of Babbitt and More, yet we shall see that it

was the only form of Humanism that would be acceptable to the American people. And the moral is not obvious. Anyone who has lived in the United States knows that the Americans are a real people with their own culture, with a profound understanding of one side at least of life. The possibility of such simple-mindedness is not due to ignorance or stupidity, but to the fact that there is no point of contact between abstractions and their own intensely concrete life. It comes perhaps as something of a shock to the European to realize what a difference, what a complete break, there is between the average American and himself. In these days of rapid travel, of common literature, of journalism, of world economics, it might not seem to be possible that radical differences between Western peoples should persist, but every day spent in the States drives the truth home. And this is not said with any intention of disparaging the American—very far from it. An Englishmen who cannot admire the quality of the American character simply reveals his own insularity, and, in parenthesis, it may be said truly enough that no European is so bold as to criticize America with one half the vigour of those Americans who are trying to transplant European culture, with a hundredth part of the bitterness of Babbitt and More.

But it will be wise to interrupt these thoughts about the quality of American civilization and to resume them later, when something has been said about the efforts of the founders of the New Humanism to "humanise" their country.

Both Babbitt and More belong to the academic world, and to that side of the academic world which has least meaning for the American, the side of the humanities. Mr. More is a Greek scholar in a country where Greek fulfils its proverbial use of being Greek to everyone. Mr. Babbitt is a Harvard professor of literature. They are both leisured critical gentlemen in a land where criticism is yet to be born for want of a literature that has attained stability or form, and where there is no time or place for the leisured gentleman. They are both out of sympathy with change; they are both convinced that the human mind has attained its

greatest heights in the past ; it is for us to imitate. In fact, they belong mentally to an old world, and, like all old people, they are telling us how far better things were done in their day. They may be right, but they are not believed.

It is impossible to read the two most important works of Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism* and *Democracy and Leadership*, without realizing how learned and how wise they are. The first by universal agreement is a masterly refutation of the weak side of Romanticism. But surely the task was not difficult, though it could not have been easy to accomplish it with such completeness. Romanticism is intellectually incoherent ; it turns out to be a glorification of the feelings ; it is nothing but a delight in imagery ; it is a love of mere living. How much more clearly we realize all this after Babbitt has taken us through chapter and verse of the Romantic writers ; how intellectually superior we feel when More makes fun of modern art and poetry, and ridicules Whitman, Dreiser, Cabell and Lewis ! Yet we know that all these arguments neglect the truth that will always justify some kind of Romanticism, the truth that man must always seem a little mad to anyone who persists in measuring him by the standard of logical intelligibility and consistency. On the one hand, he will not be limited by his "clear and distinct ideas", he will jump to conclusions which he cannot clearly and distinctly justify ; on the other, the moment he does transcend the limitations of logic and sensible experience, he is all at sea, and in his attempt to reach the object of his deepest intuition he often is satisfied with the creations of his imagination, or the comforts of his uncontrolled feelings. If he is of those who can reason to a God, he must try and touch God, and if he cannot succeed, he will relieve his pent-up desires by some expression, some throwing-out of what he feels but cannot analyse. And this happens to all men, not only poets and mystics. They are all trying to cling on to something wider than themselves, whether it be their family, their nation, their work—any of which can be turned into a religion—or their abstract ideals of justice, service, and progress. Babbitt has an easy task showing the results of allowing people to

guide their lives by blind aspirations, for in their attempt to rise to angelic radiance they will descend to the level of animals. But would he not have as easy a task showing the dangers of allowing people of the same mental capacity to live according to the conclusions of their syllogisms? Personally, I should prefer to trust to the feelings and instincts of the average man.

The second book, *Democracy and Leadership*, tells us why Babbitt is so unromantic. It is not because of the dangers of Romanticism at all, but because Babbitt is one of the few men who cannot be a Romantic; he has no faith whatever. However odd the faith of many a Romantic, there always is a faith, a faith in something greater than man, though it may turn out to be less than man. But Babbitt is a complete sceptic: naturally any Romanticism is nothing but vain delusion. He has no belief in religion, though he does admit that religion, when it is accepted, is the easiest road to Humanism. He has to fall back on human nature in experience; in the last analysis he is simply telling us what his reading of history and literature has convinced him to be the best recipe for happiness. He tells us often that the only test of a philosophy is whether it makes the individual happy, but his suggestions for attaining this happiness are entirely his own opinion. He has come to the conclusion that happiness is achieved through self-control, the will to refrain, the realization that there is a dual law, one for man and one for thing. But he never gives any reason why nature should be so oddly constituted. Why should the accepted standards be the best standards unless we have some clue to what is good? He tells us that “the gentleman or man of the world . . . could humanise himself only by constant reference to the accepted standard of what a normal man should be”. But in the past, and even to-day, the accepted standard is at least partly due to the moral teachings of the Christian religion and the metaphysic on which it is based. His educational theory is to develop habit and conventional activity rather than experiment and free-choice. That is all very well if you can persuade the questioning adolescent that the habits he has learned are good, but otherwise

reaction is inevitable. All his works, in fact, are filled with advice and insight that to the believing Christian seem admirable—indeed, they are culled from the teachings of the faiths of India, China, and our Western Christianity—but, unfortunately for Babbitt, "Humanism is more practical for the present generation than religion". The result is that he offers us the fruit without the tree, and wonders why so many prefer an inferior fruit growing on an inferior tree, with a chance of more and perhaps better fruit in the future. Under the circumstances, Babbitt cannot be surprised when a critic writes : "No reader can go very far with him, unless he is willing to take over a shallow and jerry-built metaphysics and an antiquated psychology that insist first on a dualism between man and nature, then on another dualism between what Mr. Babbitt calls our 'expansive desires' and what he calls 'the higher will'." Babbitt somewhere tells us that Mill's philosophy is based upon spiritual controls which his philosophy fails to supply. Babbitt's, as his critic guesses, is based upon religious controls which he denies to exist. He tell us that there have been at least two cases when Humanism has been practised without any religious faith, in China and in Greece. But, as Mr. Christopher Dawson has shown in *Religion and Progress*, it is a fallacy to suppose that either Greek or Chinese Humanism was without a religious foundation. The Rites are, he writes in his discussion of Confucianism, "nothing less than the external manifestation of that eternal order that governs the universe, which is known as Tao, the Way of Heaven". "They are not, as the Western observer is apt to suppose, a matter of social etiquette." While in Greece it must be remembered that, apart from the fact that a religious metaphysic supported the code of good behaviour, only a very small portion of the population made any pretence of living up to it.

Some of Babbitt's critics in the *Critique of Humanism* appear to be superficial and even verbal in their attacks. In particular, one resents their criticism that the Humanists are inconsistent because they claim to preach moderation and restraint, while they denounce those who

disagree with them in an unmeasured fashion. "When first principles are involved," writes Babbitt, "the law of measure is no longer applicable." "One should not be moderate in dealing with error." Since truth is ever intolerable of error, our sympathies are with Babbitt, until we ask ourselves how Babbitt can be so certain that he has the truth. Picking out maxims, as he does, from the flower of Chinese, Greek and Renaissance cultures, he can hardly fail to hit upon the truth at times; but as these truths fail to grow out of a coherent philosophy, as they are without roots, the critics of Humanism are justified in their dissatisfaction with the intolerant attitude of Babbitt and More. One can even understand one of his critics, who in his exasperation stoops to the phrase: "Now, why the deuce is virtue . . .?"

We have said that Babbitt is no believer in metaphysics, but he uses its language, and unfortunately. He agrees with More's denunciation of the "Demon of the Absolute", a phrase which seems to stand for the tendency of philosophy to fit parts into a unity before the parts have been properly analysed, for its desire to rush to a conclusion, and to be so certain that there is a conclusion. But Babbitt is equally insistent on a Demon of a Dualism, and with far less reason. For if the metaphysical absolute is a vain dream, as he tells us, so must be any dualism. Unless existence has some meaning, some purpose in which all things in some way participate, why should we argue to a different law for man and the rest of nature? Naturally man, being differently constituted from animals, will act differently from them, just as animals will act differently from inorganic matter, but, unless there is some purpose in them all, the most we can say of them all is that they are acting for themselves as best they can in a meaningless flux. Any dualism that has real significance arises from an understanding of the nature and purpose of the whole. St. Paul and St. Thomas were only justified in dividing off the law of the Spirit from the law of the members, because they believed in a Personal God, the theology of whom involves a distinction between the order of grace and the order of nature.

These criticisms are entirely destructive, and they by no means do justice to the distinction of More or to the wisdom of Babbitt ; they are the afterthoughts of one who, while reading the works of both authors, was filled with admiration. For they were saying the very things that most needed to be said in a world that boasts of its disbelief and is suffering from the consequences. But Babbitt can only expect to convince one who is already converted to most of what he denies. Small wonder that the creed of the New Humanism, austere and difficult in any case, unattainable except by a few wandering philosophers of an old and experienced world, falls quite flat in the land of its origin. Only in a completely perverted form does it reach even the educated people. Babbitt may protest at length, as he does in his contribution to *Humanism and America*, that he is "unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists", that "Humanism gains immensely in effectiveness when it has a background of religious insight". His fundamental scepticism is too easy to accept to-day not to be far more convincing. The very word "humanism" in its historical and natural connotation contrasts with supernaturalism as well as with the spirit of science. There is little danger that it will carry the day against the latter ; there is a possibility that it might add to the scepticism of the educated classes.

In vain too does Babbitt protest that Humanism is not only different but fundamentally opposed to humanitarianism. In one sense it is true enough, for humanitarianism is a love for our fellow human beings, whereas Humanism is an enlightened love of ourselves. How thoroughly justified seems Babbitt's indictment of modern scientific humanitarianism on the ground that it busies itself with reforming others instead of itself, how true his statement that nowadays everyone looks after his neighbour's business to the neglect of his own self-reform, till one remembers that Babbitt's idea of self-reform can only mean feathering one's own intellectual, moral and physical nest ! Real charity begins at home, but only because real charity means the love of God, and our neighbour through Him. Babbitt's

charity must begin at home and end at home, only making excursions abroad to collect materials for the home comfort. The only criterion of reform or action he can ever fall back on is the happiness of him who is wise enough to know where his real happiness lies. “Too great wealth”, he tells us, “must be remedied by control of desires, not by influencing the desires of the poor.” A splendid sentence, and reminiscent of the advice of Leo XIII or Pius XI, but on Babbitt’s philosophy what conceivable reason is there for the poor to curb their desires, and what reason for the rich, unless they have the wisdom of the rare Humanist, and even then, for would they not think that their wealth would be more wisely administered by their wise selves? In contrast, humanitarianism, philanthropy, social service, even State or Municipal Socialism, however easily misguided in practice, however hypocritical in many instances, have at least part of the gospel counsel, “Love your neighbour as yourself.” There is in them some spirit of revolt against injustice and unfairness, some belief in certain rights of each and every man. Luckily, perhaps, the Humanism that is preached and popularised has not been able to follow Babbitt’s distinction between Humanism and humanitarianism, and has frankly meant the latter when it speaks of the former.

Thus it comes about that I was able to listen to a popular lecture on Humanism, which was in effect a lecture on agnosticism, the spirit of science, and humanitarianism. And, given an understanding of the American people, I am not sure but that the professor was wiser than Babbitt. As another professor, this time of psychology, said to me: “It’s no use talking about Humanism here; we simply won’t go back”—and that in the great depression! George Moore in one of his books of conversations introduces an American of literary tastes, a graduate of Harvard. This man tells how after leaving the university he chose to spend a year as a working man in a coal-mine. Puzzled by his choice, Moore asks the reason. “In order to see life”, was the answer. This man spoke for the great majority of Americans—I do not speak of the gilded youth of the

East, of which I know nothing except that it has little influence on the millions who live between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. These millions are a great race of experimentalists with an immense enthusiasm and a faith in themselves and the future. They are too busy, too keen, to bother about abstractions, or to think of logic. They have a remarkable awareness of what is happening around them ; they have a strong imagination of what can happen to them in the future. They have all the qualities and defects of simplicity in its original sense of "one-fold", of living on one plane, of appreciating the concrete event. This explains many curious anomalies. It explains the thousand religions, sects, societies, which jostle one another and yet do not conflict. It explains the strange fact that lawlessness in certain matters, such as the violation of the drink laws, or political graft, does not breed a general spirit of disrespect for the law where it is helpful ; the respect of the American for traffic laws must cause all European motorists to blush for shame. It is a question of taking or leaving, as each thinks fit. So long as it does not give an impression of disparaging criticism, I would say that Americans are like children, filled with fancies, passing interests, and enthusiasms ; they are subject to their feelings, and, like many children, they have underneath their spontaneity a common purpose and a real intention of succeeding in whatever they undertake. Like children too, they have an uncanny way of getting hold of the facts and pursuing causes to the bitter end, hence their great advance and even scholarship in the subjects that really interest them : business, science, empirical psychology, medicine. Their literature is by no means to be despised, though More does not agree. Their poets and their novelists express with a sincerity that is a characteristic of all real literature an overpowering interest in phenomena, the thousand aspects of life, the thrill and misery of living. Here is material for the creation of a great literature, when they have the time and interest to compare and select and value. They have unconsciously created a turn of expression that makes their language a series of vividly concrete images.

It is now far better suited than ours to describe and convey to others events, actions, attitudes—in a word, the phenomenal. I shall never forget a wireless broadcast of a football match. The speaker unrolled, with an originality of expression and a nice sense of the exactly appropriate word, a string of images that would have improved the work of many a poet. I cannot refrain from quoting a gem : “Look at him picking up the ball in that crowd, as cool as an Esquimaux sitting on a block of ice !” and the only thing that prevented him from talking faster was want of breath.

One cannot help feeling that the problems of this vigorous and youthful race are not going to be solved by an abstract ethical Humanism. Nor are they going to be solved by certain of the academically minded, who are vainly trying to impose European culture on the American. This movement is strong, though it is, I think, resented, and rightly, by many. The effect of the “culture” is curious. The student is fascinated, but to him this culture is yet another fact of life. He wants to learn culture as he learns chemistry. When he finds that culture is not a fact that has meaning in his life, he forgets all about it. It does not occur to him that culture is not learning somebody else’s valuation, but learning how to value for oneself. Naturally, for in terms of what has meaning for him he has a very shrewd, if deplorable, sense of values. Lately an attempt to spread culture was made in the Universities. It consisted of setting to all Universities who would take it a long “cultural” examination, which was in fact an elaborate general knowledge test. Great was the indignation of the students, but greater that of the teachers. This has nothing to do with culture, they protested. And yet, were they justified ? Culture cannot be taught or tested in examination, but general knowledge can ; and even if general knowledge does not make a cultured person, it is a better prolegomenon to culture than imposing values culled from people who live in different conditions. The American is not yet ready for any superimposed syntheses of other people’s views, however wise—he is himself only beginning to gather the material for his

own synthesis. More sneers at Dreiser, but Dreiser is making a real contribution to the future of America, while More is unread, unwanted.

I am very far from suggesting that much of the teaching of the new Humanism is not needed in the United States to-day. The Good and the Beautiful do not change, and there is a lack of both in the drab industrial civilization in which Americans seem content to live. But the very fact that they do not hate it or resent it in the way we do has to be considered. It is their first civilization, and they have faith in what it can lead to. This faith is genuine. It is the naïve optimism of youth. It is the opposite to the stoical attitude of Babbitt, which persuades itself that all cannot be lost. It is the faith of one who has not yet been deceived. Disillusionment may come; it may not be a long way off. But the world is still too full of mysteries and unexplored possibilities. In this respect America is in striking contrast to Europe. We have become so "cultured", our standards and values are so thought out, that we rather die than endure a change of status. Each person has his pride and his allotted place. An aristocracy of wealth replaces an aristocracy of land, and both will soon be replaced by an aristocracy of labour. The division of classes, though resented, is accepted. At any given time each class sets up its standard of what it ought to do, and it lives up to the standard. The labourer is every bit as proud as the aristocrat; he will not do a job below his dignity or outside his contract; he will not even ape the wealthy, because he persuades himself that he is proud of his status, and better than his social superiors. In America there is little of all that. No one thinks in terms of status at all; they think in terms of concrete facts, which at present are dollars. Everyone believes he can do what he has set out to do. He has his job, and it will lead him to fortune if he has ability and luck; if not, he will try again. Even unemployment is not primarily an injustice; it is hard luck. Times will change. Never was there a country of greater simplicity and less stoicism. Hence the queer mixture of good-fellowship, service, humanitarianism with callous-

ness and even cruelty. The job is the first thing. The employer sacrifices his men without compunction, but he is kind and generous to them personally, so long as it is not disadvantageous to be so. High wages are not merely enlightened economic selfishness, they are the result of a real sense of brotherhood. But brotherhood comes after, not before, business.

And here, it seems, is the danger of trying to mitigate the crudities of American life by ethical Humanism. The great economic machine may come to spoil what is best in American character. It grows more and more powerful, and less and less human, while it is often very inefficient, as at the present day. The good-fellowship and humanitarianism which has been inherited from the times when wealth was abundant and scope for work and enterprise enormous, may be strained. There are many who say that it already is. What chance has an abstract ethics, an abstract taste, of resisting an increase of callousness and cruelty, a growth of resentment in those who have begun to realize that their chance may never come again? Humanism looks to the past, to the order that has allowed itself in Europe as well as in America to drift into these great social difficulties. Moreover, Humanism, while denying or at least implying a denial of any religious faith that can make hardship and suffering acceptable to the disillusioned, defends the *status quo*. One intelligent American critic told me that he thought Babbitt's work was a disguised defence of the rich employer. This seemed an exaggeration, but it is one aspect of a Humanism that is taught by men who at times seem to sneer at the *nouveau riche* and at the whole of the West.

The future of America is a mystery. It may solve its own problems, economic and cultural, in its own way, as other young nations have done in the past. It may, under pressure of economic depression, disintegrate into a selfish and callous individualism, in which each will fight for himself and lose his present faith in the simple values of "service" and philanthropy. It may continue along the path of what is in effect another form of communism. The "Humanist" is not correct in suggest-

ing that the American is losing consciousness of his own soul; the truth is that he has never had time and inclination to worry about it. The inequality of wealth is so great, the spending of money so rapid, the value of standards of wealth so uncertain, the future so precarious for any individual, the risk of either highly paid employment or penniless unemployment so constant, that one is led to ask oneself whether the great majority of the population still possess private property as understood by the Popes in their social encyclicals. There is no great difference in effect between an economic system where the State distributes the income of the country according to its whim, and a system where that income is consumed from day to day by a people who receive it in portions that bear little visible relation to the social value of their work. In both cases there is little chance of the individual building up his character and personality through the ownership and control of a secure share of material goods. Unfortunately, the American character is as much to blame as the economic system. The childlike character has its defects: it does not understand the nature of growth, it does not realize that continuity is as important as change, that the past and the future are as much realities as the present moment. The American does not wish to exercise the highest human prerogative, free choice, because he will not wait for its conditions, time and continuity. The "Humanists" assert that this is due to America's spiritual leaders, the writers, the poets, the educators, the scientists, the social reformers; the leaders answer that it is the inevitable result of the prevalent economic conditions. Obviously there is truth in both views. To the outsider, who can take a disinterested point of view, it appears to be the inevitable result of a hundred years of prosperous pioneering. A certain discomfort is a necessary condition for spiritual reflection; a sense of want is a condition for the discrimination of values. As a nation America has never been uncomfortable nor in need. We have seen the advantages of such a position, but it must mean that she has yet to pay the price of the culture about which she is so curious. It may be that the first instalments are being

paid to-day. No one expects a vigorous growing schoolboy to be a mature philosopher, but the health and strength built up during the early years need be no bar to the growth of wisdom in later years ; they may prove to be a counterweight to the morbidity which the over-use of the mental faculties seems to generate. When the adventure of mere living begins to pall, and a divine discontent troubles the citizens of the United States, they will be none the worse for their well-nourished, healthy, and simple upbringing. The doctors of Humanism are a little before their time to-day ; maybe when they return, America will have “humanised” herself and in her own way. It is the only way.

MICHAEL DE LA BÉDOYÈRE.

ART. 2.—THE GROTTO CHAPELS OF SOUTH ITALY.

1. Dom Cuthbert Butler, "Lausiac History of Palladius" (in *Texts and Studies*, vol. vi, ed.: Armitage Robinson).
2. Rufinus, *Historia Monachorum* (Migne P. L., vol. xxi.) Migne P. G., vol. cxiv, 1375-1436.
3. Cardinal Pitra, *Hymnographie de l'Eglise Grecque*.

THE birthplace of Christianity was a cave in the East. Monasteries, too, began in the East, and it is in caves and desert places that we first find them. There is a mass of tradition, doubtless more or less authentic, about the monks and hermits of the first centuries, but the earliest historical records which we have of their life are in the writings of Palladius and Rufinus.

About A.D. 420 Palladius, Bishop of Helenopolis, wrote in Greek the Lausiac History, so called because it was written at the request of Lausus, a man of high rank in Constantinople. Palladius was born about 364, and lived the life of a monk first with Isidore, who acted as Secretary to the Hospital of Alexandria and had lived at Nitria. But in search of a stricter life he went and took up his abode with a certain Dorotheos, who had been a disciple of St. Anthony, and according to the precept and example of that Father never slept lying down. But the life with Dorotheos was too strenuous for him, and he returned to Isidore, spending the greater part of his time, however, in travelling about among the lauras and hermitages of Egypt, Palestine, and Asia Minor. He is said to have visited 2,000 monks. He was acquainted with Nitria, called the home of Christian monasticism (for we must not forget that there were monks in the East before Christianity), and Mount Tabenna, where the monks lived under the rule of St. Pachomius. He was a friend of St. John Chrysostom, as well as of that remarkable and saintly woman Melania the Elder, who was also the friend and travelling companion of Rufinus.

Rufinus, who wrote the *Historia Monachorum*, was a friend of St. Jerome, with whom, however, he afterwards quarrelled. His work exists in Latin, Greek, and Syriac, and is kindred to the Lausiac History.

From the writings of Palladius and Rufinus we gather that the monastic communities of their time were spiritual democracies, very loosely bound together. The monks lived in huts or caves generally grouped together into lauras, and met on Saturday to say their Office in common. On Sunday they met for Mass, but on other days one passing by their cells would hear them reading their Office in solitude.

"We came", says Rufinus, speaking of one of his visits to the Egyptian Desert (he was twice there—once in 374 and again in 385), "to the famous Monastery of Nitria, where there were about fifty tabernacles, in some of which several monks lived together, in others a few, and in some a solitary monk. . . . But beyond this, further in the desert, there is a place which on account of the multitude of cells scattered in the desert is known as Cellia. So vast is this desert, and so widely scattered are the cells, that the solitaries neither see one another nor can the sound of converse be heard."*

The monastic life of the Desert of Egypt, if it did not begin with the Decian persecution of 256, was largely augmented by it. Probably this and successive persecutions gave the same impetus to the eremitic life of the monks of Sicily, Calabria, and the Basilicata.

We have no historical proof of the existence of very early monastic caves and lauras in Sicily and Calabria beyond the fact that when the later solitaries found their way to these solitudes they always found evidence of monastic settlements earlier than their own. There is a mass of tradition, such as that of third century hermits on Mount Etna and of such early saints as St. Maurus, who in the fourth century is said to have established himself in a cave where still the old chapel of St. Mauro stands, close to Gallipoli.

All we know of the kind of life led by these monks we must infer from the life led by their brethren of the East. They were all liturgists. The Office said alone or in company took up a great part of their time, and from the fourth century there seem to have been two schools of liturgists—one that of the ancient anchorites of the

* Rufinus, *Historia Monachorum*; ch : xxii.

deserts, who recited psalms interspersed with spaces for silent prayer; and the other, that newer school which began with St. Basil, which interpolated the psalms with versicles and tropaia, and with which began all the charm of antiphonal singing.

We have several descriptions of these liturgical modes. In the year 390 Cassian* betook himself to Egypt to perfect himself in the monastic life. Twenty years later, in the Monastery of St. Victor at Marseilles, he describes the life of the Fathers of the Desert amongst whom he had lived while there.

Among the Egyptian monks, he says, twelve psalms are recited at the Evening Office and twelve at the Night Office. After the psalms follow two lections, one from the Old Testament and the other from the New. If two brothers are present each recites six psalms; if three, each recites four; if four, each recites three. The other monks, if any are present, listen seated on low stools. At the end of each psalm, or sometimes after a few verses, the hegoumenos gives a signal; all rise and stand silent, then prostrate themselves, rise and continue their prayer.

By the anchorites the Psalter was used as a method of contemplation. One of them, the Abbot Isaac, says that the use of the psalms is the means of arriving at the highest perfection of prayer, when the soul is occupied with no image nor with any phantom, when it uses no words but allows itself to be carried away into ardours and movements which cannot be expressed, when it is carried outside sense and all visible things and offers up to God only sighs and groanings which cannot be uttered.

The other mode of reciting the office, however, appealed strongly to the young, and drew to the cells of those who used it a crowd of laymen who wished to recite it with them.

In the life of St. Auxentius† the hymnologist, a monk of Chalcedon, we find this mode described. Auxentius was born in Syria; he went to Constantinople in the time of Theodosius the Younger and took service in the

* *Johannis Cassiani de Coenobiorum Institutis*, Lib. i-iii. Migne P.L. 49.

† Migne P.G. cxiv. 1375-1436.

Cohors Scholaris. He combined his military service with a life of rigid asceticism, and chose for his companions three men who afterwards, equally with himself, embraced the monastic life—John the Monk, Marcian, afterwards honoured as a saint, and Anthimus, who became a priest. These four met in the ruined church of St. Irene on the vigil of feasts and passed the night in fasting, prayer and song. Men and women joined them, and they formed choirs under the superintendence of Auxentius for the singing of the Office and “holy hymns”. Some years later Auxentius had renounced the career of arms and shut himself into a cell on a solitary mountain near Chalcedon. Multitudes of people had recourse to him. He appeared at the window of his cell and bade them renounce the fevered joys of the town with its dances and spectacles and give themselves up to the pure joys of sacred psalmody which he taught them. Some fragments of the chants which the anchorite composed and which he and the people sang together in the silence of the night on that lonely mountain-side are still preserved to us.*

St. Basil, in his treatise on the Holy Spirit, speaks of the joys of the early Church, of nights of prayer and holy psalmody in which the whole congregation took part. We find the same spirit in the well-known description by the Abbess Egeria† of her visit to the Holy Land.

That this divergence between the two methods of saying the Office continued to exercise the minds of liturgists for some centuries is shown by a story told by Cardinal Pitra, in his *Hymnographie Grecque*, of two monks, John of Moschus and Sophronius of Damas, who lived in the sixth and seventh centuries. He says that they had gone to Mount Sinai to visit the Abbot Nilos, who lived at the top of the mountain with two of his disciples. At the hour of Vespers (the *Hesperinos*) Nilos began the *Doxa*.† They all recited the psalms, but they used no tropaia. They sang the φῶς ιλαρόν

* Cardinal Pitra : *Hymnographie de l'Eglise Grecque*.

† *S. Silvia Peregrina*, edited by Gamurrini. Rome, 1887.

↓ The “Gloria Patri”.

(Hail, gladdening Light); then the prayer "Vouchsafe, O Lord, to keep us this night without sin"; then the Song of Simeon. Then came supper followed by Night Office—now the *Apodeipnon* or Office of Compline. This consisted, first, of the *Hexapsalmos** and the "Our Father". This was followed by the first station, so called, of fifty psalms. After which the monks sat down and one of the disciples read the Epistle of St. James. This was followed by the second station of fifty psalms, and then another disciple read the Epistle of St. Peter.

Then the remaining fifty psalms were recited. Afterwards the Abbot passed on the Book to John of Moschus, who read the Epistle of St. John.

After this began the nine canticles of the Office of Orthros (Lauds), recited without tropaia, the three psalms called *alvai* (148, 149, 150)—so called because they all begin in Greek with "*αἰνέτε*", "Praise ye".

They recited the Creed, the Pater Noster and the Gloria in Excelsis and Kyrie Eleison. The Abbot said: "Son and Word of God, Jesus Christ our God, have pity on us, help us and save us", and they parted.

Now the two visitors criticized this Office, saying to the Abbot: "Why do you not observe the rule of the Church Catholic and Apostolic?" And the Abbot replied: "Whosoever does not observe the ordinances of the Church Catholic and Apostolic let him be anathema now and for ever."

Then John pointed out various tropaia, antiphons, hymns and versicles which were in general use in the Office, and which these anchorites of the desert did not use; such as the tropaia of the *κύριε ἐκέκραξα*, the canticle of the Three Children, and the *πᾶσα πνόη*, the antiphon to the Magnificat, and many others.

Cardinal Pitra also tells a story of a young man coming to a monastic laura from the city of Cæsarea and accustomed to the chants and antiphonal singing which, from the time of St. Basil, had been in use there, who begged the head of his laura to let him have a separate cell where he could say his Office after the manner he had learnt in the city, because the old man with whom he shared the cell

* Psalms 4, 6, 12, 24, 30, 90.

would have none of it, and the feasts which had hitherto been made joyous with melody had become fasts for him.

The method of antiphonal singing spread to Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, Jerusalem and the whole East, as well as to Italy. It was this psalmody which arose from those churches of Rome, such as Sta Prassede and San Silvestro in Capite, where the bodies of many holy martyrs rested, and where, says the *Liber Pontificalis*, the Popes placed Greek monks that "perpetual psalmody might rise over them day and night". It was this psalmody, too, which echoed through the mountains and ravines of Calabria and the Basilicata where the saints whose names are to-day but names lived their lives of prayer and work and love.

It is not till the ninth century that we have any authentic records of the lives of the monks of South Italy. The acts of the martyrs we have, but between the fourth and the ninth centuries there is a lacuna.

Then, born in 824, we have St. Elias the Younger, of whom there was a Greek Life in the Library of St. Salvatore in Messina. Also St. Fantinus, who died in 903, of whom there is a Greek Life in the Ambrosian Library in Milan; St. Saba with St. Christopher and St. Marcarius, of whom there are Greek Lives in the Vatican Library; St. Vitalis, whose Life was written by an almost contemporary Greek and translated into Latin in 1094 (about a hundred years after his death). His lections were read in the Office of the Church of Armentum in the Basilicata, where his body was preserved. Then we have St. Luke of Armentum, founder of the Monastery of Carbone; St. Elias Speleotes, founder of the famous Cave-Monastery of Melicucca, and St. Nilos of Rossano, founder of Grottaferrata. Of some of these we have very full lives, unfortunately for the most part in Latin, because the Greek Lives have been lost.

One of them, St. Elias Speleotes,* surnamed the Thaumaturgus, was born at Reggio, of rich parents. At the age of eighteen he joined himself to Arsenius, a famous hermit who dwelt in a cave near Reggio. A Saracen

* See A.S.S. Scpt. iii. 848-87.

invasion drove the monastic company from Italy, and they lived for eight years at Patras on the Gulf of Corinth. On their return to Italy Arsenius died, and Elias, having heard of another hermit, by name Daniel, who lived near Seminara, betook himself thither.

He set out fasting and on foot, and arrived towards evening at Salinae, where Daniel was, hard pressed by thirst, for the weather was hot. When, therefore, the monk who guarded the enclosure gave notice that a stranger approached, Daniel bade the gate be closed, saying to the stranger : "Stay thou there, for thou art not worthy to come in hither." So Elias sat him down under a rock to rest. At sunset there was sent to him a small portion of bread and a little water, which he received thankfully, as unworthy of even that. So when he had been tried, Daniel, with a joyful countenance, appeared before him and embraced him, saying : "Now I know that thou art a true monk and a worthy follower of our great Arsenius." Then they fell to talking of the salvation of the soul and of the future rewards of the saints, until Daniel exhorted his friend to repose after his long and toilsome journey. But the Saint devoted the time while he was alone to the saying of the night psalms, according to his custom. While he was thus engaged he heard the sound of the wooden clapper which called the monks to Night Office, wherefore he joined with the rest. Now when the first psalms were said and it was time for the lection, Daniel, overcome with sleep, bethought himself to leave the chapel quietly for a rest. But Elias, seeing this, seized him by the arm, saying, "Brother, do not yield to the spirit of sloth ; stand with me and strive till the morning hour, for the Kingdom of Heaven is to the violent."

So Elias took up his abode with Daniel. Soon, however, he began to long for solitude, and with two disciples, Cosmas and Vitalis, departed to a place of which Cosmas had had a vision. He seemed in his vision to come to a great country of rocks, bare and desert, covered with little tabernacles each with its monk, and from them rose a murmur of monks reciting their psalms and praising God. And in the midst of them all stood Elias, shining

like a clear star. Awakening from his sleep, he said, "Arise, Brethren, let us depart." So they departed and came to the place which is now Mount Elias, and there Elias and his brethren abode in a cave. The place was steep and difficult to approach, but multitudes of men began to arrive there, and Elias received all who came who were worthy of the habit, and the number was so great that the place became too strait for them. But one day Cosmas saw a crowd of bats coming out from a narrow place in the rock, and they understood by that that the mountain was hollow. Lighting a torch, he with difficulty got through a narrow opening and there found himself in a vast cave, great and spacious in length and depth and height. Elias, entering, praised God, and they made the cave fit for divine worship and also for habitation; and Cosmas made an opening towards the south so that the demons who had here their habitation might fly out and the sun might enter. He also made a salt-pit and a mill for grinding corn. This was the famous cave-monastery of Melicucca. Meanwhile Elias with great labour and sweat prepared materials and built an altar and dedicated the place of the altar to the great Archangel and to the holy Apostles, to whose aid he always had recourse. And from that place there arose without ceasing through the whole night praise to God and the sound of hymns and continual prayer. The monks recited the whole psalter each night, with all the hymns and lections of Vespers and the Canon (or Night Office) and Matins, as though they were in the very presence of God. Elias himself remained motionless throughout the Office save for the prostrations which he made from time to time. It was indeed as if he were rooted to the ground, so firmly did he stand, leaning neither on his stick nor on the wall. Nor did he stir even so much as an eyelid at the bite of a mosquito or other noxious insect. And from the Office he proceeded to the Mass, after which he remained in a contemplation so profound that his eyes seemed sunk into his head. All the day he occupied himself in working and receiving those who came to consult him from far and near.

This story seems to me of great value in the history

of our Greek monks. It describes very clearly the beginning of a cave-monastery. It shows, too, that the liturgy was said in the same way in the lauras of South Italy in the ninth century as it was in Egypt or Chalcedon or Cæsarea in the fourth and seventh centuries.

The life of St. Vitalis, who died in 994, is of singular interest. For a long time he had no fixed abode, but wandered about among the rocks of a pathless and uninhabited place, Castra Roseta on the Ionian Sea.

The place was infested with brigands and murderers, but he went in and out among them, and by his prayers and gentleness he converted many of them and induced them to renounce their evil life, so that he made that place no longer a terror to the district. Then he journeyed to the Basilicata and abode in a cave near St. Chirico, in the Raparo Mountains. Later on the famous monastery of St. Angelo de Raparo arose over this cave—a natural stalactite cave—which can still be seen under the half-ruined church. Here the wild animals came to him and, laying aside their savageness, licked his feet, and would not leave him without the grace of his blessing. And multitudes of birds sought the cave and filled the boughs of the trees around, begging with shrill voices and sweet songs for the blessing of this holy man; and he blessed them and said, "Now go and make room for the others." So they flew away, and their places were taken by others, and so on till all the birds of the mountain had received their blessing.

Around his cave a laura rose, and he rebuilt a ruined church to serve as a chapel, where he and his brethren said the Divine Office. And his fame spread far and wide.

Now in a village in the valley below was a certain woman of whom a neighbour had gone to borrow bread, and she swore with a great oath that she had no bread although her pan was full. "If I have," she said, "may you see a serpent on my neck." At supper-time she went to get bread from her pan, and a serpent came out from the pan and wound itself round her neck. And she went about with this serpent on her neck from the 8th of March to the 17th of May, for nothing could

loose it. No one could do her any good, and at last she was induced to go and implore the grace of St. Vitalis, and other women went with her. It was nightfall when they arrived, and St. Vitalis was in the lake, called still the lake of St. Vitalis, where he said the Night Office. So the women lay down to sleep in the porch of the church. When St. Vitalis returned to his cell at the hour of Matins and found the women sleeping on the ground he was angry with the monks, and said, "Why did you leave them out there all night? Wherefore did you not put them into your cells?" Then said the monks, "Far be it from us, Father, to disobey your holy command." Then St. Vitalis bade one of the monks conduct the women to his cell and light a fire for them and give them food, while he and the others went to Matins. So the women were refreshed and slept in the warmth. And the monk, seeing the serpent round the woman's neck, fetched a girdle of the Saint and laid it on the woman's neck, and the serpent straightway fell off and the sleeping woman knew nothing of it. And St. Vitalis, coming back from the chapel and seeing the serpent lying on the ground, knew that the woman was loosed from her torment and glorified God. And he sent them all back to their village with his blessing and with provisions for the day; but to the woman he gave a double portion, for, he said, "If any ask of thee by the way thou wilt have whereof to give them."

St. Vitalis ended his life in the cave of the Crocefisso on the hillside above Melfi, in 998. The cave where he died was used as a chapel, and is now beneath an ugly modern chapel to which the people of the countryside have ignorantly transferred the devotion which their forefathers bore to the cave which witnessed the departure of a saint on his last journey. The old grotto-chapel is a three-apse chapel, very tiny, which was like many others of those cave-chapels long used as an indiscriminate burying-place. In one apse can be seen figures which are evidently painted over older figures. Our Lord, in a magnificent red vesture, is seated and giving the Greek blessing, with St. Basil and St. Benedict on each side.

The whole of this district is full of cave-chapels. Supreme among them, on the top of Monte Vulture, is the Grotto of the Archangel—a great dark cave-chapel with frescoes, superimposed upon other and older frescoes, of the Madonna, the Archangel and St. John.

Monte Vulture is a mountain standing by itself above Melfi. It is an extinct volcano, and on the top in the old crater are two dark mysterious lakes. It was once a great laura and full of caves which one finds in unexpected and often inaccessible places. Bertaux saw several of these caves, but in a field by the roadside there is a very beautiful one which he did not see. It lies off the high road as you begin the ascent to Monte Vulture, by the side of a field and behind a mass of low-growing bushes. You might walk along that road every day for years and not find it. Below it lies a green and fertile valley watered by the Melfi, and behind it rise the dark heights of the mountain. When we visited it the chestnuts and vines were beginning to come out on the lower slopes, the grass under the giant olives was bright with spring flowers, and the air was fragrant with their breath and joyous with the sound of bubbling streams. It was a warm spring evening, the sun was lowering to the west, and his beams entering into the cave lightened what otherwise would have been darkness. They fell upon a chapel full of colour—walls, pillars and roof covered with frescoes, many darkened with age and smoke, some destroyed, but the effect as we entered was one of subdued grandeur. The nave is about twelve metres in length, ending in a stone altar coloured a beautiful deep red, with traces of ancient decoration still clinging to it. Four niches open off the nave, and at the end, near the high altar, is a tiny room with a stone seat for the custodian. The cave was probably the chapel of a laura, for there are caves in the rock all round about where monks might have lived. The frescoes, however, date from after the Norman occupation ; they are of the eleventh and twelfth, one or two of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but underneath there are traces of much older ones.*

Evidently the chapel was used later as a chapel of the Latin rite.

On the roof, extending throughout its whole length, is a magnificent colossal figure of the "Christos Pantocrator", seated on a throne upon a richly embroidered cushion. His tunic is of a deep rich red, and His mantle of white. In His hand He holds an open book of the Gospels whereon can be read "Ego sum Lux Mundi", and with His right hand He gives the Greek blessing. On the right of the entrance is a beautiful figure of Saint Michael, the Archangel in the dress of a Byzantine warrior. This figure is one of the most imposing in the chapel. In his left hand the Angel holds the globe; with his right he drives his lance into the Dragon at his feet. His hair falls on his neck in the little ringlets peculiar to Byzantine art. His nimbus is adorned with pearls. He wears the girdle and jewelled stole of the Byzantine Angel, and his hands are peculiarly fine and delicate.

Beside Saint Michael on the left stands Saint Margaret. Her face is destroyed, but her gemmed nimbus is still visible, and her left hand is stretched out to the Angel.

On the right is Saint John the Baptist, bearded, with his two hands outstretched in the same direction toward the great seated Christ, who is giving the Greek blessing with His right hand, while with His left foot He holds on His knees an open Gospel. On the same wall as the Christ, but lower down near the entrance, is another figure of Saint Michael, after the same pattern as the first, and beside him is a beautiful seated figure of the Madonna and Child. Our Lady's mantle, of a deep grey, wraps her head and shoulders. Her dark-red robe falls to her sandalled feet. Her brow is low, her eyebrows dark and straight. One beautiful hand with its long slender fingers lies on her breast; with the other she makes a throne for the Child, whose hand, disproportionately large, is held towards her in the gesture of a Greek blessing. His face looks out from beneath its halo with the strange look of age characteristic of the Byzantine art of the twelfth century.

Facing the entrance, over the principal altar, a great central arch displays the symbols of the Four Evangelists, with the figure of Christ in the midst, on medallions. These medallions are probably late twelfth-century work.

On the right, underneath the medallions, is a beautiful figure of Saint Nicholas of Myra. He has a delicate face, and his nimbus is surrounded with pearls. Over his vesture is the episcopal stole; he is giving the Greek blessing with his right hand, while in his left is a closed book. Beneath the arch is the titular saint of the chapel, Saint Margaret, with Saint Peter on her right hand and Saint Paul on her left. The figure of Saint Paul is scarcely discernible, but that of Saint Peter is very fine. His face is solemn and dignified. His red mantle is in the many folds of the Roman toga. His hair is white and his beard short, and he is giving the Greek blessing with his right hand. From the closed book in his left hand hang two keys.

Many of the frescoes of this chapel belong to that short and artificial, but very interesting period of Byzantine art in Italy which began after the Council of Melfi in 1059, when the Norman warriors, quick, with the marvellous versatility of their race, to seize upon the valuable equipment of those they conquered, constituted themselves the protectors of the Greek rite, the benefactors of Greek monasteries, and the patrons of Byzantine art in Italy.

But far richer than any other part of Italy in the remains of these cave-chapels is the flat, rocky peninsula known as the Terra d'Otranto, which lies south of a line extending from Brindisi to Taranto. Its rock formation is of calcareous tufa, which is never more than lightly covered with earth, and sometimes not covered at all. It is traversed everywhere by ravines, generally shallow, but sometimes deep and precipitous, which were probably formed by streams which in the winter rushed in torrents to the Ionian Sea.

These ravines are full of caves, some natural, others made perhaps in the first instance by prehistoric man, but afterwards adapted to their use by monks and hermits.

In many cases, as at Matera, there seems to be some evidence that they were the homes of the troglodyte people, such as Strabo mentions as having dwellings at Moesia, south of the Danube. There are traces, also, of them at Monte Gargano, and Professor Orsi thinks that

they had their dwellings near Syracuse in caves which were afterwards used by the monks.

The Terra d'Otranto was the most Byzantine part of all Byzantine Italy. Here the Byzantine influence lasted longer than anywhere else. Many parts of it were Greek in language and in rite long after the rest of South Italy had been completely latinized. Now, however, the great monasteries of the Greek rite, which, enriched by Norman money and fostered by Norman influence, long survived the Byzantine domination, have fallen into almost complete ruin. Far fewer traces remain of them than of the rough caves and frescoed chapels which are centuries older than they.

At Taranto not a trace is left of the great Monastery of St. Peter Imperialis magnificently restored by Nicophoras Phocas, which was so called because it was subject only to the Basileus, and was, like the great monasteries of Constantinople, a veritable city. But in the country round, at Lizzano, Pulsano, Gravina, Matera, the caves of the monks who lived there long before the monastery walls were raised still surround the rock-chapels they cut and frescoed. St. Andrea of Brindisi has all but vanished, though Brindisi was so strong a centre of Byzantine influence that its inhabitants demanded a Greek notary from Charles of Anjou because so few of its inhabitants understood Latin.

But the frescoed chapel of St. Lucia at Brindisi and the Lauras of St. Giovanni Battista and St. Biaggio, so called from the chapels in their midst, remain to this day.

The Laura of St. Giovanni Battista is, like so many others in the Terra d'Otranto, completely underground. It consists of caves where the monks lived, a large cave perhaps used as a refectory, and a small frescoed chapel.

The little chapel is about seven metres long, five wide, and two and a half high. A great pillar of tufa in the midst supports it. It has three tiny apses, in one of which is the Christ with the Madonna on His right hand and Saint John the Baptist on His left—the group known as the *Diésis*. The drawing of the figures is not beautiful, and the colours have faded. The Baptist wears over his garment of skin the orarium or stole

mentioned by the Emperor Basil in his *Menologium* of the ninth century as worn by priests in all ecclesiastical functions. It is a straight piece of cloth covering the shoulders and fastened with a knot or brooch. It is peculiarly Eastern, and bears some resemblance to the praying-shawl still worn by the Jews. On the south wall is a beautiful Madonna holding in her hand a globe, on which are the Greek M and Θ, and below a Π, perhaps standing for *Pantocrator*. Beside her is Saint John the Baptist clothed in tunic and pallium, like the figure in the Chapel of Saint Venanzio in the Lateran, which dates from the seventh century. The third figure is that of Saint Clement, which bears the legend of "Clemens R.P.". He wears a curious tiara with two horns like that of the Hebrew high priest. Tarentini, the learned Archdeacon of Brindisi, who seems to have known of this cave in 1878, says that this headdress was worn by bishops to whom the Western Emperor had granted the right of coining money, and is taken to imply the possession of the temporal power by the Roman Pontiff !

A little further off is the Laura of Saint Biaggio. The cave-chapel of this laura was visited by Bertaux, who has much to say about it. Millet also speaks of it in his *Recherches sur l'Iconographie de l'Evangile*. The structure of the laura and the pictures of the chapel are Syrian in character.

The ground on which is the Laura of Saint Biaggio belongs to a tobacco-grower. It is situated on one side of a little valley cut in the tufa rock. The first and largest opening is the entrance to the chapel. To the left of it are five other caves, one with six sleeping-places, another with one, another with three, and another with five. There are rough seats in some of them, and a hole blackened with smoke where evidently a fire was lighted.

But further on, cut in the rock, no longer in a cave, but in the open air, are several rounded cavities which look like mangers. Some of them are just under a jutting ledge of rock which might have formed a shelter from heavy rain, but some are without any kind of protection. These were the sleeping-places of the monks

who were followers of Saint Anthony, whose custom was not to sleep stretched out. Even these mangers were a concession to human weakness, for the more austere did not lie down at all, but snatched a little sleep in their seats in the intervals of prayer and study, except in case of sickness and extreme old age. We counted nine of such sleeping-places, and evidently there had been others where the soft rock was broken away. It seems as though this laura had been the habitation of both Syrian and Hellenistic monks; for the Hellenists used the straight sleeping-places.

The chapel is frescoed. The entrance is rounded with a high step, and looks to the west. It is about twelve metres long, five wide, and two and a half high. It is rectangular, and all around the walls towards the east there is a long low seat cut in the rock. The cave was evidently used as a chapel in modern times, for above the altar are three modern figures, apparently those of Saint Nicholas, Saint Biaggio and perhaps Saint Peter Damiano. The chapel was evidently completely covered with frescoes, but many have entirely disappeared and many are scarcely discernible or quite unrecognizable. Tarentini says that it used to be a favourite occupation of the people to use the heads of the frescoes for rifle practice. Probably, too, a good many of the figures have been wilfully destroyed with the hope of finding treasure behind them.

The frescoes we see now bear evidence of having been recopied from or substituted for much older ones. As always, fragments of earlier colour can be seen underneath the present work. From the reproductions given by Père de Jephania and by Millet of the caves of Cappadocia, and from the observations made thereon by Monsieur Mâle, the Director of the French school in Rome, it seems probable that some of these pictures are the work of artists from Cappadocia in the twelfth century.

The most striking of the frescoes is the great Ancient of Days. It is on the roof, in the midst of a representation of the visions of Isaiah, Ezekiel and Daniel. Around the central figure are the symbols of the Evangel-

ists, and at each corner is an angel. All around the majestic figure with its white beard and hair are stars, and the Greek legend, ὁ παλαῖος τῶν ἡμερῶν, appears written beside him. He is girded, as in the vision of Daniel, and His right hand is raised in the Greek blessing. In His left He holds an open Book with the words: ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἀμπελος, ὁ πατηρ μου ὁ γεωργος. In the corner stands an Angel with veiled hands.

On the roof also are represented the Annunciation and four scenes from the Life of Our Lord—the Nativity, the Flight into Egypt, the Presentation, and Christ entering Jerusalem.

All of these bear traces of Syrian influence. The Flight into Egypt represents the Child on the shoulder of Saint Joseph, and the ass led by Saint James the Less (his name is written beside him), while an Angel with a staff conducts the party. The story is taken from the apocryphal Syrian Gospel of the Childhood, as is also the fresco of the Nativity. Unfortunately it is much destroyed. Our Lady is sitting in an attitude of great weariness, her head leaning on her left hand. The other, holding a handkerchief, lies heavily on her lap. Below her the nurses are bathing the Child, and on the left are the shepherds to whom the angels are announcing the birth. A little way off sits Saint Joseph. His head also rests on his hand in an attitude of sympathetic dejection, and on the right advance the Magi on horseback in great excitement and with uplifted hands. Two of them, Melchior and Caspar, are represented full size, but for Balthazar, the third, there was apparently no room, so he is to be seen below as a tiny, almost indiscernible figure.

Of the Monastery of St. Mauro of Gallipoli, one of the richest monasteries in this part of Italy, there remains but a tiny chapel on the hillside overlooking the sea. But it was evidently surrounded with lauras. The chapel of one of these, St. Salvatore, is now one of the outhouses of a farmhouse. A part of its iconostasis can be seen, and in the little apse over the place where the altar stood is a beautiful diēsis—that most ancient Christian symbol of intercession, consisting of our Lord

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enthroned as judge with St. John the Baptist and the Madonna on either side as intercessors, one for the Old World, the other for the New.

But of all the Greek monasteries none was so famous for its power, its wealth and its learning as that of St. Nicolas of Casola, which now is reduced to a broken arch in the outbuildings of one of the filthiest farmhouses I ever saw. St. Nicolas was built for the monks with Norman money. It possessed a library celebrated far and wide, whose books were lent, as can be seen from the entries made in the margin of its famous *Typikon*, to the monastic settlements far and near. Amongst these entries there is a note of books lent to the monks of Poggiardo, now a small country-town about twenty kilometres from Otranto. Up till a few months ago there was no trace of any monastic settlement at Poggiardo, but quite recently the workmen, in putting drains—which it had never before possessed—into the town, came upon a stone cavity, which was afterwards found to be a chapel, cut in the rock and frescoed all over.

We found it all dug out but full of filth, for it is in the main street and open to the weather and to all the rubbish which the villagers like to throw into it. We spent some time cleaning the frescoes, and found in the central apse an exceedingly beautiful Madonna and Child. In the apse on the right is Michael the Archangel with a spada, dressed as a Byzantine warrior, with, in the left-hand corner, a medallion bearing the inscription ΜΗΤ probably for Μιχαηλ πρωτοτοξευτος. On the left there is a long row of figures, amongst whom are St. Gregory Theologos, the famous St. Parasceve, and St. Peter. In the midst is Christ as Light of the World, bearing an open Book in which can be seen on one page, εν ειμι το φως, and on the other, λαονθει μοι μετε ορη. The colouring of these figures is exceedingly fine. The robes are richly embroidered. The hair is reddish, and the eyes a beautiful red-brown. The feet in their sandals are fine and delicate, and behind them there is a drapery in layers of colour—blue, red, yellow, red.

The chapel is about seven metres long and four wide. It is about seven feet high. There is no trace of an

entrance, which must have been by a rough rock staircase. The place was evidently built up and forgotten when the town grew up. There are indications of caves of habitation around. We saw some of the cellars of the houses in the neighbourhood, which bear traces of roughly cut crosses and holes for air and light, such as one finds in all these caves where the monks lived.

At Carpignano is another underground cave-chapel evidently belonging to a laura subject to St. Nicholas of Casola. There are several frescoes in this cave, two of especial interest. The earliest is a representation of an Annunciation with Christ enthroned between the Madonna and St. Gabriel. A Greek inscription under it says that it was painted in 959 by the painter Theophylactus for the salvation of the souls of the priest Leo and his wife and son. The fresco was evidently painted under Alexandrine influence, for the Christ is an exact copy of the Christ of the Cosmos, a sixth-century manuscript of Alexandria of which there is a seventh-century copy in the Vatican.

The soft face with its great eyes, the white lines to emphasize the high-lights, and the simplicity of the dress are as different as possible from the majestic rigidity of the Byzantine Christs with their rich vesture falling in heavy folds. On each side of the Christ there are the figures of the Annunciation. Mary is seated, and at the back of her throne is a Greek monograph. The standing angel over whom is written "Gabriel" in Greek characters is giving her the Greek blessing with his right hand; the other is hidden in the folds of his robe. He has a young, soft face, and the ends of his white fillet lie against his nimbus. Soft, too, and round, almost Coptic in character is the face of Mary, whose hand appears from under the embroidered edge of her heavy cloak holding a distaff.

The cave contains another Christ, painted in 1020 by an artist called Eustachios for a certain Hadrianos. This painter, if not a Greek himself, had studied in the school of Byzantium. His Christ is seated, richly clothed, His face stern and austere, His whole attitude rigid and unbending and majestic. The dress falls in

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long straight folds with a jewelled girdle and stole. His whole attitude is that of a judge. Here mystery and awe take the place of the benign gentleness of the Syrian Christ.

The Chapel of Carpignano is in good condition and owes its preservation to the fact that it is used as a chapel where Mass (the Latin Mass—one would wish it could have been the Greek) is said at least every Sunday. Thus it is sacred in the eyes of the people, who not only preserve it but solicit alms of the passers-by for its maintenance. But as a rule these cave-chapels are in the most deplorable condition, and unless something is done for their preservation their frescoes will soon entirely disappear.

GERTRUDE ROBINSON.

ART. 3.—GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS, S.J.

1. *Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins*. 2nd Edition. By Charles Williams. Oxford University Press, 1930.
2. *Gerard Manley Hopkins*. By G. F. Lahey, S.J. Oxford University Press, 1930.

FR. GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS, S.J., was born in 1844. "Both his parents (whom I knew)", writes William Addis, "were High Church of the Moderate School." His proficiency in the arts showed itself early. Whilst still a boy he used to compose songs and verses, and was, besides, sufficiently good at drawing to be encouraged to take it up as his profession.

"The Vision of Mermaids", which is one of the new poems most welcome in this second edition, was composed in his last year at Highgate Grammar School, and its success and beauty must have made clear to him that he had especial powers in the art of poetry. Besides a sensitiveness to beauty, he showed an equally remarkable strength of will, and these qualities were to combine wonderfully in his life as a grown man.

In 1862 Hopkins won a scholarship at Balliol. Robert Bridges was among his contemporaries, and they made friends for life. Pater Jowett and Riddell, Liddon and Pusey, were the dons whom he liked and who taught him. He called himself a Tractarian, thought and talked seriously with his friends about the spiritual problems which occurred. Besides composing poetry and reading widely in English, French, and German, he took a double first in "Greats". In after years Jowett wrote of him as "the star of Balliol", and as one of the finest Greek scholars he ever saw.

During his last year at Oxford, in 1866, he wrote to Newman asking to be received into the Church. Two years later he entered the noviceship of the Society of Jesus at Roehampton. He burnt nearly all the poetry he had written and wrote no more for some years. His journals continued, however, and his wonderful insights are fully set down.

In 1875, encouraged by some words of his superior,

he wrote the magnificent "Wreck of the *Deutschland*", of which Robert Bridges says that "it stands like a great dragon folded in the gate to forbid all entrance" to his work. In 1883, at Stonyhurst, he became friends with Coventry Patmore. Their letters, as also the correspondence with Canon Dixon, show well the fineness of Hopkins' character. He had a remarkable gift of compassion; his insight was clear and his judgment exact. He was courageous, enduring, and sensible.

In 1884 he was appointed to the chair of Greek at the Royal University, Dublin, and in 1889 died there at the age of forty-five of typhoid. In a consolatory letter to Bridges, Patmore writes : "Gerard Hopkins was the only orthodox and, as far as I could see, saintly man in whom religion had absolutely no narrowing effect upon his general opinions and sympathies. A Catholic of the most scrupulous strictness, he could nevertheless see the Holy Spirit in all goodness, truth, and beauty ; and there was something in all his words and manners which were at once a rebuke and an attraction to all who could only aspire to be like him."*

The appreciation of Hopkins' poetry has become more than the curious interest of literary scholarship appraising one last candidate who might have qualified for Victorian poet-hood. Indeed, the critic may well be discouraged from this way of scrutiny by the example of those with whom the attempt has usually ended in the safety-first admonition, "a poet's poet". It is with this phrase that the critic, on finding the work too exacting for his taste, has protected his own inadequate understanding against the prying of those outside his hastily drawn pentacle. Certainly Hopkins is exacting.

Brute beauty and valour and act, oh, air, pride, plume, here
 Buckle ! AND the fire that breaks from thee then, a
 billion
 Times told lovelier, more dangerous, O my chevalier !
 No wonder of it : shéer plód makes plough down sillion
 Shine, and blue-bleak embers, ah my dear,
 Fall, gall themselves, and gash gold-vermilion.

* G. F. Lahey, S.J., *Gerard Manley Hopkins*, p. 53.

But it is one of his most excellent qualities that he made poetry difficult at a time when it had become deadly easy.

Il y a trop peu d'écrivains obscurs en français ; ainsi nous nous habituons lâchement à n'aimer que des écritures aiseées et bientôt primaires.*

It was during the prevalence of a similar *lâcheté* in England that Hopkins was writing those "obscurities" and "oddities" which made his friend Robert Bridges so uneasy.

That shrewd observer, the late Sir Edmund Gosse, in an address delivered in 1913, in speaking of the Future of Poetry, said :

If we could read his [the modern poet's] verses which are still unwritten, I feel sure that we should consider them obscure. That is to say, we should find that in his anxiety not to repeat what has been said before him, and in his horror of the trite and the superficial, he will achieve effect and attach interest—*obscuris vera involvens*—wrapping the truth in darkness. . . . He will be tempted to draw farther and farther away from contact with the world. He will wrap his singing robes not over his limbs only, but over his face and treat his readers with exemplary disdain.

It is significant that what is in some ways a far-seeing forecast of poetry now, serves also as something of an explanation of Hopkins' poetry that had been written thirty years before. And it is, in fact, the poets of to-day, the heirs of this predicted obscurity, who are the natural companions of Hopkins. Much poetry, and his with it, has had to wait till our times for poets to justify and again insist upon the necessary quality of troubling the reader.

Poetry cannot be entirely the work of the poet. It must be or should be in part the conception of the reader.

For, as Mr. Sitwell goes on—recalling Ronsard :

* Rémy de Gourmont, *De Stéphane Mallarmé*.

Poetry is the conversation of Gods through the medium of Man.*

This is in considerable contrast, if not wholly irreconcilable, with the opinion of Dr. Hake, a critic respected at the time when Hopkins wrote, who says :

Poetry that is perfect poetry ought never to subject any tolerable intellect to the necessity of searching for its meaning.

Since Hopkins and the poetry of to-day have at least the charge of obscurity in common, it may be interesting so to consider them, that together they may make each other a little less strange.

Living poets have not remained untouched by the fitness of this association. The *Anthology of Twentieth-Century Poetry* includes as much Hopkins as T. S. Eliot, and, commenting on such an inclusion in his preface, Mr. Harold Monro says :

On the same lines, it might be argued that the magnificent Gerard Manley Hopkins should have no room. But chronology may now be dropped, he belonging temperamentally and technically to the Twentieth Century, not to the Nineteenth.

One aspect of this technical likeness may be illustrated by comparing the end of James Joyce's "Anna Livia Plurabelle" :

Can't hear with the waters of. The chittering waters of.
Flittering bats, fieldmice bawk talk. Ho ! Are you not gone
ahome ? What Tom Malone ? Can't hear with bawk of bats,
all the liffeying waters of . . . Night now ! Tell me, tell me,
tell me, elm ! Night night ! Telmetale of stem or stone.
Beside the rivering waters of, hitherandthithering waters of.
Night !

with, for instance, the sestet of Hopkins' sonnet, "Harry Ploughman" :

He leans to it, Harry bends, look. Back, elbow, and liquid
waist

In him, all quail to the wallowing o' the plough ; 's cheek
crimsons ; curls

* Osbert Sitwell, *Who Killed Cock Robin?* 1921.

Wag or crossbridle, in a wind lifted, windlaced—
 See his wind-lilylocks-laced ;
 Churlsgrace, too, child of Amansstrength, how it hangs
 or hurls
 Them—broad in bluffhicle his frowning feet lashed ! raced
 With, along them, cragiron under and cold furls—
 With-a-fountain's shining-shot furls.

Or with this from “The Wreck of the *Deutschland*” :

And the sea flint-flake, black-backed in the regular blow,
 Sitting Eastnortheast, in cursed quarter, the wind ;
 Wiry and white-fiery and whirlwind-swivelled snow
 Spins to the widow-making unchilding unfathering deeps.

Or :

What hours, O what black hours we have spent.

Or :

Sees the bevy of them, how the boys
 With dare and with downdolphinry and bellbright bodies
 huddling out,
 Are earthworld, airworld, waterworld thorough hurled, all
 by turn and turn about.

These will illustrate sufficiently Hopkins' technique, and the reader may see in them, too, other affinities with modern methods than this “Revolution of the Word” which is being formed into a doctrine around the body of James Joyce’s later work.

M. Paul Bourget * insists on a distinction between literature which is *actual* and literature which is *historical* : which implies, as Mr. Herbert Read says of this distinction, that for the existing state of affairs certain authors have no immediacy, no impelling influence, no sympathetic power. “We can learn from them, but we cannot be inspired by them.”† But Hopkins has immediacy. And this present edition of his poetry was followed shortly by two volumes, each by young poets, containing work avowedly in the manner of Hopkins which attracted notice. Thus Hopkins, who had pressed

* *Quelques Temoignages*, 1928.

† *Phases of English Poetry*, 1918. Preface, p. 1.

forward to our own day, can be questioned on the condition of poetry as he left it.

Poetry may present itself to the onlooker as an orderly pile of poets, the oldest at the bottom, a huge stack of dead bards shrouded in their dead language, touched into a glow when visited by the radiance of a scholar's learning. The distant top of this enormous pile, twitching it is true with an energy of its own, is just discernible to a hawk-eyed passer-by. This is the view of the pedant and also of the superior person who likes to wave to the twitchers on the hill-top. The extreme esoteric view, in fact.

Alternatively, poetry may seem scattered like flowers in a meadow waiting to be culled into posies or chaplets, hugged to the fluttering bosom and savoured beautifully as each communicates in secret its own personal fragrance. This is the extreme eclectic view. Its hierophants are always taking nips of "inspiration" to restore their sickly understanding.

Every reader or writer is in peril of one or other contagion. Hopkins should be a useful prophylactic.

Put him in the pile between Swinburne and Sir William Watson and his poetry works itself to the surface to kick about with Joyce, Eliot, and Lawrence. Spread him out in a meadow and his poems should stab the fingers of even the most horny-handed posy-seeker.

Mr. Charles Williams, in the preface to his excellent second edition of Bridges' original edition of 1918, makes a sensible distinction in saying :—

Other poets have sung *about* their intellectual exaltations; in none has the intellect itself been more the song than in Gerard Hopkins. In this he was unique among the Victorians.

And it is this quality which associates him naturally with poets to-day. Hopkins would have agreed with Rimbaud that "poetry will no longer sing of action; it will be in advance". "There will be such poets! . . ." Rimbaud goes on. Hopkins was one. And it is perhaps in this quality of being "in advance", this quality, not of celebrating, but of being itself the most extreme limit

of the consciousness of living, being "in advance" of life, that most surely links Hopkins to the Rimbaud succession and to its present developments.

Poetry "in advance" may not be easy. It must, however, be sincere. And we can learn from the notes in this edition how natural it was for him to write in this difficult manner. Mr. Williams has added examples of his early work which show that he could make fine use of traditional styles. Even when he was developing his later technique he could write, for instance, the poem "May Magnificat"; but this was not the poetry he wrote to please himself, and in comment on it Hopkins says, "A May piece in which I see little good." Of his sonnet in honour of St. Alphonsus Rodriguez, he says, "The sonnet (I say it snorting) aims at being intelligible."

Father Lahey's *Life of Gerard Manley Hopkins* —an *apéritif*—quotes enough of his letters to show that Hopkins was very far from desiring to make converts to any new school of experiment. He showed his work only to a small group of friends: Robert Bridges, Coventry Patmore and Canon Dixon. And one cannot but admire with what charm he preserved himself technically aloof from these poets and yet never lost sympathy with their writing in the least degree. His style was purely the outcome of his poetic sensibilities, and, in the nature of things, entirely above the suspicion of desiring to attract attention. It is characteristic that he stretched the sonnet form to its utmost rather than broke it, that he invented a new, though not a rebellious, system of prosody rather than denied prosodicality. And it is the inevitability of his new and strange phrases and the certainty that here at least is no literary humbug that compels the attention of the reader, who may feel the style a rebuff. For Hopkins is one who not so much turns his back upon but simply avoids the thinning ends of the Romantic and Humanist tradition. We know how this tradition persisted and how the *fin de siècle* æstheticism picked and chose as gauds for its pall what protruded obviously from symbolist Paris and what might have engendered in a purer air a new birth.

This persistence has meant that now there must be violent fracture, searching for formulas and theories, and express disgust with the old styles—exercises of which Hopkins had no need.

Mr. Herbert Read has put the matter thus :

The ballad poet is identical with the world he lives in. The humanist poet is the nucleus of his world, the focus of intelligence and intellectual progress. The religious poet lives at the periphery of his world—at the point where his world is in contact with the infinite universe. The romantic poet is his own universe ; the world for him is either rejected as unreal in favour of some phantom world, or is identified with the poet's own feelings. The four phases complete a cycle, beginning with the world as poet and ending with the poet as world. My presumption is that the typical modern poet is aware of the completion of this cycle, and as a consequence either despairs of his function, or is desperately anxious to find a way out of the state of eccentricity.*

The Pre-Raphaelites completed this cycle and brought poetry to a standstill. The problem with which they had to contend was that of a despiritualized Romanticism. They had heard with Arnold the withdrawing roar of the tide of Faith on Dover beach, but could take no notice, for example, of the "Bateau Ivre" that was to be launched upon it at the other side of the Channel. The philosophic structure that supported the social order had become so enfeebled that it could not house and preserve in its integrity what remained of the common æsthetic tradition of the Christian West, and from the point of view of the imposing façade it is fortunate that Art did, in fact, make no very intrepid sallies upon it. The least stirring of this ill-accommodated function was invariably felt to be an attack on the moral order. The scholastic tradition whereby Art tends towards the perfection of the thing done—*ad bonum operis*—and does not concern itself with the perfecting of the doer—*ad bonum operantis*—had been confused, together with the rest of the Christian philosophy.

The remedy of the Pre-Raphaelites was eventually a

* *Phases of English Poetry*, 1929, p. 131.

repose that tended to *rigor*. Their beauties are static beauties : they gravely sought to catch and fix transcendental ideas in needlework and tapestry, when those ideas had no clear definition in the minds of author or reader. The immediate effect of their work was to disperse a vague feeling of "moral good", and was inevitably taken to supply a deficiency existing in the moral order itself. Poetry had already taken on the virtues of Action. It had become "noble" and "wise". In this confusion, from which artists sought to extricate themselves, there was no alternative to what Lord Lytton called Swinburne's "naughtiness" but the religiosity of Christina Rossetti.

M. Maritain sums up by saying, "Art was sacrificed to Prudence in the nineteenth century [and] tended in 'right-thinking' circles solely to Respectability." *

His vocation and faith tended to set Hopkins apart from these perplexities. His natural perception was of a purity and keenness which one can compare with the original founts of romanticism. With Keats he might have written, "If a Sparrow comes before my Window, I take part in its existence and peck about the gravel." For him, as for Shelley, "life like a dome of many-coloured glass stains the white radiance of Eternity", but his faith allows him even more than a Wordsworthian delight in the consequent variegation of colour, for

Christ plays in ten thousand places.

And frequently a joy in this pied effect is found in his poetry :

Glory be to God for dappled things—

for

All things counter, original, spare, strange ;
 Whatever is fickle, freckled (who knows how ?)
 With swift, slow ; sweet, sour ; adazzle, dim ;
 He fathers-forth whose beauty is past change :
 Praise him.

* Jacques Maritain : *Art and Scholasticism*, p. 86.

Yet though he retrieved all the first romantics' keenness of perception, he knew there could be no copying their method of rendering this perception in art. Where Shelley writes :

Sound of vernal showers
On the twinkling grass,
Rain-awakened flowers,
All that ever was
Joyous, and clear, and fresh, thy music
Doth surpass.

Or Wordsworth :

Up with me ! Up with me, into the clouds !
For thy song, lark, is strong ;
Up with me, up with me, into the clouds !
Singing, singing,
With all the heavens about thee ringing.

Hopkins has :

Left hand, off land, I hear the lark ascend,
His rash-fresh re-winded new-skeined score
In crisps of curl off wild winch whirl, and pour
And pelt music, till none's to spill nor spend.

And aside from the mainstream of literary development he made a method fit for his own insight.

Among the new influences that tended to free art from its false position in the moral order was Pater's remark that all art aspires to the condition of music—a suspicious beckoning towards Symbolism.

He died on the eve of the nineties, when the half-success of Pater's invitation was beginning to intrigue the drawing-rooms of London. This success was, in fact, owing to the natural instinct for art to turn away from the didactic. The "decadents" gloried in the legend of their moral laxity in an attempt to discover and manifest the truth of Wilde's *mot*, "That a man is a poisoner is nothing against his prose style."

Music—and chiefly Wagner—was the way for Poetry to achieve independence. Verlaine had said, "Take eloquence and wring her neck—nothing but music and the *nuance*": indeed, as M. Paul Valéry says,

"Ce qui fut baptisé le Symbolisme se résume très simplement dans l'intention commune à plusieurs familles des poètes . . . de reprendre à la musique leur bien": le secret de ce mouvement n'est pas autre."

Music, so rarely explicit, runs a less risk of being thought immoral.

Music, it seems, can encourage poetry either to aspire to its condition or to concentrate on achieving a succession of effects in Pure Sound, each effect to be as exact a representation as possible of the object. Swinburne is an example of the successes and excesses of the first way.

I don't know what other poets do (he says), but this is what I do. For weeks I hammer out a melody in my head till I get a rhythm that satisfies me. I then fit words to it—any words—detached words—till I get the sound of vowels and consonants to my mind. And then I put words to it.*

Hopkins says of his writing "The Wreck of the *Deutschland*": "I had long had haunting my ear the echo of a new rhythm which now I realized on paper", but in the result there is no aspiring to the condition of music as in Swinburne; there is nothing "*mallarméen*" about this or anything Hopkins wrote. But there is a hitherto unachieved luxury of sound-effects. No poet in the English language has worked more satisfactorily in this field. His artistic sensibility, however, warned him off the more dangerous ground.

There is a sketch for a poem of Hopkins beginning :

TEEVO cheevo cheevio chee :
O where, what can that be ?
Weedio-weedio : there again !

and ending :

Through the velvety wind V-winged
 To the nest's nook I balance and buoy
 With a sweet joy of a sweet joy,
 Sweet, of a sweet, of a sweet joy
 Of a sweet—a sweet—sweet—joy

* Letter in *The Times Literary Supplement*, Jan. 8th, 1931.

that shows Steinish leanings. But Hopkins never finished this poem and goes no further down that road. This method, however, produced some extremely fine work, as can be seen from the quotations above. A good example can be taken from his sonnet "The Windhover".

I caught this morning morning's minion, kingdom of daylight's
dauphin, dapple-dawn-drawn Falcon, in his riding
Of the rolling level underneath him steady air, and striding
High there, how he rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing
In his ecstasy ! then off, off forth on swing,
As a skate's heel sweeps smooth on a bow-bend : the hurl and
gliding
Rebuffed the big wind. My heart in hiding
Stirred for a bird,—the achieve of, the mastery of the thing !

About 1884 his work, enormously enriched by technical experiment and discovery, becomes deeper and more certain. An example is the sonnet beginning :

Tom—garlanded with squat and surly steel
Tom ; then Tom's fallowbootfellow piles pick
By him and rips out rockfire homeforth—sturdy Dick

where this last line compresses both the sound and the sight of a gang of workmen going home, the nails of their boots striking fire from the flinty road. Yet this image dexterously serves the effect of the whole poem, which gives an insight clear into the happening itself.

There is less luxuriating in the use of Pure Sound. Corresponding with this change, it is in our present times, when music is no longer in its former iatric relation to poetry, that we are to look for a further statement in poetic theory in advance of Pater's dictum. It is to be found in the Abbé Brémont's discourse "Pure Poetry", delivered before the French Academy in October 1925.

His address ends with the words that all poetry aspires not to the condition of music but of prayer. In his book, consequent on the address, he presents the poet as a mystic *manqué*. The Abbé uses the word mystic to stress the importance he attached to the intuition.

It is the intuition—M. Claudel's “Anima”, Herr Wust's “Vernunft”—that is more constantly Hopkins' poetical material than anything else. “Such divination of the spiritual in the things of sense, which also will express itself in the things of sense, is what we properly call Poetry.” Here M. Maritain is speaking not only of art; the Abbé Bremond, too, is writing not so much about the art of poetry, but about that faculty of intuition of poets, also called poetry, by which they divine, perceive, are inspired. Hopkins puts it thus in his sonnet to Robert Bridges :

The fine delight that fathers thought ; the strong
 Spur, live and lancing like the blowpipe flame,
 Breathes once and, quenched faster than it came,
 Leaves yet the mind a mother of immortal song.
 Nine months she then, nay years, nine years she long
 Within her wears, bears, cares and combs the same :
 The widow of an insight lost she lives, with aim
 Now known and hand at work now never wrong.

This insight is what is important for Hopkins as a poet. He had written in 1879 :

But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern, or what I am in the habit of calling *inscape*, is what I above all aim at in poetry.

Hopkins' insistence on the perceptive faculty of “inseeing inscape” is most in accord with the work and discussion of T. E. Hulme and the imagists, to whom modern poetry owes so much. It was this group, followers of Bergson in his revolt against Descartes, that recovered and insisted on the faculty of intuition; who, in pressing further the symbolist doctrine, set the poet to render the image.

Hopkins agrees that the object for poetry is not the thing seen but the seeing of it. His poetry does not describe the thing or even describe the perception. But, in his way of speaking, poetry *inscribes* it. Poetry does not impart conceptual or rational knowledge, but “real” knowledge, “infused” wisdom.

Hopkins brings words together so that from their condition there may leap out whole and clear that "insight" which is the very essence of poetry. Of the ellipses, usage of strange words and spellings that may be necessary to this result, Mr. Robert Graves says :

. . . if the mood reaches a point in fantasia where grammar becomes frayed and snaps, then it can dispense with grammar. In structure it is Protean ; there is no architectural preconception ; the growth is organic. In imagery it is only bound by the preference of the individual author for imagery of a particular kind.*

It is the work of the original poet to pass sentence on what is trivial, trite, or lax, and to recall the reader to the elementary definitions of Poetry. It was some such task which confronted Blake coming at the end of the Age of Reason, who says :

When the sun rises, do you not see a round disc of fire somewhat like a guinea ? O no, no, I see an Innumerable company of the Heavenly host crying : "Holy, Holy, Holy, is the Lord God Almighty !" I question not my corporeal or vegetative eye any more than I would question a window concerning my Sight. I look through it and not with it.†

HARMAN GRISWOOD.

* *Another Future of Poetry.*

† Catalogue to an Exhibition, 1810.

ART. 4.—A CATHOLIC WRITER

WITH the death of "M. E. Francis" (Mrs. Francis Blundell, daughter of Michael James Sweetman, of Lamberton Park, Queen's Co.), which occurred on 9 March 1930, there passed away an Irishwoman who for thirty-eight years had maintained that standard of fiction-writing to which only a mind rich in natural capacity, and further endowed with the inspiration of the Catholic faith, could reach. Her compatriots may well be proud of the high literary success attained by her, and they should not forget that, while she preserved undimmed from her cradle to her grave that purity of mind which is so peculiarly a quality of her country, she persistently and valiantly held its reflexion before the public gaze in her writings, undismayed by the attitude of the modern world.

It was a volume of her short stories published under the title *In a North Country Village* by Messrs. Osgood, McIlvaine & Co., in 1893, that first obtained widespread recognition for M. E. Francis. In its pages she struck that note of truth in portraying members of the working-class without exaggeration and without sentimentality which readers and reviewers thereafter looked for in her work, and never failed to find. In the succeeding years many such volumes from her pen followed each other ; they dealt with the peasantry of her native land, with the farmers and cottagers of Lancashire, with the Dorset folk among whom she made her home between the years 1896 and 1909. When towards the end of her life she settled in Wales, she described that usually baffling people as convincingly as the friends of her earlier years.

Mrs. Blundell's power of making the sons and daughters of such widely different fields as to be essentially of different nationalities, stand forth so vigorously alive from her pages, lay not only in the Celtic imagination which enabled her to discern their problems and feel their pains and joys as though they were her own, but in that spiritual quality of her mind whereby she identified herself in the truest sense with her "neighbour". She had no sympathy with the school of writers who portray the working-man as necessarily coarse and habitually

immoral, but stoutly maintained that such characters existed in a minority. She was an idealist consciously and with purpose, an artist determined to show the best side of human nature.

The pure, sparkling humour of her Dorset novels, *Fiander's Widow*, *The Manor Farm*, *A Maid o' Dorset*, and of scenes in practically all her works, was always devoid of any hint of unkindness, while it roused the very spirit of laughter.

"It is not easy to describe the qualities which combine to make these tales peculiarly attractive," wrote *Punch*'s reviewer of the collection of short stories entitled *Simple Annals*, "but I can say without reservation that Mrs. Blundell is supreme among novelists of the present day in her sympathetic understanding of the lives of humble country folk. Humour is another of her gifts, but she does not use it to make her characters ridiculous; one laughs very often with them, but hardly ever at them. Here, for instance, one smiles at Granfer Sampson trying to re-enlist when he is nearly seventy, but the lasting impression is of pride in the old granfer's spirit. . . ."

The conclusion of the short story, "Father Pat", included in an earlier volume entitled *Frieze and Fustian*, affords an example of the simplicity and poignancy of Mrs. Blundell's art.

Pat Brophy was the only child of a very poor widow. It transpired that he had a vocation to the priesthood, and his mother gave him up with a glad and grateful heart when a friend of the parish priest undertook to educate him in England for the Liverpool diocese. She had not seen her son for many long, hard years, when she set out on foot to tramp from her home on a remote Irish countryside to Dublin, thence to cross over to Liverpool to be present at his first Mass. Father Shehan had with difficulty provided the money for her ticket on the boat. She had not warned Pat of her coming, lest his attention should be distracted on that supreme morning of his life.

"When the young priest was unvesting after Mass, there came a little tap at the sacristy door, a little

modest, tremulous tap, and a strangely familiar figure met his gaze.

"'Father Pat,' said Biddy in a choked voice, and dropping a shaky curtsy, 'I've come to ax your reverence if ye'll bless my babes for me, an'—an' will ye give meself yer bless—'

"She tried to sink on her knees, but the mother instinct was too strong for her, and with a sudden sob she flung her arms round his neck.

"'My boy !' she cried. 'Sure it's me that must bless ye first !'"

Mrs. Blundell's aim throughout her literary career was to uphold the principles of the Catholic Church while writing for the general public ; she believed that good could be done by setting high ideals before the fiction reader ; she strove, without insistence and without sententiousness, to provide an antidote to the immense volume of fiction which deliberately sets out to attract curiosity and interest by its direct appeal to the baser side of human nature. She condemned that school of writing which glorifies the sinner as the liberator of mankind from the shackles of convention. If she depicted the characters in her own books as breaking the commandments, it was in order to throw Catholic principles into relief. For instance, the Church's teaching on the indissolubility of the marriage tie is brought into prominence in *A Daughter of the Soil*, *Renewal*, and *The Runaway*; her uncompromising attitude on the subject of the sixth commandment is subtly placed before the reader in *Honesty* and *Young Dave's Wife*.

The scenes of these last-mentioned novels are laid, as so many other of this author's tales, in Dorset and in Wales, where such Catholics as there are congregate in the small towns and are practically non-existent in the country districts ; consequently the characters are not represented as being Catholic. Yet the mind of the Church, and not that of the modern world, is reflected in these pages ; the reader is made to feel all the anguish of the innocent Honesty when her husband says to her : "In your heart—ye was a fallen woman."

To the end of her life M. E. Francis maintained that

she enjoyed writing *The Wild Heart* more than any of her other books. In its pages her special gift of vivid characterization, humour, and pathos, and her power of describing scenes of nature, are exhibited at their best.

To appreciate her artistic idealism, which never rings false, a love scene drawn by her pen need only be contrasted with that of almost any writer of the present moment who claims to describe rural life. Take as an instance the meeting between Tamsine Strange, the heroine of *The Wild Heart*, and the half-gipsy David Chant, now her lover, soon to be her husband.

Tamsine set off, her tall figure in its light print dress seeming to gather the evening sunshine, while the little old white dog limping after her showed presently against the sky-line like an ambulating streak of flame.

The patch of woodland to which she directed her steps was a considerable distance from her house—a wild, irregular expanse, where oaks of quite respectable age and size reared themselves above a thick undergrowth of hazel and hornbeam, or stood solitary in the midst of moss-grown spaces, the turf beneath and the foliage overhead appearing at this hour to radiate golden light. Here and there were groups of fir trees, the boles and branches of which were now ruddy, while the needles were like points of fire. And sentinel yew trees kept guard over sundry small clearings, the shiny surface of their narrow leaves reflecting the universal brightness. Clumps of gorse added their natural blaze to this general conflagration, and thus Tamsine stepped through glowing mazes like a rustic and very human Brunhilda, guarded by the fire-god even during her waking hours.

And now striding through the brake came a lover young and ardent, like that Siegfried of whom she had never heard, yet in whose personality even her ignorant mind divined something of the unusual, almost of the abnormal; and as they met and kissed in the midst of the warm, sweet-scented wilderness, the girl's soul was thrilled and uplifted by a happiness such as she had never dreamed of.

The author made David Chant the interpreter of her own intense love of wild nature.

"Hark!" he cried on that moonlight night, when, resisting his

wife's entreaties that he would abjure poaching, he rushed out to his doom.

He seemed to listen again, and Tamsine listened too, though at first the tumultuous beating of her own heart seemed to drown every other sound ; but presently she was conscious of the innumerable voices of the night, the sighing of small currents of air, rustlings and stirrings among trees and hedges, the call of night birds, even the stamp of a hare on the resonant soil of the downs ; then, borne on a passing breeze, the tossing and creaking of boughs.

"The woods are calling me," said David, and he made a quick step away from the window.

A coarser view might so easily have been introduced into the story with the character of Martha West ; but with her usual delicate art the author avoids this and sensationalism alike, sustaining the idyllic note as the story reaches its climax.

When Tamsine, not many weeks after their wedding, finds David dying of a gunshot wound in the flowery chalkpit of the wood on the downs, she does not rush wildly for help or endeavour to staunch his wound.

Tamsine and David being Dorset peasants, there is no allusion in the book to anything connected with the Catholic Church. But M. E. Francis could not, visualizing the scene through her Catholic eyes, bring herself to describe a good woman seeing her husband on the brink of eternity without attempting to succour his soul.

Her heart stood still within her for a moment, and then her faith, strong and living for all its simplicity, came to her rescue.

"There's mercy above," she said; "God's good."

"Yes, He's good," he acquiesced. "I did pray ye might come to me—I was afeared I'd have to go wi'out sayin' good-bye, but He let ye come—an' you're good—you showed me all the good I ever knowed."

Tamsine sat up, rallying all her strength. If indeed she had been able to help him in the past, surely she could help him now. . . . She pillow'd her husband's head on her lap, and, bending over him, looked into his eyes.

"'Tis true, 'tis true God's good, David," she said earnestly. "He'll forgive ye if ye turn to Him. There's no sins so great that He won't forgive them. He said Himself—even if they was red as scarlet."

David looked up with eyes already dim : his lips moved, and she bent lower to catch what he said.

"A thread o' scarlet," he murmured. "Thy lips are as a thread o' scarlet, an' thy speech comely." That's in your song, Tamsine."

"Oh, David, David," she exclaimed almost voicelessly, "you mustn't think o' me now—think o' God—the great God you're a-goin' to meet—David, dear David, lift yourself up to Him."

Her tears dropped upon his face, but he was smiling.

"You—lift me up," he said.

Drawing his inert form a little higher into her embrace so that his head rested on her bosom, she raised her voice in obedience to a sudden inspiration, and began to sing.

She forgot all about the threatened advent of the police : in that solemn moment she scarcely realized her own overwhelming sorrow ; she only thought of David's ebbing life and that it behoved her to make the most of the few moments that remained to turn his thoughts to higher things. And David had always loved to hear her sing.

Sitting there with her world crumbling to ruins about her, she put the whole intensity of her faith and love into the words which were to be the last he should hear on earth. Her voice steadied itself after the first few bars and floated upwards piercingly sweet.

"When other helpers fail and comforts flee,
Help of the helpless, oh, abide with me."

The silence of the oak copse was invaded by many tramping feet, and birds flew shrieking from the boughs as a number of tall helmeted forms forced their way into their quiet paradise.

In obedience to the directions of their leader, the men surrounded the pit, and, drawing close to the edge, peered in. . . . The girl, still supporting his motionless form, continued her clear, unwavering singing.

As they stared aghast, she stopped, glanced downwards at the face which rested on her breast, and drew the lids over the unseeing eyes.

Then she looked up at the ring of curious faces with a sort of smile.

"You may take him now," she said.

For indeed the Wild Heart was quiet at last.

The determined holding aloft of the true ideal of purity in the writings of M. E. Francis was recognized by the reading public at the outset of her literary career.

Her first successful novel, *A Daughter of the Soil*, was chosen from among many others to be the first work of fiction published serially in the weekly edition of *The Times*. When it made its appearance in book form *The Times'* reviewer wrote of it :

... After a course of neurotic novels, given up to new women, lawless women, and prodigal daughters, many readers must be disposed to cry, "Throw open the windows and let in the fresh air!" They will find the tonic they need in Mrs. Francis's *A Daughter of the Soil*.

Thus even at that early date Mrs. Blundell's work was greeted as a refreshing change from the then new sensational fiction, and when "the sex novel" issued forth with the peculiar blatancy of the last decade, she still retained an unostentatious but faithful and discerning following. During the last years of her life, a story, to command a good market, had to centre round what has come to be known as "the sex problem"; this further had to be treated "boldly" or "with courage" to suit publisher and reviewer. The fact that the so-called problem has always been with us and is in reality no problem at all, was ignored.

It must be conceded, however, that the difficulty in dealing with natural situations without acknowledging supernatural guidance does constitute a problem for other than Catholic fiction-writers.

In Mrs. Blundell's opinion only harm could be done by writing intimately about offences against the virtue of purity. Holding fast to the maxim, "Let not such things be so much as named among you", she saw the big cheques pass her by, for her books were now found wanting in the "strong situations" demanded by the publishers for the majority of their readers. Yet in our path through life are we not fortunately more familiar with men and women and their doings as she drew them for us, than with those lustful beings and their crude passions which are dominant in latter-day fiction?

"Why write about ugly things when there are so many beautiful things to write about?" she used to say.

But when she felt that she could, as she always expressed it, "do good" by treating of possibly the ugliest of all subjects, namely the White Slave Traffic, perhaps the very cost of the effort carried her to her high-water mark of literary achievement in *The Story of Mary Dunne*. It was characteristic of her to make this effort as a practical interpretation of her firm belief that our Creator expects us to use His gifts in His service. When the Bill of 1913, which did so much at least to mitigate the terrible evil in question, was in preparation, she was asked to be present on the platform at a public meeting in support of it. The traffic with all its attendant horrors was fully dealt with by the speakers, and she there and then resolved to do what lay within the compass of her capacity to expose it and to warn the innocent of danger without outraging their sense of decency. The book which was the outcome of this difficult, self-appointed task is a monument to the ideals of a Catholic novelist. It was inspired by the burning wish that it should be in some measure as it were a shield to the innocent, and was dedicated "To Mary". The whole power of the story lies in its reticence.

Purity seems to radiate from the Irish cottage home whence Mary Dunne, all childish innocence, issues forth to her destruction when she goes to seek a situation in Liverpool. Truth is in every line of the drawing of each character : there is no sentimentality in the description of the dignified, simple old priest ; no want of virility in the portrait of Mat Kinsella, Mary Dunne's honest Irish lover.

Here is Mary's mother, who has left her native place in the Wicklow mountains for the first time in her life, arriving at the Liverpool hospital to take her daughter home.

Her blue eyes had a strained look, and her face under its tan seemed drained of colour ; her very lips were white. Yet after the preliminary pause during which she had, as it were, taken her bearings, she advanced towards the girl with a studiously matter-of-fact air :

"Well, Mary," she said, "what way are ye, child ? I'm come to take ye home."

She stopped again, a yard or so from the rocking-chair, and laid her bundle on the table ; a faint odour of turf smoke diffused itself through the room.

And when the nurse had left mother and daughter alone :

Mrs. Dunne pushed back her bonnet and gazed at the girl, her eyes burning under her heavy dark brows, her whole worn face one eager question.

Mary, standing by the table and shaking in every limb, gazed at her fixedly too, and then turned aside her face with a wail.

"Mother, I couldn't tell ye," she said. "I'd sooner die than tell ye."

The colour rushed back to the woman's hollow cheek, and she stretched out her arms.

"Sure, there's no call for ye to be tellin' me anythin' at all," she cried brokenly. "Come here and let me get my arms about ye. Sure, I've got you back, my lambeen bawn—that's all I want."

Only the old parish priest, Father Delaney, and the mother herself knew of the tragedy ; the ailing father was never told. Yet on the arrival of Mrs. Dunne and her daughter at the threshold of the tiny cottage which was their home :

Mary stumbled forward and presently seized her father's outstretched hand. His pallid old face was puckered with anxiety, his eyes peered at her with painful keenness from under their grizzled brows, and his voice quavered when he spoke.

"A nice show they've made of ye over there ! Ye're not the same girl ye were when ye went out."

The transient light died out of Mary's face, and she bit her lip to avoid bursting into tears.

Oh, it was true, indeed, too true—she wasn't the same girl ; she could never be the same girl again ! After a moment she bent forward to kiss him, but he continued to hold her at arm's length.

"What ails her at all ?" he asked his wife. "What have they done to her over beyant ?"

"What have they done ?" echoed Bridget shrilly, though her voice shook with nervousness, and, without revealing the truth, she dilated on the exhaustion incidental to travel.

But Mary loosed her father's hand and was about to step past him into the cottage, when, seized by a sudden impulse, she turned and threw her arms round his neck.

"Och, kiss me, Da!" she faltered with a sob. "Da, I'll not feel it's home unless ye kiss me!"

"What's this at all?" said Mike querulously. He strained her to him nevertheless, with his weak, thin arms. "What's she cryin' for at all?" he asked his wife with a catch in his own voice.

"Sure she thought maybe we weren't glad to see her," responded Bridget, observing that Mary was unable to speak. "Sure it isn't her fault if she's been sick an' doesn't look the same. Tell her she's welcome avick, whatever way she is, an' that 'ull make her happy."

"Is it welcome asthore?" said Mike, endeavouring to peer into Mary's face, which she kept hidden on his shoulder. "Is it welcome? No, but a thousand times welcome. *Cead mille failtha, mavourneen. Cead mille failtha.* All I'll ax ye is never to go away again as long as I'm above ground."

And, unconsciously imitating the type of all merciful fatherhood, he drew the innocent prodigal close, and fell upon her neck with tears.

Mrs. Blundell's fiftieth book, *Wood Sanctuary*, was published two days before her death. In the review of it which appeared in *The Tablet* some weeks later, the following lines occur :

This brings us to our crowning praise of M. E. Francis, whose death last month hugely bereaved English literature. In these columns we have argued again and again that truly Catholic novelists are not necessarily novelists who write about Catholics. Rather are they those who write about life in a Catholic way. Nor priest, nor nun, nor Mass nor shrine is mentioned in *Wood Sanctuary*, but all is viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*.

In recognition of good service done with her pen, Mrs. Francis Blundell received the Apostolic Benediction from His Holiness on her deathbed. For from the hour when she determined to adopt the path of literature and to uphold Catholic ideals as she went, to that when, as she lay dying, she dictated in a failing whisper the outline of a little story which she thought "might do good", M. E. Francis maintained her standard; she raised it at the beginning of her literary career, and, disregarding all temptations to lower it in pursuit of either popular favour or pecuniary success, she kept her colours flying to the end.

M. B.

ART. 5.—THE FIRST ABBOT OF DOWNSIDE

HUGH EDMUND FORD, first Abbot of Downside, was a man of remarkable presence and distinction, and I recall very clearly my first impression of him. It was at Downside on an evening in September towards the end of the summer holidays in the middle nineties, when he would have been between forty and fifty years of age. The community was gathered round the great fireplace in what is now the Boys' Refectory, with its panelling walls surmounted by portraits of bygone Gregorian dignitaries. The Prior, as he then was, who had been away from the House for a week or two, had just returned, and, entering the Refectory from its upper end, walked down to greet his brethren. Then came the introduction; a playful enquiry from him about a common friend; a reply quite unintentionally amusing which brought to his face a smile so happily infectious that it seemed to ripple down the line of tall monks who were standing near—and you knew that you had met a man who wished to be your friend. And more than thirty years of friendship have made that first impression only the more certain, deep, and clear.

Never before and never since had one seen a man of finer bearing. For in those days he was six feet in height, but so well proportioned that he was not noticeably tall. His head, seen from any side of him, had a grandeur about it, so shapely was it and so well poised; his eyes were of a keen grey that seemed to rest upon certainty, and these with his finely cut but olive-pale features marked him out as inevitably distinguished in any company of men. His face in repose was stern, and upon occasion very stern, as some of his portraits show him, but in fact this sternness was rather the foundation of his character than the outward expression of it, and was exercised much more upon himself than upon those who were privileged to live with him. In daily intercourse his countenance was a joyous one, and with so unfailing a power of communicating its joy to others that in his absence he was missed as one misses the

sunshine. Many, who knew him longer than I, can add their witness to mine when I say that I can never remember to have seen upon his face a look of sadness or impatience or to have heard from his lips a single unkind word. His features, too, in spite of their beautiful pallor, of which I have already spoken, had just that tinge of delicate but real health which gave him a look of youthfulness even in his old age. And what delicate lines were traced upon his forehead, lines of suffering, yes, but crossed by others that told you how many and how selfless those sufferings had been! Only those who knew him best could say how true a confession he made to his friend, the late Bishop of Clifton, when he told him not long before his death that, whatever he had not done, he had always loved the brethren. *Majorem caritatem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.*

Hugh Ford first came to Downside as a boy of ten in the April of 1861, and he remained in the school until 1868. Recollections gathered a good many years ago from some who knew him during his schooldays give us an impression of his attractiveness and charm, but at the same time of his quiet and very dignified reserve. "To tell the truth," writes Father Clement Clarke, "he never came forward much as a boy—nor do I remember any particular incidents that foreshadowed his future 'greatness'—if I may use the term—beyond his sterling character—his innate goodness—his undemonstrative piety—his steadiness of purpose—his solid virtue—his affectionate nature and his sympathy and kindness together with marked self-control. There was, however, one feature in his school life that was very marked, and that was his fast friendship with Francis Gasquet" (afterwards Cardinal).

From other letters one learns how a quick and clear sense of justice marked him out from his earliest years as a silent receiver of confidences and a friendly settler of disputes; of how, too, from the very first he had so resolute a way of following his own sound judgment that others naturally deferred to him and willingly followed him as a leader. For he never seemed to override the

opinions of others, much less disregard their feelings. On the contrary, they followed him the more willingly because they knew that their own expressed opinions were always taken into account. And much of his success as a ruler in later years came from his habit of always seeking the highest measure of common agreement in those he was called upon to guide.

In 1868 he went to Belmont, Hereford, then the novitiate of the English Benedictine Congregation; and he was professed on 25 January, 1870. Owing to illness, he could not remain there long, but returned to Downside in 1871. In October 1873, being still in very delicate health, it was thought wise to send him on a voyage to Australia. There he lived an open-air life for nearly three years, often making expeditions in the bush and being in the saddle for days at a time. This experience was in every way beneficial, restoring him to a good measure of health, teaching him resourcefulness, broadening his human sympathies, giving him a love of nature and of natural science as well. He brought home with him a collection of Australian mammals, together with four hundred birds, which later were the subject of an article by the late Professor St. George Mivart in the *Downside Review* of January 1884.

After his return to Downside in June 1876 he was appointed to a position in the School, and on 10 June, 1877, he was ordained a priest.

In the following autumn Father Aidan Gasquet became Prior of Downside, and under him Father Edmund Ford's long period of active and responsible work for House began. Prior Gasquet was then thirty-two, Father Ford twenty-seven.

Father Edmund was then made Prefect of Studies, or what would now be called Head Master of the School. The Downside Community "at that time was small and young: the Prior was thirty-two, the sub-Prior thirty-seven; there was an octogenarian; Father Edmund was twenty-seven, and with the other ten members of the community, still younger, made up fourteen, all told."

Father Ford's work in and for the School was both

abiding and progressive. An immense improvement in the quality of the work done by the boys took place, as the examination results soon began to show. He was an excellent schoolmaster, but he was so much more. One who was a boy in the School at this time writes of him as follows. "I was a good deal with Father Edmund, as I was in the choir when he was choir-master. But in every capacity in which I came across him he inspired me with admiration. Always firm, sometimes severe (my fault), full of jokes, full of sympathy in troubles, taking strong interest in all we were doing—I should think Father Ford received far more confidences and applications for advice than anyone in the place. His advice, in my experience, always turned out sound. He always seemed to be bent on making boys open, honest, self-reliant, and cheerful in trouble. What good company he was at all our tucks, etc ! The excursions to Longleat with the choir derived most of their lasting recollections of pleasure from his genial company and exuberant spirits. Comic songs in the brake on the way back ! I can sing some of them now. . . . My brother, who died shortly after he left Downside, was Father Edmund's particular friend ; there was a strong affinity between them ; something difficult to describe, a sort of understanding of a breezy, straightforward, manly open nature which both seemed to possess and which seemed to draw them together."

In personal as in other ways Father Edmund was quietly influential. Like St. Philip Neri, never idle and always cheerful, he encouraged his boys in every kind of wholesome and wholehearted activity. A good pianist himself, there was music and all that music could do for them in so many directions. There was sport and the sporting temper, of which he himself was so proficient an example, particularly at hockey and as a skater. He was keen, too, to awaken in his boys an interest in everything that lived and moved and grew in the open air. There were the books he would put into their hands that often disclosed their magic as one lay of a winter's evening and read them in the dancing firelight. *Huckleberry Finn*, for instance, which came to have for some of

them all, and perhaps more than all, the authority of a theological treatise. Others got from him their first real love for Shakespeare. His way with boys was very simple. "I go among them just as I am, and so I find them just as they are," he used to say. He was very severe on faults of a certain kind, deliberate persistence in wrongdoing, or the making of others to suffer in order to gratify oneself. But to failings he was very tender. "People's failings should make them lovable", was one of his sayings. And to him they did. In Sodality, which he took for many years, he talked to the boys in a way that had about it the best sort of unconventionality and freshness—hitting the nail on the head, driving the point of it home, touched with a playful humour, winning the mind to assent. Yet, like a true Benedictine, he wanted the boys to grow good in God's way, and not in his own. But the breeze and sunshine and freedom of his own nature was a great help. *Propter justitiam et mansuetudinem, adolescentuli tui dilexerunt te nimis.*

When later, as Prior or Abbot, he gave away the school prizes his remarks were always of the happiest. I remember the very last of these occasions, when he touched upon the Education Question in a way that brought it down to the simplest of issues. "Those of us", he said, "who are experienced in culinary matters already know, and those who are not must take my word for it, that it is impossible to cook potatoes without salt. Well, it is the same with Education. You can no more educate without Religion than you can cook potatoes without salt."

Dom Edmund was appointed Sub-Prior in November 1883, and held that position conjointly with the Prefecture of Studies till September 1884, when he went to Rome. His companion there was Abbot Cummins, who writes of him as follows: "We were thrown together for a year in Rome, lodging in a loft of the Scots College in not altogether harmonious surroundings, and I found what a cheerful, charming companion he could be. He knew very definitely what he wanted, and generally got it, but was ever considerate, tolerant, pleasant. Together

we rambled about historic Rome, sampled seriously various universities and many professors, pursuing 'advanced studies' up and down Italy in a desultory but effective manner. We never distinguished ourselves in the Schools, but visited famous shrines and stayed in monasteries, acquiring much useful experience, scholastic and monastic ; we displayed the English Benedictine habit and name, long unknown in the Eteral City, and the humble Ospizio which we started in the Scots College garret grew shortly under the munificent hands of Leo XIII into the stately College of Sant' Anselmo. What happy memories come back of pilgrimages often over the hills to Subiaco and Olevano, to Monte Cassino and La Cava ! Father Edmund was ever an equable, pleasant, interesting companion, always an edifying monk, keen on serious work on his own definite lines, simple and almost austere in habit, with great social gifts but no frivolous or worldly tastes. Soon after we parted he was chosen as Prior of Downside, and was speedily drawn into the thick of domestic controversy, where he showed himself clear-headed, well-informed, quietly persistent in his aims, always serene and pleasant, smiling when beaten, but biding his time. When fortune frowned he took up mission work with zeal, and was most successful in building up at Beccles both a parish and a very beautiful church. Then came a turn in the tide of affairs, and he was called back to Downside again to be Prior, and eventually its first Abbot. Shortly afterwards our paths converged again. We did not always agree in official life, but differences of interest and policy never impaired the ease and pleasure of fraternal intercourse. He could hold his position with a dogged tenacity that never seemed to know defeat ; but he was a chivalrous opponent, never taking unfair advantage, and with never a trace of personal feeling. Perhaps I thought him a better Gregorian than English Benedictine, and too ready to sacrifice the Congregation to Downside ! But whatever our theoretical differences, personal relations were never clouded. We never met again after he had to winter abroad. But there abides the vivid memory of a brother monk and early friend whose personal

charm and many gifts made intercourse very pleasant both at the time and in after recollection."

Abbot Cummins has just spoken of Father Ford as a chivalrous fighter, which indeed he was, and that without any detriment to the peace of his truly monastic soul. For within the domestic life of the English Benedictine Congregation he found a cause which he thought to be well worth fighting for.

It will be remembered that until a few years ago England was a "missionary" country in which the normal working of either the parochial or monastic life was almost impossible. Until the middle of the last century we had no territorial hierarchy of our own, and were dependent for our spiritual ministrations upon the labours of priests and monks who, for the most part, were trained and lived beyond the seas. And so it came about that for centuries after the Reformation one of the highest and most heroic ambitions of every English Benedictine monk, living under obedience at Douai or elsewhere, was to serve on the English mission even at the risk of his life. Hence arose the idea of the "mission" as one of the integral factors in the English Benedictine vocation. And even when the times of fiercer persecution had passed away, the organization of those Benedictines who followed their vocation in this country remained predominantly missionary in character. But at the French Revolution two of the English Benedictine communities were expelled from France, returned to their own country, and in due time were established at Ampleforth and Downside, each with the right to elect its own prior.

But although each monastery had its own prior, it was not in fact autonomous. For the prior of each house was obliged at the request of the President of the Congregation to send upon the mission any of his monks that the President thought fit to appoint. And when once engaged upon missionary work, each of these monks was under obedience to a missionary provincial and not to his own prior. Such outside control of the monks engaged upon missionary labours had been reasonable when the monastic houses were abroad and communica-

tion was difficult ; but when the majority of the monks lived in this country, when the hierarchy had been established, and when the secular clergy, increasing in numbers, were more and more in a position to do their own parochial work, such outside control of the monks on the plea of missionary necessities became less and less reasonable and finally anomalous. So at least thought Prior Ford and those who were in agreement with him, and thus arose a strong movement towards giving to the superior of each monastic house the complete control of his own community.

Father Ford became Prior of Downside for the first time in July 1885, and the three years during which he held office were preoccupied with the constitutional reform to which he had set his hand. The struggle was not without dust and heat, and at the end of that period it looked as if it could not be carried through. A letter to Abbess Gertrude Dubois of Stanbrook, a valiant fighter also engaged in winning constitutional betterment for her own community, shows us how difficult the contest had become. "You see", writes Prior Ford, "I am embarked on strong waters, but the result, whatever it may be to me personally, will do good to the position of the houses. . . . Dom Guéranger's letter is really a comfort to me, for, in spite of many opinions and traditions to the contrary, I have striven to follow what he there advises. So long as I am Prior I live for the community. . . ."

At the same time he was fighting for the cause of the Stanbrook nuns as well as for his own ; and a little later he again writes to the Abbess a word of comfort. "You and all at Stanbrook must always feel this joy, that your troubles are the troubles of laying the foundation of a great future—a future already visible to you. . . . May your fervent prayers bring us God's light and help that we may not fail in anything required of us." A year later the Abbess writes to thank him for what he had done for Stanbrook. "I shall never forget that the stand that you took at the General Chapter (in July 1888) in favour of Stanbrook has been the turning-point for us in England."

At that same General Chapter Father Ford ceased

to be Prior of Downside, and another was appointed, not by his own community, but by the Chapter itself, to rule in his stead.

But he held his peace and kept to his purpose. "I thank God", wrote the same friend to him "that you feel so calm under such an ordeal, and that the bruising pain does not disturb your rest. There must be a special grace in that, for I do not think you are a stoic by nature or temperament."

Another friend wrote as follows: "Your head has knocked against the wall. I had told you it would be so. You seem ready to be the martyr. You have got the palm. I am sorry, very sorry."

Yet in spite of appearances he had reason to hope. "Mgr. Stonor", he writes on August 6th, "sends me a message from Cardinal Masotti not to lose courage." And then again on the 20th, "How quickly the clouds vanish when we have had the patience to wait for God's time!"

Meanwhile he left the care of his cause to others. "My brothers at Downside", he wrote, "are distressed that I have kept away from them; but it seemed to me very needful that it should be plain to all that the same movement would continue even if Father Bernard Murphy and myself were out of the way."

In 1889 he was sent to Beccles to start a new parish, and, as always, threw himself with cheerfulness and energy into his task. He soon became popular in the district with all sorts and conditions, and his ways of making acquaintance with the townspeople were many and various. He had a dog, a faithful rough-haired terrier called "Sam", a great fighter who by his local prowess won for his master a reflected reputation. One day when out for a walk with Sam, he overheard the following conversation between two workmen whom they were passing. "Who's 'e?" said one. "I dunno," replied the other, "but that there dog, they call the 'Cathlic dog'." And it was perhaps characteristic of Father Ford's versatility that he often followed up paths of opportunity that were opened to him by Sam. For, calling to apologize for Sam's misbehaviour, he would

get into friendly talk with the owner of the defeated "Protestant dog" which sometimes led to more serious conversations. A letter from one of his younger parishioners tells us more of this pioneer work. "At first, of course, there were rumours of Jesuits in disguise and so on ; but no better man than Father Ford could have been found to break down prejudice. One thinks of him first perhaps as a delightful boys' companion, full of interest in everything that my brothers and myself were keen on—fond of animals and boats and exploring rivers and the countryside and delighting us with stories of rough life in Australia, where he had spent some time when young. Perhaps it was because of his sympathy with our own hobbies and sports that he was able to interest us in his own work—the drawing of converts, and the organization of a body of men in his guild and in other ways for the work of the parish. Through him we became interested in the various types of people that gathered round him. My most vivid recollection of St. Benet's in those days is that of the church full of representative inhabitants of a small country-town, listening on a Sunday evening to a carefully planned instruction in some point of Catholic doctrine ; for Father Ford was a great advocate of simple yet reasoned and co-ordinated courses of instruction. And as these instructions undoubtedly drew many to the church, so he himself drew others by his personal charm and naturalness."

"I wish I could say all I feel about Father Ford," writes another parishioner. "He is unique. I don't think I ever knew anyone else who had such a balance of strength and tenderness, fighting qualities, and dogged perseverance combined with the most delicate sensitiveness ; for with all his shrewdness, he lived in the supernatural. He once gave me his view of life in a very few words, 'There are souls to save and potatoes to plant wherever we go.' And he was at his very best with boys. His heart was so young, and we all found this out. . . . What a help he was in time of trial and difficulty—and how he dreaded to see people settling on the lees and sitting down under discouragement!"

He did his work well at Beccles, for he built there one of the most beautiful of our smaller Catholic churches and filled it with a varied and devoted congregation.

But in July 1894, his cause having found favour at Rome, he was again elected to be Prior of Downside, and was now to have the happiness of seeing the main effort of his lifetime crowned with ultimate success.

What had happened in Rome during Father Ford's five years' exile at Beccles may best be told in the words of Abbot Butler. "Early in 1889 the President, Abbot Austin O'Neill (afterwards Bishop of Port Louis, Mauritius), went to Rome, and in a short time came a circular-letter from him (to the monks of the English Congregation) announcing that it had been clearly brought home to him that the mind and wish of Rome was that the government of the mission by Provincials should be abolished, as a survival of a state of things that had passed away with the return of the monasteries to England; that the missions (parishes) should be attached to the monasteries and placed under the rule of the Priors, and the monks serving them continue to be the subjects of the Prior of the House of their profession—that being the system universally obtaining in other Black Monk Congregations serving parishes. And the President said he was instructed to come home and carry the change through.

"The announcement fell as a bombshell: for the thing now declared to be ordered by Rome was the principal plank in the platform on which Prior Ford had taken his stand. Straightway a great transformation came over the face of the Congregation. The Prior of Ampleforth (Father Anselm Burge) at once ranged himself with the President, and carried with him the whole resident community of Ampleforth and a considerable number of the Fathers outside (on the missionary parishes); also the Prior of Douai, the brother of the President, rallied to him, and carried with him a considerable number of Edmundians. . . . Thus the Congregation was now divided into two fairly equal camps, and the little group that had worked with Father Ford found itself allied with half the Congregation, under the

leadership of the President. Those who hesitated to accept the President's message all declared that if Rome spoke clearly they would obey. . . . But Rome just then would give no voice . . . since she desired that the change should come from the Congregation itself and be the handiwork of the General Chapter. There ensued two years of acute controversy, with Extraordinary General Chapters, a lively pamphlet war, and visits and representations to Rome on both sides. At last Rome had to act ; and in November 1890 the Bull *Religiosus Ordo* was issued ordering the aforesaid change in government."

It now remained to carry out the constitutional reforms laid down by this Bull. A Papal Commission was set up for the purpose. But for nine years the work went forward very slowly amid much difference of opinion, until at last in 1899 Leo XIII himself intervened. Father Gasquet, who had now become very influential in Rome, had kept the Pope fully informed of what had been going on, and was appointed by the Holy Father to be the President of a new Commission. Both he and Father Ford took a determining part in the final result. A new Bull, *Diu Quidem*, was issued which raised the old priories of Downside, Ampleforth and Douai to the status of abbeys, "with all the rights and privileges attached by law and custom to that title", thus setting its seal to the abbatial form of government, and making each abbey autonomous in all things which concerned the welfare of its own subjects.

The new Constitutions were drawn up and confirmed in Rome, and in the autumn of 1900 each abbey was in a position to elect its first abbot. It was fitting that the choice of Downside should rest upon Edmund Ford, who had done so much to bring about this better state of affairs. He was elected as first Abbot on September 26, and on October 30 he received the solemn Abbatial Blessing at the hands of Dr. Brownlow, the Bishop of Clifton.

In the peace of the new stability now won for the English Benedictine Congregation, growth and progress became possible in many directions. And Abbot Ford

was blessed by God, not only in his work already done, but also in the work that there was yet to do. He was also blessed in the men of exceptional character and ability who were sent to work under him. There was the building of the choir of the Abbey Church according to the inspired design of Mr. Garner, completed and opened in 1905. There was the church music and choir, directed by Sir Richard Terry from 1896 until 1902, and brought to such high perfection that the musical critic of the *Saturday Review* wrote that in his belief no better singing could be heard anywhere in Europe. There was the new House at Cambridge under Dom Cuthbert Butler, then laying the foundations of his great reputation as a critical scholar. And there was the School, over which, by one of Abbot Ford's wisest inspirations, Father Leander Ramsay had been appointed as Head Master in the autumn of 1902. Abbot Ford evidently knew his man and the spirit that was in him to do what he did for Catholic education in this country, and which perhaps we may better understand when we remember Father Ramsay's own words to someone who asked him whether he wanted Downside to be the best Catholic school in England. "No," he replied, "I do not; but I do want it to be the best school in England because it is Catholic." A real distinction, expressing a great and selfless ambition.

And each of these distinguished men have testified at one time or another to the happiness of their personal relations with Abbot Ford—how in him they found a superior loyal to the last degree, "a man good to go hunting tigers with", but also a man pleasant to live with, delightful to talk to and even to disagree with, probably on account of a certain atmosphere of old-fashioned but sweet-scented courtesy that seemed to accompany everything he said or did.

In 1906 Abbot Ford's health gave so much cause for anxiety that he felt called upon to lay down the burden and responsibilities of office. For fifteen years of his life he had been the superior of the Downside community, and that at a most difficult period of its history. What he did and was during that time is recorded in the annals

of his house and impressed upon the lives of those he so much influenced by his own life. In the history of a religious house a decade and a half seems but a day, but Downside in a short space of time was fortunate to have had a series of rulers who each in his own way has left an unmistakable impress upon its growing tradition. Of the impression left upon it by Abbot Ford it would be impertinent for a layman to speak, but of how he influenced those outside his monastery something may be said.

Soon after his resignation Father Ford, now titular Abbot of Glastonbury, was appointed as superior at Ealing Priory, a foundation of his own, having a small community, a growing school, and a great church in the first stages of construction. But even this proved almost too exacting in his delicate state of health, although for ten years he remained in official connexion with it.

It was during the war and afterwards that, being finally relieved of official life, he enjoyed his Benedictine peace amid so much that was stirring at home and abroad.

The Benedictines, considered historically, seem to have been sent into the world to civilize it almost, as it were, by accident, and they did it by exemplifying in their own daily lives the perfection of the natural life by supernatural means. Of such a kind was Abbot Ford's influence, and no better account of the nature and success of it can be found than in one of Mr. Compton Mackenzie's novels called *The Heavenly Ladder*, where we have a thumbnail sketch true to the very life. And by the courtesy of Mr. Compton Mackenzie himself I am glad to be able to quote from it.

Mark reached his hotel that evening and found an elderly English priest sitting on the wide balcony and looking out across the shadowy meadows and dim pastures to where above them the day was still in bloom upon the highest peaks like a late rose. They fell into conversation, found each other's company pleasant, and agreed to dine together.

The priest proved to be a Benedictine monk, the titular Abbot of some famous and noble foundation long ruined, "*in partibus infidelium*", Mark said to himself.

He was wondering if he should tell this beautiful and dignified old man that he himself was what the other might have called a Protestant minister, or perhaps more kindly an Anglican clergyman.

But the Abbot didn't seem to be at all in a controversial mood.

"What I want at the moment," he said, "is a good novel. One of the minor horrors of the war was the extinction of the Tauchnitz, don't you think?"

And so they dined pleasantly together and talked of the war and after, discussing among other things the League of Nations.

"Do you really believe in it?" said Mark.

"I do and I don't," the Abbot replied. "As a Christian and a Catholic I can't help feeling that the Church offers all that the League of Nations offers and more, and that what the Church has not yet been able to effect is hardly likely to be effected by a body without any visible unity or, I fear, invisible unity. I rejoice to see the temporary triumph of what is a genuine ideal over the forces of cynicism; but I cannot see an enduring life for any League of Nations that refuses to admit the vanquished to its councils. . . . However, anything that tends towards the unity of the human race will help the hearts of men to desire the perfect unity in which Catholics recognize the only possible future, institutionally speaking, for the world."

The conversation continues in a lighter vein for the rest of dinner, but after dinner, when they are taking their coffee together on the balcony, it again becomes more serious, but rather in a different key. Mark feels that the Abbot is hardly interested in religious controversy as such and dislikes a too subjective turn of conversation. But he goes on thinking in the silence of what the Abbot seems to stand for, "representing something in humanity that was as solid and impressive as the mountains opposite. That face was clear-cut in the moonlight as the outline of a crag."

"You are pensive," the Abbot said.

"I was thinking about the League of Nations," Mark replied.

He wanted to add: "And its resemblance to the Church of England." But he was ashamed to give an impression of sneering at his birthright of Anglicanism.

Mark then tells the Abbot something of his own history, that, although an Anglican clergyman, he had enlisted in the war as a private, and what his thoughts had been when lying wounded on the edge of a mine crater.

"Sometimes I have been tempted to regard it as nothing more than an extravagance of delirium. Yet the vividness with which it remains in my memory, and not merely in my memory, but incorporated in my present outlook, gives it a reality that the visions of fever usually lack."

"Have you ever read the *Vita e Dottrina* of St. Catherine of Genoa?" the Abbot asked.

"I've often meant to; but I never have," Mark replied. "Why do you ask?"

"Your vision of the golden chain," answered the Abbot, "with the hook at the end of it reminds me curiously of her experience. Somewhere, if I remember rightly, she speaks of God as descending by the golden thread of His secret love, which catches up man by the heart and draws him nearer to Himself. . . . You get the same idea in Dionysius, whose luminous rope suspended from heaven touches earth and enables us to climb by it. . . . But the parallel between [your dream] and St. Catherine's doesn't stop here for in the dialogue between our Lord and herself He tells her that His love can better be known by inward experience than in any other way, and that for a man to gain this Love, Love must snatch man from himself, because it is his self that is his own chief obstacle. . . ."

This is the point at which the title of the book justifies itself. Mark falls into silence, but after some minutes the Abbot tells him that further talk is useless. And then comes his last piece of advice. He advises him to read the Rule of St. Benedict, although he may have done so already.

"Your experiences have perhaps not taught you quite all you might have learnt from them. There was a more objective vision granted to [another]. It was no golden chain or luminous rope,

but a ladder upon which the angels of God were beheld ascending and descending. It was, if I may say so, a more practical affair than your chain. I could wish you to behold it. Meanwhile may I suggest that you should pay a visit to Monte Cassino, and if when you have visited Monte Cassino you still lack an answer to your question, I hope you will go to Subiaco. But do not go to Subiaco first. I will give you letters so that you may not feel a tourist. . . ."

A day or two later they travelled together as far as a central railway station, whence the Abbot journeyed to England, and Mark went south to Italy.*

Carlyle in his *Past and Present* has by his genius penetrated to the heart of Abbot Samson; and so I believe, in the same way, Mr. Compton Mackenzie has caught the secret of Abbot Ford's personal influence. Many of the things that his lifelong friends would wish to keep in memory are here set down in truth and proportion: his practical temper of mind; his personal delicacy and charm; his distinguished appearance; his interest, not only in people, but in all the problems of Christendom whether present or past; his feeling for the natural basis of all truly supernatural life; his deep sense that what seem so often to us the daily accidents of life are the means sent by God Himself for the making or marring of our spiritual call—a call that comes equally to everyone, if only it be listened to and followed in a life of work and prayer. Piety as learnt from him had nothing unreal about it, nothing unusual, nothing artificial; it was the habit of solid virtue based on solid and daily devotion. The ladder was there, a ladder of steep and difficult ascents and of easy falls; the angels were there to help us in either event. God was at the top of the ladder, and every honest step taken upwards brought faith and hope and love in greater and greater reality to the soul. The soul could not get on alone; religion was an objective and a social thing; the Church was the Body of Christ; and each of us by learning his place and part and work in it was "making his soul", was very gradually learning God's will, and year by year

* *The Heavenly Ladder*, pp. 317-327, *passim*.

might become a little more useful to those around him by becoming a little more self-forgetful.

Even to the last his influence grew, especially, it seemed, over the young, who were ever glad to be with him, and he with them, to listen to all they had to tell him of their doings and of what they hoped to do. I am permitted to give just one playful example of it written to the Abbot when he was almost eighty years of age, again a reminder of the character of St. Philip Neri.

Hugh Edmund, my lord, kind friend and protector,
Loved by the brethren, half-worshipped by me,
How dost thou keep young and witty and cheerful ?
If I'm to grow old, God make me like thee !
How dost thou soothe and calm all our raging ?
How dost thou comfort us, Father so kind ?
Tell me, I pray thee, thy secret so glorious,
That I may, like thee, have strong heart and great mind.

The answer came, not in poetry, for the Abbot's muse was on holiday. "If you want to grow old like me," he wrote, "keep your interest in and love for other people. Most people grow more interested and centred in themselves as they grow older. That is why they are 'old men'!"

He died on October 30th of last year, and the words which he himself addressed to the nuns of Stanbrook on the death of their own Abbess, Dame Gertrude du Bois, may fitly be re-written of himself, to all those whom he knew and were privileged to know him.

"It is one of the mysteries of life that the death of noble souls should be such a power over the living. You will be feeling that in your sorrow there is something of joy, even of triumph."

W. E. CAMPBELL.

ART. 6.—RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE*

1. *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology.* By Gardener Murphy.
2. *Psychologies of 1930.* Clark University Press.
3. *The Psychology of Intelligence and Will.* By H. G. Wyatt.
4. *Physique and Character.* By E. Kretschmer.
5. *The Laws of Feeling.* By F. Paulhan.
6. *Pleasure and Instinct.* By A. H. B. Allen.
7. *Principles of Experimental Psychology.* By Henri Piéron.
8. *Thought and the Brain.* By Henri Piéron.
9. *The Mental Development of the Child.* By Karl Bühler.

[NOTE.—With the exception of (2) all the volumes in this list are published by Messrs. Kegan Paul in the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method. The output of works on Psychology in its various aspects is so great to-day that it is neither possible nor practical to attempt to survey the whole field of this subject. We shall therefore in the course of this paper restrict ourselves to the consideration of a few more recent publications which present certain special points of interest.]

AMONG the subjects which have recently come under discussion, that which concerns the real data of psychology itself is momentarily very prominent. Of late years something of a fog has gathered round this word, on account of the extreme diversities of stand-points from which psychology is approached by psychologists themselves.

Although it is not the province of science but of philosophy to define the aim and method of a science, as Professor Piéron (7) remarks, "The separation between philosophy and psychology calls for some declaration as to the aims and methods of this science and some justification to its right to be called a science."

The main claim of psychology to be a science rests on the fact that it approaches problems of mind and mental function by experimental and empirical methods.

How this separation between psychology and philosophy

* A paper read at the Conference of Higher Studies, Heythrop College, 1931.

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came about, and how this science of experimental psychology has developed, is ably treated by Mr. G. Murphy, who follows the growth of modern psychology from its pre-experimental, empirical stages, through the rise of experimental psychology, down to the more recent developments of the various schools which exist side by side at the present day, bearing the common label "Psychology".

These schools, we shall see, differ on many points which to the more conservative among psychologists appear fundamental to the very notion of psychology.

The more philosophical psychologies of German and Austrian origin are dealt with in a special section at the end of this volume by H. Klüver. Mr. Murphy also includes in his historical survey very good accounts of the recent analytical psychologies of Freud, Jung, and Adler.

We have to accept the fact that psychology to-day is looked upon and treated as a science which in the first place arose from the efforts of physicists, such as A. Helmholtz, and of physiologists, as Weber, Wundt, and others, to bring the objective facts of sensation and sensory perception into relation with the subjective states of consciousness.

How far psychology can justify its claims to be a natural science, depends very much on the meaning and scope of science in general, but this is a question into which we need not enter. The question with which we are confronted, namely the actual data and methods of psychology, is more important. It is with this question that the volume *Psychologies of 1930* has to do.

The very title of this book is significant, since it suggests that the psychology of to-day is not a unified body of scientific facts and explanations, but that there are several distinct psychologies, and this indeed seems to be the case, though among the contributors to this work there are some who endeavour to find a principle which might serve to reconcile the apparent discrepancy of views and to maintain the status of psychology as a science having a field of investigation and practice of its own, distinct from other sciences, as physics, biology,

or physiology. This book is a sequel to a similar collection of lectures delivered at Clark University, Massachusetts, in 1925.

The *Psychologies of 1925* is more restricted in its outlook than the one we are at present about to examine, in which nineteen writers have expressed their views, as against nine in the previous volume. The additions include the psychologies of the Russian physiologists, Pavlov and Bechterew; the analytical psychologies of Freud and Adler; and the English school headed by Professor Spearman.

It is not an easy matter to trace to their sources the reigning diversities of viewpoints in regard to the data of psychology. To establish any acceptable synthesis at all would be a still more difficult task, for psychologists are very independent people and like to maintain their several private standpoints and to form schools. Divided as they are, there are nevertheless certain main lines of cleavage which we can follow without much difficulty. One of these is the kind of psychology to which the term structuralism or existentialism has been applied; the other embraces a group of not quite equivalent psychologies generally described as functionalism; so we may say therefore that experimental psychology has developed along the lines of either structuralism or functionalism, and that to-day the emphasis falls mainly on the functionalist attitude.

"Structural" psychology, as exemplified by the work of Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Titchener, Külpe, and others, is mainly concerned with the "contents" and "working" of the mind without reference to "purposes" or other functional concepts. It limits itself to the description of these contents, assuming that these are to be described in terms of their constituent mental elements, which are themselves contents. The more complex states of mind or consciousness are then described as a combination of the elemental contents involved.*

From this it follows that a special technique of introspection or introspective analysis of the mental contents at any given moment is required. Introspection of this

* Harvey Carr in *Psychologies of 1930*. ch. iii, p. 64.

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kind is not a mere reflection on what one happens to experience, but was elaborated into a really scientific method, particularly by Külpe and his pupils at Marburg and elsewhere. Like other scientific methods, it has its conditions and methods of application according to the problems under investigation. Its aim is the discovery of mental contents, states, and processes. It is therefore a strictly experimental method, and structural psychology is thus an experimental science in the true sense of the term.

Compared with functional psychology, its scope, as we shall presently see, is more restricted. Structural psychology of this type is sometimes also described as "existentialism" (E. B. Titchener), the emphasis being laid on existing contents of consciousness rather than on processes. It is not immediately concerned with practical applications, though practical or applied psychology has undoubtedly been influenced by the work of structuralists. We may quote, for instance, the studies on memory and learning begun by Ebbinghaus and carried further by Meumann and others, which had practical aims in view.

We need not here enter into the discussion of associationism, which occupied an important place at one time in the interpretation of mental processes. Associationism in itself is, of course, not a product of experimental psychology; it is far older, but was adopted from philosophy into the science, and, by the same experimental psychology, came later, mainly owing to the school of Külpe, to be rejected. This, however, does not mean the overthrow of the fact that "ideas" do show tendencies to associate in the mind. Associations and also dissociations are real processes, as psychopathology has very clearly demonstrated.

Associationism has only been rejected as a final explanatory theory of mental process or of thought in general, the reason being that it implied a theory that mental contents were exclusively of a sensory nature.

E. B. Titchener was to the end a staunch upholder of this theory, sometimes known as "sensationism".

Structural psychology, then, is strictly experimental, and not primarily concerned with utilities. In this it resembles other "pure" sciences. It had its value and its day, and in its day psychology was a more consistent science than it is now.

A student taking up psychology was not then confronted with a multitude of discordant definitions. He was told that it was the study of mental states, of the facts of consciousness, and that its principal method consisted in introspection. Within this field there was room for much work, and many problems to work upon. For this reason, perhaps, the general interest in psychology was far more restricted than it is to-day, the way for which was prepared by the so-called "functionalists", who broadened the psychological outlook, introducing purposes, behaviour, personality, and conduct as data for psychological study. In so doing, the methods were correspondingly enlarged, and it tended to become both practical and utilitarian. Such recent developments as educational, industrial, and medical psychology are the outcome of the functionalist attitude. What, then, is the programme of functional psychology? What brought about this new movement?

Mr. Edwin G. Boring, in Chapter VI of *Psychologies of 1930*, gives the following as the four marks of a functional psychology:

(a) It studies "mental operations" or activities; it is thus dynamic and not static. (b) It deals with "the fundamental utilities" of mind and the ways in which the mind is "engaged in mediating between the environment and the needs of the organism"; it is biological in the adaptive sense. (c) For this reason it considers the total organism, and gives attention both to behaviour and to phenomena. (d) For the same reason it lends itself readily to technology or practice, for the practical problems of applied psychology always centre in the relation of the organism to its environment.

Mr. Harvey Carr in the same volume, quoting from Titchener, further tells us that "functional psychologies distinguish between the activity or functions of consciousness and its content or structure. They emphasize

the study of function in preference to that of content." "Functional psychology is teleological." The whole course of mental life is regarded teleologically."

Whilst, however, these schools differ, yet there are some points of agreement. For the period extending roughly from 1890-1910, practically all psychologists, writes Mr. Harvey Carr, professed to be engaged in the study of consciousness. Structuralists and functionalists were alike then in that they defined their science as "the study of conscious processes as distinct from their organic conditions and correlates".

Introspection was regarded as the chief, if not the only, method of psychological observation, although the schools did not agree as to the connotation of this term.

To-day, however, functionalism has gone ahead of this, and, as Mr. Carr says, there is not one but several functional psychologies. It has, moreover, drifted more and more in the direction of biology, till at the extreme end it tends to lose all distinctive psychological characteristics and to become merged with either biology or physiology. This is notably the case with the Russian "reflexological psychology", represented by Pavlov and Bechterew, and the "behaviourism" of Watson and his school.

It is of this tendency towards biology and other extraneous interests that another contributor to this volume complains, namely Mr. Madison Bently, who writes: "Our main and underlying contention will be that the present confusion of tongues now widely deplored is chiefly due to the fact that outside concerns and foreign interests have played too great a part in shaping and defining our field. The result is that we tend artificially to maintain our identity by virtue of the common label, 'psychology'."

The present chief determiners of psychology from the outside are three. They are biology, medicine, and education. Professor Bently contributes an article entitled "A Psychology for Psychologists", which is interesting but too intricate to be considered further.

Another contributor whom we have already mentioned, Mr. E. G. Boring, advocates as a solution of this con-

troversy some kind of "eclecticism", and contends that the majority of psychologists are eclectics, that is to say, they are not tied to any particular standpoint, but take psychology as they find it, without attempting any approved form of definition. This, however, according to Boring, does not mean that anything that pretends to be psychology must be accepted on its own representations into the body psychological. Even the eclectic must choose, and in this case he chooses what has proved its worth. At bottom the test is of course pragmatic: those conceptions and methods belong in psychology which have been most fruitful, that is to say, which have placed the resultant data in relationship to the greatest number of other data, and have thus enlarged and knit together the systematic structure that psychology eventually must be.

This of course seems rather vague and something like an attempt to evade the difficulties. But the writer explains that the eclectic will accept both behaviour and phenomena as the data of his psychology, or in other words both structuralism and functionalism. By phenomena he will mean, of course, the data of "immediate experience"—experience regarded as dependent upon the experiencing individual; of "consciousness", if the word be shorn of too explicit a meaning of immanent objectivity; of "introspection", if that word be divested of its meaning of analysis into fixed elements.

Empiricism, Boring adds, is the method of all science; and the phenomena, as the positivists have said and Mach made clear to psychologists, are the first data of every science.

The eclectic of 1930 will, however, reject the kind of functionalism and structuralism, represented by Angell and Titchener respectively, which divided American psychology, but will choose "modern structuralism", that is to say, he will choose a psychology that deals with structural wholes built upon both behavioural and phenomenal terms. This new structuralism differs from the old structuralism in that it includes behaviourism, and in that it does not attempt formal analysis into fixed sensory elements.

Though we cannot further pursue Mr. Boring's own ideas as to what psychology should be, yet we feel there is something to be said for his broad outlook in that it does represent perhaps the attitude of many who are not attached to any particular school, and whose interests are mainly of a practical nature.

The main fact that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that in the focus of psychology to-day is the human being living in adaptive relation to its environment, whilst the focus of the old structural psychology was the mind and its contents and functions or acts.

It is hardly necessary to point out that this displacement of the focus from the mind in itself to the human organism in its relation to environment not only has vastly extended the scope of psychology, but has raised many and far more difficult problems, both in the domain of science and philosophy.

The division of opinion with regard both to principles and methods which separate functional psychologists rests upon their attitude to the status of mind and consciousness in relation to human activity.

One writer (I cannot recall the name) has somewhere remarked that, with regard to the Mind-Body problem, any theory is acceptable to functionalism except epiphenomenalism, which was the hypothesis adopted by experimental psychologists of the structural type.

William McDougall, who for years past has defended a functional and teleological—or purposive—psychology, upholds, as is well known, a theory of interaction between mind and body. From a purely empirical standpoint the doctrine may be valid, for there is evidence in plenty that mental events and bodily events appear to be causally related, which of course the epiphenomenalists denied.

But from a philosophical standpoint the theory, as I have elsewhere often said, is unsound, since it implies a Platonic and Cartesian dualism of mind and body—mind, as it were, being one complete thing on the one hand, interacting with the body, a separate and complete thing on the other hand.

The traditional scholastic theory of the substantial unity of the human composite could not maintain interaction in the way Professor McDougall holds, and I suggest the term "theory of co-operation between mind and body" as a philosophical explanation of the empirical facts which is more in keeping with the traditional teachings of the relation of soul to body.

But in disagreeing with Professor McDougall on this point, which after all as far as empirical psychology is concerned is unimportant, one cannot but admire his staunch defence of a soul and mind as active agents in human behaviour. He has emphatically dissociated himself from the extreme left of the "behaviourist" psychology, even to the extent of revising his earlier definition of psychology "as the positive study of human behaviour".*

McDougall's theory of interaction has only a subordinate place in his conception of psychology, which is centred round the concept of purposive activity or of goal-seeking, which he says is characteristic of all live activity.

This goal-seeking implies the existence of inner drives or urges, and he has therefore given the name "hormic" as a description of his form of psychology. Speaking of American psychology in particular, he says: "Partial, half-hearted, reluctant, as is still the recognition of purposive activity, it may, I think, fairly be said that only the crude behaviourists now ignore it completely; that with that exception American psychology has become purposive, in the sense that it no longer ignores or denies the goal-seeking nature of human and animal action, but accepts it as a problem to be faced."

McDougall claims an autonomous position for his "hormic psychology"; it is, he says, a psychology "which refuses to be bound to and limited by the principles current in the physical sciences; which asserts that active striving towards a goal is a fundamental category of psychology, and is a process of a type that cannot be

* *Outlines of Psychology*, 1923, p. 38. ". psychology may be defined as the science of the human mind."

mechanistically explained or resolved into mechanistic sequences".*

For further details concerning McDougall's point of view the reader is referred to his excellent article in this volume entitled "The Hormic Psychology".

Whilst, however, we must agree with the writer's fundamental contention, there are points in it which evoke some criticism. These mainly concern the problem of intelligence and will in regard to instinct and emotions as factors in human behaviour.

The psychology mostly in vogue to-day tends to exalt instincts, appetite, emotions, and instinctual trends over intellect and will, as the principle sources of human activity. Indeed, in some writings instinct appears almost to assume the rôle of an inner demon driving the organism to the fulfilment of its ends or purposes, thus destroying the autonomy of the organism as the agent of its activities. The problem is undoubtedly a difficult one both from the standpoint of philosophy and of empirical psychology. It is partly on account of this difficulty that the "crude behaviourists" incline to reject the concepts of instinct as well as of mind, will, and consciousness, and restrict their account and interpretation of human or animal activity to observable physiological reactions to stimuli. However valid this may be in biology, it cannot hold good for human psychology, since we cannot escape from the fact that we are aware of events within us which are psychical and not physical in nature, that is to say, which are not merely the outcome of nervous or muscular response to external or internal stimuli. How can the fact of internal psychic determination of action be explained on neuro-physiological lines alone? No one of course will dispute the fact that in so far as human activity occurs at all, physiological events accompany and follow it, sometimes also precede the activity. We cannot, however, eliminate either the psychic event or the psychic agent, or co-agent.

The chief defects in much of the "new psychology" lies in the greater importance attached to the study

* "The Hormic Psychology", in *Psychologies of 1930*.

of instinct, sentiments, and emotion, and the corresponding tendency to relegate intellect and will to a subordinate place as factors in human activity. It is therefore with considerable satisfaction that we turn to Mr. H. G. Wyatt's essay on "The Psychology of Intelligence and Will", in which he endeavours—and successfully—to reinstate these powers of man and show how indispensable they are in the study of human behaviour.

The author writes from the standpoint of an educationalist who has spent some twenty-five years in the study of education, "that is, in applying (or misapplying) Psychological principles". "To educate," he continues, "one must know not only how to impart knowledge, but how to train intelligence, how to regulate passion, and therefore how to develop and strengthen will."

Looking for assistance from psychology, he met only with disappointment, since the essential problems of intelligence and will have been neglected, or very scantily treated. "There is", he says, "much measuring of intelligence, but few attempts to fathom it, and will is apt to be disposed of by treating it as something else."

This neglect is partly accounted for by the claim of psychology to be a science and therefore to pursue scientific methods, and this has diverted psychologists from a systematic *theoretical* study of intelligence.

Experimental investigation into higher thought, i.e. intellectual processes, and into acts of volition, have indeed been carried out by pupils of Külpe. But it is not with these that the author is concerned, but with the general neglect of intelligence in practical psychology, and he gives three reasons for this:

"One reason is the aggrandizement of instinct (or of original endowment) and the keenness of the controversies which that topic has aroused. Another is the modern reaction against an intellectualist and especially a faculty psychology. A third reason is that it has been found perfectly practicable to deal with the products of intelligence, and even, presumably, to measure

intelligence itself, without a systematic inquiry into the nature of the process or function that was being measured."

The latter question has been dealt with by Professor Spearman, who has also endeavoured in his own way to reinstate intelligence and to formulate some theoretical conceptions of this function.

Another reason for the neglect of intelligence and the aggrandizement of instinct springs from the common assumption of the doctrine of evolution. To this we may add the introjection into psychology of biological concepts and methods. Man is assumed without further doubt to have descended from animals. Hence whatever powers he possesses, whether of instinct, reason, or volition, have been evolved from analogous and simple functions in animals.

Man is conscious of intelligence, so there must be some rudiment of intelligence in animals, otherwise its appearance in man would be something quite new and peculiar, which contravenes the evolutionary principle. Hence the pains taken to discover intellect in animals and animal instincts in man.

The author also takes the evolution of man for granted, and hence maintains that there is no discontinuity between the intelligence and volition such as may be discovered in a low degree in animals and that found in a higher and *peculiar* degree in man.

Both intelligence and will, as they exist in man, are nevertheless different from these functions as discernible in some degree in animals.

Being in man different and altogether superior functions, they occupy a more important place as determiners of conduct than they do in the case of the lower animals. Here impulse and instinct prevail, but in man intelligence and volition. A chapter of quite special interest is the one (Chapter IX) entitled "Intelligence the Master of Instinct", in which the theories of Shand and McDougall come in for severe and quite justified criticism.

McDougall's dictum, "Directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity",

is well known. "Instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving-power by which all mental activities are sustained, and all complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfaction while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in, their choice of means." Thus writes McDougall in his *Social Psychology*.

Mr. Wyatt criticizes this subordination of intelligence to instinct, which has become almost commonplace in psychological literature at the present day.

We cannot stop to consider his criticism in detail, but his main argument is that instinctive impulses are regulated by ideals which are derived from intelligence itself, and the author proceeds to show that, in the theory of sentiments as determiners of character and conduct, there lies what he calls "the Fallacy of Hypostatization", by which he means that certain abstractions have been endowed with powers in themselves to produce certain effects. Like Herbart's ideas, which he endowed with an intelligence and volition of their own, so it is with Shand's sentiments and Thorndike's neurones. "The sentiments," writes Mr. Wyatt, "as organized systems of emotions, become fallacious only when we find the emotions *sorting and arranging themselves*.

"As if there were or even could be emotions apart from the self experiencing them; as if indeed they had some kind of independent life of their own; as if indeed, to go further, they could be *explanatory* principles at all. In treating emotions and sentiments as the foundations of character, Shand succeeds in belittling the significance of volition and intelligence only by endowing his sentiments with just these attributes, by mistaking them for the individuals experiencing them" (op. cit., p. 184).

Various other fallacies are rife in modern psychology, according to Mr. Wyatt, and these he critically explores and disposes of. We may leave to philosophers the task of criticizing the philosophical implications in the volume, which from the standpoint of empirical

psychology should prove to be as helpful and stimulating as it is informative and opportune.*

Whilst the question of intelligence and will is paramount in the psychology of character and conduct, the problem of temperament also calls for consideration, and this subject again is one which presents many difficulties. Temperament is an important factor, yet its nature and function are imperfectly understood. The humoral doctrine of the four temperaments in man has come down to us in various forms from antiquity, and has been revived as far as its humoral aspect is concerned by investigation into the functions of the glands of internal secretion, or endocrine organs, which are now known to exercise a great influence, not only on physical growth, but on certain psychical dispositions of character. There are writers who base the study of character on the functions of the endocrine organs. This may lead to over-emphasis of physiological functions and the neglect of psychical functions.

The German psychiatrist, E. Kretschmer, has presented a theory of temperament and character in which the psychological qualities are brought into relation with bodily physique. The English translation of his work appeared in 1925, but it merits consideration here, since it is apparently not too well known. The importance of Kretschmer's work is, however, recognized by Dr. E. B. Strauss, the able translator of a book entitled the *Psychology of Character*, by Rudolf Allers, M.D., of the University of Vienna, which we also recommend very highly.

According to Kretschmer, human beings in general fall into two main groups, which may be distinguished by certain characteristics of physique on the one hand and of temperament and character on the other. Some individuals present one or other form in a conspicuous and easily recognizable degree, but the majority of average normal people usually present a compound of each type in which one or other element may predominate.

* Governed by his acceptance of animal evolution as applicable to man. Mr. Wyatt sees no essential difference between animal and human "intelligence" and "will". In man it acquires a degree of superiority which makes it both unique and peculiar to him.

The first part of the book is devoted to the diagnosis of physical characteristics. This is a highly technical and expert matter, and cannot be dealt with here.

With regard, however, to temperament, the author admits the difficulty of defining it, for, he says, the expression "temperament" has for us no well-defined meaning. It is a class of mental events which is correlated with the physique and probably through the secretions. The temperament works in with the activity of the "psychic apparatus", providing feeling-tone, inhibiting and pushing forward.

Furthermore, the temperament has clear influence on the following psychic qualities :

- (1) On the psychæsthesia, abnormal sensitivity or insensitivity to psychic stimulation.
- (2) On the mood-colouring, the pleasure or unpleasure tone of the psychic content, particularly on the scale which lies between gay and sorrowful.
- (3) On the psychic tempo, the acceleration or retardation of the psychic processes in general, as regards their particular rhythms (tenaciously holding back, suddenly darting forward, inhibition, formation of complexes).
- (4) On the psycho-motility, on the general movement-tempo (mobile or comfortable). As also on the special character of psychic activity (lamed, stiff, hasty, vigorous, rounded, etc.).

Kretschmer proceeds further to show that the direct action of the brain can cause modifications of the temperament, as do also the internal secretions. "It is an empirical fact", he writes, "that the endocrine system has a fundamental influence on the mentality, and especially on the temperamental qualities."

The temperament, then, appears to consist of a complex group of qualities which derive their specific quality from the chemical constitution of the blood.

This doctrine is not necessarily materialistic—it tends rather to show the intimate relation which exists between mind and body in the function of the individual,

These temperamental qualities display themselves in different strengths and qualities in different individuals,

but these may be grouped in general under two heads, which Kretschmer terms cycloid and schizoid, or the cyclothyme and schizothyme temperament. These terms, as well as the temperamental and physical qualities which they denote, are derived in the first instance from psychiatry, and represent certain forms of psychosis. But since in these particular psychoses temperamental and physical elements are discoverable which occur also in a milder form in normal individuals, the terms may be introduced into a theory of normal temperament and character. The cyclothyme personality is one in which a certain roundness and comfortableness of physique is combined with a gay, cheerful, good nature, moving sometimes to a depressed condition. Persons of this type are usually sociable, affable and extraverted, with an orientated emotional life.

"The temperament of the cycloids alternates between cheerfulness and sadness, in deep, smooth, rounded waves, only quicker and more transitorily with some, fuller and more enduring with others."

Again, the "cycloid" men, Kretschmer observes, "keep through all their manic-depressive vicissitudes the fundamental symptoms of their temperament in a general way from the cradle to the grave".

The biological influence, on the other hand, which produces the schizophrenic and schizoid personality is something that is planted inside, that makes its appearance at a certain period of life, and with a certain sequence of phenomena, and then proceeds further.

Again quoting from the author: "The schizoid peculiarities of character looked at from the surface are as follows :

(1) Unsociable, quiet, reserved, serious (humourless), eccentric.

(2) Timid, shy, with fine feelings, sensitive, nervous, excitable, fond of nature and books.

(3) Pliable, kindly, honest, indifferent, dull-witted, and silent."

Schizothyme personalities are also said to be frequently hard, cold as ice; often idealist, systematic, fanatic.

Among examples of each group derived from biography

the author mentions "Mirabeau and Robespierre as illustrating the cyclothyme and schizothyme types of leaders of men".

Physically Mirabeau is said to have possessed a round, short-limbed figure, full of temperament, flexible, soft, and mobile—a typical "pyknic", as this kind of physique is styled.

Psychologically, he is described as possessing a great amount of the élan of a daring whole-hogger, as well as the foresight and skill of a diplomat, a fiery spirit full of oratorical force and brilliant perception, full of life and self-confidence, somewhat of a glutton, a gambler, but good-natured as a child.

Robespierre, on the other hand, presents a striking contrast, a picture of idealism, fanaticism, and despotism, features which he shared with the reformer Calvin, a portrait of whom in the volume shows the lean, haggard face, long nose, angular profile so often characteristic of this temperamental type.

Of Robespierre the author writes: "There are few personalities in history who are such pure resultants of schizothymic characteristics in their most bizarre contrasts as Robespierre: the most icy emotional coldness next door to hyper-strained emotions, heroic pathos and idyllic sentimentalism, the highest idealism and the greatest brutality, fanatical tenacity and sudden jibbing at a decision. The impression of close reserve side by side with the most open devotion to principles. Sulkiness, distrust, affectation, pedantry, and timidity are all found in certain degrees."

These examples give us a fair though very incomplete picture of the meaning of temperament and its division into cyclothyme and schizothyme types, as well as of the particular behaviour patterns associated with each.

The examples quoted represent of course extreme types, but in the average normal individual a mixture of cycloid and schizoid qualities may usually be found, hence the diagnosis is often of great difficulty, and only accessible to the trained expert.

Here, then, we must utter a word of caution. This is primarily a medical treatise, and its use in practice is only

possible to those specially trained in the technique. From the descriptions given in the book it might be tempting sometimes to apply them either seriously or in fun, and to label people as cyclothymes or schizothymes, much in the same way as people throw inferiority or superiority complexes about without fully understanding their significance or the difficulties involved in their accurate diagnosis.

As a suggestion, however, for a deeper study of the psychological characteristics of temperament, and the basis of a science of character in general, Kretschmer's work deserves attention for the light it throws on the peculiar individual differences of temperament and ensuing behaviour which is sometimes so baffling to the observer.

To what extent, in what manner, we may ask, is an individual's general attitude to life, to the community, to art, literature, philosophy, and religion, coloured by cyclothymic or schizothymic qualities of temperament? This is a question of deep interest and importance for the better understanding of character and social relations.

Kretschmer's study of temperament in relation to physique stands in a class by itself. It belongs to psychiatry rather than to general psychology, hence we do not find therein psychological analysis of affective phenomena such as feeling or emotion, inseparably connected as these phenomena are with temperament. For a psychological study of this kind we may turn with profit to the writings of F. Paulhan and A. H. B. Allen.

Although F. Paulhan's *Laws of Feeling* cannot be said to be recent, it has acquired a fresh interest on account of its anticipations of various views and tendencies in the domain of affective psychology which have arisen during the steady advance in past years of endocrinology, comparative psychology, and psycho-analytic psychology. As the translator of Paulhan observes, there seems to be a convergence of opinion in the direction already more or less anticipated by Paulhan, and in this lies his justification for the publication of the English translation commenced ten years ago but laid aside. He further notes that Paulhan "has been one of the leading figures

in contemporary psychology for over half a century", and, though "his writings are not entirely unknown outside France, references to his name in English publications are few and far between". In the great French *Traité de Psychologie*, 1923-24, Paulhan's conclusions on the subject of feeling are accepted as fundamental.

We may describe this work as a very profound and subtle analytical and synthetical study of the nature of feeling and the place it occupies in all human activity. The author's main thesis with regard to the origin of feeling and emotion is that it is due to the arrest of tendencies, a view which we encounter frequently in the writing of other authors on the subject.

"Whatever affective phenomena we take," the author states, "we can observe the same fact : the arrest of a tendency. From the most ordinary emotions to the highest and most complex feelings we can always verify this law" (p. 16).

A further important characteristic of affective states lies in the multiplicity of nervous and conscious phenomena produced.

In the course of his study we meet with many statements that have been confirmed by investigations in endocrinology, psycho-analysis, psychology, and studies in instinct and emotion.

It may be objected that Paulhan's work is unduly biased by a mechanistic attitude. Man is looked at as "an assemblage of innumerable elements bound up in many systems in such a manner that the same element can successively enter a great number of systems and so on, until we come to the personality regarded as a whole, which should be the greatest system of all, if man's organization were complete; but it presents a remarkable incoherence, so that the secondary systems are not united in a superior, and instead of joining and combining they often interfere with another."

This is a conclusion for which psycho-analysis adds further evidence. It is acceptable, however mechanistic it appears, if we only attach a phenomenological significance to the term mechanistic. It is in this light that we may,

and often indeed do, "picture man as a sort of imperfectly finished or somewhat disordered machine in which every passion, every emotion, every feeling is therefore the sign of an imperfection in the organism". A conclusion which, the writer states, "clearly emerges from all the circumstances accompanying the production of emotion—the arrest of tendencies, the rush of blood to the brain, the rise in temperature, the multiplicity of phenomena, their relative incoördination", etc.

The mechanism implied here is not a philosophical conception, and perhaps the writer does not intend a materialist and mechanical theory of life as such. He is dealing solely with certain affective phenomena, their causes, manifestations, and interrelations, in short their mechanism, to use a brief and convenient term which is not incompatible with a spiritualist theory of man's essential nature.

Man is an organization of physical and psychical elements, grouped in interrelated systems in hierarchical dependence. It is with these systems and the effective phenomena arising from their activities, and particularly the arrest of activity, with which the author is concerned, not with any philosophical considerations. The facts related may be put to the account of either strictly materialist philosophy or to the account of traditional scholastic theory, which indeed would be found to support much for which Mr. Paulhan contends. Feeling-states and affective phenomena in general are accompanied by, or possess a certain quality of, pleasure or unpleasure. This also comes in for detailed consideration in Paulhan's volume, but is more fully and specially considered by Mr. Allen in *Pleasure and Instinct*.

Pleasure and unpleasure are elementary feelings, qualities or affects. They are neither cognitive nor conative states, but are cognized or felt as accompaniments of certain mental processes such as sensation or instinctual striving.

Wundt formulated a three-dimensional theory of affects which comprised the following pairs of opposites—pleasure, unpleasure, tension, relaxation, excitement, inhibition; and endeavoured to correlate these with the

amplitude and frequency of the pulse and respiration. Wundt's conclusions have not been borne out by subsequent investigators, so that the prevalent theory of feeling is that set forth in this volume; namely that feeling is a one-dimensional quality ranging between pleasure and unpleasure.

Sensory pleasure is the mental element which accompanies the sensations of the bodily processes when they proceed in a normal fashion, but when in the exercise and enhancement of vital activities a conflict arises from their depression and stoppage, if this becomes more or less acute a feeling of unpleasure is experienced.

With regard to those strivings which are the outcome of instinctual tendencies, feelings of pleasure and unpleasure are related to success or failure in their respective functionings.

The instincts of nutrition, reproductive instincts, curiosity or impulse to knowledge, the impulse to power, altruism and the gregarious instinct, æsthetic experience, are accompanied by feeling which will be experienced as pleasurable or unpleasurable, according as their course runs smoothly towards their respective goals or meets with obstacles which give rise to inhibition or frustration.

In some respects Allen seems to bear out Paulhan's conclusion that elementary affects arise from the arrest of tendencies. The further question as to the value of pleasure and unpleasure in regard to action is discussed in later chapters. The author again agrees with Paulhan that these affects are not motives or causes of action, but may be considered as concomitant experiences, or, as the author states, "component parts of consciousness, separate elements, capable of bearing qualities of their own".

In the two volumes of Henri Piéron we are introduced to other aspects of psychology which have to be taken into consideration. *Thought and the Brain* is mainly a neurological study of the relations of Mind and Body, and treats of the cerebral activities engaged in mental functioning, sensory reception, the mechanisms of language and affective phenomena.

The problem of the localization in the brain of various sensory functions such as vision, hearing, and speech mechanisms, and finally of motor reactions, is an old one, which has been the subject of a vast amount of experimentation. Theories have ranged from exact localization in different portions of the brain of the various functions to the assertion of functional equivalence of the brain as a whole. The fact that serious lesions of the brain are sometimes found not to impair certain mental functions has led to a partial rejection at least of the theory of localization.

Prof. Piéron examines the data very closely in the light of recent research and post-war experience, dealing with the intricate question of aphasia and its relation to thought.

The term "aphasia" covers a group of disorders such as verbal blindness and deafness; aphemia, or inability to enunciate words, whilst the capacity to understand and read words mentally is retained; agraphia, or disturbance of writing.

Intelligence may become disturbed in various ways through these aphasias and their combinations.

A much debated question is that which concerns the seat in the brain of intellectual functions. The cortical areas related to sensory and motor processes had been pretty well mapped out, but there remained over and above these certain "dumb" areas from which, when subjected to stimulation, no response was evoked; thus arose the theory that these areas were in some way related to the higher non-sensory mental functions. The author discusses in detail the pros and cons of the theory.

Although more importance has been attached to the relation between the brain and the cognitive functions of the mind, that subsisting between this organ and affective phenomena, especially in the sphere of pathology, has only come into prominence in more recent times. In Part VI Prof. Piéron speaks of the affective regulations of mental life, its rôle and mechanism. Here the phylogenetically older portions of the brain, such as the thalamic area, are found by experimental investigations

to exercise a greater influence than the more recent cortical areas which preside over cognitive functions.

Some controversy has arisen over the relative part played by the cortex of the brain and the lower thalamic centres in emotional expression, but "the facts show", the author states, "that thalamic activity suffices to govern the general behaviour of the organism as a function of certain tendencies, with affective regulation, and that thus the automatic reactions of fear, anger, and satisfaction take their place in a complex which has real affective value". *Thought and the Brain* is a work which demands some preliminary acquaintance with brain physiology, but nevertheless it must be reckoned as an indispensable addition to a psychological library, in which we should also include his *Principles of Experimental Psychology*.

This is a book which might well serve as a general introduction to modern psychology, and as a preparation for further study.

It does not attempt to explain technical methods nor to show how psychological experiments may be carried out. There are other works, such as those of Myers or of Drever and Collins, which deal more fully with methods of experiment. The author of the *Principles of Experimental Psychology* has gathered together the principal results of experimental work in psychology and arranged them in sections under various headings, namely "The Reaction Processes and the Form of Behaviour", "Affective Reactions and the Orientation of Conduct", "Perceptive Reactions and the Acquisition of Experience" (in this section we find interesting observations on the perception of Space and Time). He then goes on to consider the intellectual reactions and the elaboration of experience, in which he treats of the association process and the action of memory, and of language and thought.

In the two parts which follow M. Piéron treats of the levels of activity and the utilization of experience, degree of mental efficiency, attention, activity and work, incitement and fatigue, concluding with a section on mental evolution, the differentiation of natural types, sex and race, and analytical classification of individuals, type and character, Mental profile.

As will be seen from this summary of contents Mr. Piéron adopts the functionalist standpoint in common with other noteworthy French psychologists, such as a M. Ribot, M. Pierre Janet, and others.

"The entire domain of psychological studies," he writes, "considered as having to do with the phenomena of consciousness, is concerned in reality with particular forms of activity, of behaviour, of characteristic modes of reaction, principally verbal."

And again, "There is a science of behaviour, of activity, of the co-ordinated responses of organisms considered in their totality. This science constitutes psychology. It differs from physiology in that the latter is concerned with partial mechanisms, with limited systems of reaction."

There is a psychology of animals, which does not need to raise the question of consciousness that Descartes settled in the negative, a psychology of children, a psychology of the insane, a psychology of primitive man, as well as a psychology of adults belonging to our civilization. "There is no essential difference of method".

The book opens with a brief historical survey of the development of experimental psychology, to which the author adds a section on the aims and method of psychology, parts of which we have quoted above in order to illustrate the standpoint from which it is written.

Like his other volume, to which we have already alluded, the *Principles of Experimental Psychology* requires some preliminary acquaintance with general biology and elementary psychology.

This is assumed throughout this work. Without it the reader may be puzzled by some of the statements through lack of familiarity with the terminology.

It is essentially a summary, but a systematic one, and indeed presents a very complete general account of experimental psychology as it stands to-day.

In conclusion we would like to refer to Karl Bühler's book, *The Mental Development of the Child*.

Child psychology, which as a science dates approximately from the publication of Preyer's studies, frequently took the form of *diaries*, day-to-day observations on the

behaviour and mental reactions of children from birth upwards.

Bühler, aided by his wife, Charlotte Bühler, who has also contributed much to child psychology, gives us in this book a general view of the child's mental development, which follows three stages, namely Instinct, Training, and Intellect, which represent three levels. The author proceeds to treat of the child's perception of space and time, its memory and imagination, in which he has an interesting chapter on fairy-tales and their relation to the child's fantasies. The age of fairy-tales of our children, he tells us, begins about the fourth year and lasts according to the type of education they receive. The author concludes that "certain achievements of the imagination are definitely encouraged by the fairy-tale", as by no other type of literature.

Another important activity of childhood is drawing, the various stages in the development of which is interestingly described with illustrations. These show how uniform is the type of drawing corresponding to different ages.

The final chapter is devoted to the evolution of thinking, the formation of the first judgments, the development of the sentence, and the origin of concepts. Where and when can this function be first observed? "A child of six months gives as yet no indications; the two-year-old judges"; therefore all these activities which go to make up the functions of judging must have arisen in that time.

As a pioneer in the experimental psychology of thought-processes Dr. Bühler is well known, hence his present contribution to the subject in so far as children are concerned is especially valuable, and at the same time it throws much light on the general psychology of thinking and the process of its development.

The few volumes that we have been able to pass in review in the foregoing pages show us how wide is the field which psychology covers.

G. A. ELRINGTON, O.P.

ART. 7.—THE ORIGIN OF THE MENDICANT ORDERS

THE thirteenth century was one of the most constructive periods in the history of the Church : it was the harvest-time of the mediæval renaissance which began in the eleventh century. In the thirteenth century mediæval thought attained to its most creative activity ; the mediæval idea of a universal Christian commonwealth received its most complete development ; the revival of learning issued in the widespread growth of the university ; and so too the spiritual awakening which began in the eleventh century produced in the thirteenth century a new type of religious life vowed to the especial service of the Church. This new type became concrete in the new Mendicant Orders of Friars —the Franciscans, Dominicans, Carmelites and Augustinians. These were not the only orders produced in the thirteenth century. The Servites and Friars of our Lady of Ransom belong to this period ; and there were a host of less important orders which had but an ephemeral existence, such as the Brothers of the Sack. But it was to the four greater orders that the title of Mendicant was formally given by the Church.

As the name implies, the mendicant orders were those which depended for their bodily maintenance either wholly or in part upon the casual alms of the people. Having by their rule or constitutions either no fixed revenues at all, as in the case of the Franciscans and for a time the Dominicans, or only restricted revenues, as with the Carmelites and Augustinians and later the Dominicans, these four orders were given the ecclesiastical right to solicit alms as an ordinary means of subsistence. Thus they differed from the earlier monastic institutions, which subsisted on the income derived from landed property and which were in fact landed corporations.

This economic difference does not of course explain the main and essential difference between the earlier monastic bodies and the new orders of friars : it merely explains their generic title. The more essential difference is one of vocational character and purpose.

This is shown in certain external traits; thus:

(a) A monk by his profession is vowed to stability; that is, he becomes a member of a local community and his life's purpose is worked out in that community. The friars, on the other hand, were bound to no local community, but were members of a world-wide fraternity: they belonged to an order, not to a community.

(b) The social obligation of a monk was to build up and maintain his monastery, spiritually and temporally. The monastery was a sort of city-state, or rather *colonia*, to which the monk owed allegiance. The social obligations of the friar were outside his cloister or dwelling-place—in the world at large.

These external differences corresponded to internal purposes and ideals:

(a) The primary ideal of the monk is the *Vita Contemplativa*. His rule of life turns on this fact. He may indeed become a missionary or take part in the active life outside his abbey; but these things are accidental to his proper vocation—undertaken at some special call of charity.

The friar's life included the *Vita Contemplativa*; but with him the *Vita Contemplativa* is conceived as fitting him for missionary work: his ideal is the missionary life of Christ on earth. If the goal of the monk is to live with Christ in Nazareth, the goal of the friar is to work with Christ in His public life in Galilee and Judea.

The distinction may be further viewed from the respective functions fulfilled by the monk and the friar in the conception of Christian civilization. The monastic life tends towards the creation of the social unit, the mendicant ideal towards the fostering and right instruction of individual life. From this point of view the monk and the friar must be taken in connexion with the secular civilizations in which they had their origins. Monasticism took definite shape in the period of transition from the old Roman world to the modern world, when the primary moral need was the establishment of social order amid the anarchy of a new world, and the development of monasticism followed

very closely the development of social order in the world at large, until the abbot became a feudal lord. The mendicant orders arose with the reaction against feudalism, side by side with the secular reactions. Thus we get the secular mediæval corporations—the township, the trading-guild, the university, expressive of the new individualist spirit which had arisen in secular life: and we get the mendicant orders consecrating to religion this new individualism, as the monks at an earlier time had consecrated the new social organization of the early mediæval world. For this reason it was that the friars of the thirteenth century were in instinctive sympathy with the social and political reform movements of their time.

Yet the mendicant orders of the thirteenth century did not spring from an unprepared soil. In fact no great constructive movement ever does spring from an unprepared soil. The mendicant orders sprang out of the great religious reform movement which set in about the middle of the eleventh century, when the spiritual depression of Christendom both within the cloister and in the ranks of the people at large was at its worst. The movement for reform was first voiced with a magisterial appeal in the Cluniac reform of the Benedictines: the appeal was swiftly taken up by the Papacy, and with St. Gregory VII—the great Hildebrand—a new era of purification and constructive reform set in throughout the universal Church. During the twelfth century three General Councils—the first, second, and third Councils of the Lateran—were convoked to deal with matters of discipline in regard both to the clergy and the laity. Meanwhile a new spirit of ascetism showed itself in the foundation of new monastic orders, such as that of Grammont, and in the monastic reforms of Citeaux and the new Clugny. But the new ascetical piety took on new forms. The eremetical life was revived amongst the Carthusians and amongst the numerous eremetical communities which now came into being and were eventually drawn together in the thirteenth century under the Rule of St. Augustine and the Rule of Carmel. The twelfth century also saw the reform of the Canons

Regular, notably those of the Order of Premonstratensians and the English Gilbertines. Then too there arose orders—active orders as we now call them—devoted to the care of the lepers and the sick, such as the Cruciferi, or to the redemption of captives, as the Trinitarians; whilst the Crusades produced the military orders whose purpose was to succour pilgrims on their way to the Holy Land and to fight for the Holy Places. But most original of all were the lay associations or fraternities, which by the end of the twelfth century were a real force in the Church. With all these lay fraternities the guiding purpose was a return to the simplicity and unworldliness of the Christian life. Many of them, partly for want of wise leadership, partly driven by the lack of sympathy and opposition on the part of the clergy, fell into heresy and schism. Of such were the Waldenses. Others, such as the Humiliati of Northern Italy, remained orthodox, and were finally given a rule of life by the Apostolic See and commissioned to preach penance, that is, the reform of Christian morals.

Christendom was thus teeming with new cloistral reforms and new orders and the new lay fraternities, when St. Francis and St. Dominic came upon the stage of history. It was part of the genius of Innocent III that he recognized the need of these new orders in the Church. During his pontificate he solemnly approved the orders of Premontré and the Trinitarians, and approved too of the lay fraternities of the Humiliati and the orthodox Waldenses. He did but continue this policy when he approved the *forma vitae* of St. Francis and sanctioned the inception of the Dominican order.

The intensive reform movement which went on throughout the twelfth century was a reaction against the secularism which had invaded the Church, and against the externalism and formalism which had displaced true spirituality in the cloisters, the sanctuary, and the general life of Christendom. As a reaction against secularism the reform movements reverted to the ideals of evangelical poverty and simplicity; as a reaction against formalism they sought to revive the *Vita Contemplativa* and the ministry of apostolic preaching.

In so far as any of the reform movements represented merely the spirit of reaction, they either fell into sectarianism and heresy, as did the Waldenses and other lay associations, or they dwindled into ineffectiveness, as did the Order of Grammont and the lay association of the Humiliati. But the greater number of the reform movements represented something more than a reaction : they marked the presence of a new spirit arising in the mediæval world—a spirit which affected at once the secular and the religious life. By the end of the twelfth century an immense change had come over the mind of the mediæval world. The feudal conception of society was giving place to what may be termed the "Corporation" conception, as witnessed in the uprising of the towns, the universities, and the trade-guilds. The old classic learning, cherished through long ages in the monastic schools, was going down before the enthusiasm for the new romantic literature and the new scientific and speculative learning : whilst at the same time a new form of religious piety had sprung up which was to revolutionize mediæval devotion—the piety towards the Sacred Humanity of our Lord. It was this new piety which made the Cistercian Order so attractive in the twelfth century, for in the Cistercian cloisters it was given an intensely emotional and poetic expression. In a less mystical form it influenced the institution of the active orders for the nursing of the sick and the redemption of captives, for in the leper and the captive the members of these orders saw the objects of Christ's pity.

But whilst the Cistercians were greatly influenced by the new piety, they were irresponsible to the new social spirit of the time. In their organization they belonged to the established order ; and they were untouched by the new speculative intellectual movement. Only amongst the reformed Canons Regular was the speculative movement taken up and fostered. The Black Benedictines had indeed produced St. Anselm and Lanfranc ; but as a body they remained steadfast to the old classical studies. But the Canons Regular in their organization stood within conservative lines, and were but partially touched by the new social conception of

society. It was in the active orders that we first get some similarity to what was then the modern conception : they were fraternities ; their superiors were ministers. But they stood wholly aloof from the intellectual movement of the time. Not one of these new orders could be said to hold the position which in an earlier period had been held by the Benedictines, as representatives in any way of a new Christian polity in contact with the world in all essential points. Not until the rise of the mendicant orders do we get such a counterpart ; for the mendicant orders do represent in a sort of universal aspect the spirit of the later Middle Ages brought into the service of religion. In their piety, in their social organization and sympathies, and in their intellectual outlook, they were wholly at one with the new spirit which was transforming mediaeval Europe—purifying and consecrating it to God's service, yet wholly one with it ; and that accounts for their remarkable influence in the later mediæval world.

The mendicant orders, then, were not a "miraculous creation" of the thirteenth century : historically they came into being by a process of gradual evolution which was really the work of a changing civilization. True, in the case of the two most influential mendicant orders—the Franciscans and Dominicans—this historic evolution was powerfully assisted and formulated by the personalities of the respective founders, Saint Francis and Saint Dominic ; but on the other hand both these founders were largely influenced by the reform movements which had preceded them and which they may be said to have completed and brought to a fuller fruition.

Three main lines of development in the reform movement of the twelfth century led up to and coalesced in the formation of the mendicant orders in the thirteenth century : the revival of the eremitical life and the hermit-communities ; the reforms of the Canons Regular ; and the new lay penitential movement.

In the case of the Carmelites and Augustinian friars, there can be no question of their direct derivation from the hermit-communities which were so widespread in the twelfth century. The Carmelites indeed claim

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to be historically descended from hermit communities which maintained themselves in Palestine from the time of Elias. Whatever authenticity there may be in this claim, there was a community of hermits on Mount Carmel in the middle of the twelfth century which received a rule of life from Albert, Patriarch of Jerusalem in 1202. This rule enjoined absolute poverty and perpetual abstinence. This community was driven from Mount Carmel in 1238 and came to Europe ; it coalesced with other existing hermit-communities and so formed the Carmelite Order ; they were declared a mendicant order by Innocent IV in 1245. In like manner, by a union of many diverse hermit-communities, the Order of Augustinian friars was formed in the middle of the thirteenth century.

These two mendicant orders show a direct historical descent from the hermit-community. In both cases, however, the original eremitical life was modified when the communities were formed into orders by the influence of the already established orders of Franciscans and Dominicans. From this time the Carmelite and Augustinian hermits adopted the mixed life of contemplation and apostolic preaching, and in this organization approximated to the mendicant system as already definitely formulated amongst the Dominicans and Franciscans.

Unlike the Carmelites and Augustinian friars, who grew out of the existing scattered communities of hermits, the Franciscans and Dominicans owe their being to the genius of two men, rightly called their founders : SS. Francis and Dominic. Yet, as we have said, even here there is a certain filiation in regard to the reform movements which had gone before. There was a very close relationship between the Dominicans and the reformed Canons Regular ; whilst in the Franciscans two streams meet and coalesce—the eremitical movement, and that of the lay penitents. Whether St. Dominic was himself a Canon Regular before he began his apostolic labours in Southern France is doubtful ; what is certain is that in the organization of his order he was much influenced by the Norbertine Reform : possibly too by

the Reformed Canons of St. Victor in Paris. In the constitutions given by St. Norbert to the Premonstratensians, the maintenance of the liturgical worship was, as with all Canons Regular, the main purpose of the Canon's vocation ; but to this St. Norbert added the duty of apostolic preaching as an integral part of the vocation of his order. Amongst the Canons of St. Victor, the study of theology with the purpose of expounding Catholic dogma was similarly an additional duty, subordinate to the Canon's primary work. The originality of St. Dominic lay in the fact that in his order apostolic preaching, with the study necessary to form the efficient preacher, became the dominant purpose, all else being subordinated to that. But the spirit of the Dominicans and the organization of the order was largely derived from the Canons Regular ; so much so that for some years after their foundation the disciples of St. Dominic were officially styled Canons Preachers, not Friars Preachers. On one important point in the organization of his Preachers St. Dominic departed from the system of the Canons and fell into line with what may be styled the new democratic system of government which prevailed in the new secular corporations and in some of the recently established orders. The superiors of the order were to be elected only for short terms, and the legislative authority was vested in the Chapters, in which not only the superiors, but the whole body of the order, through its elected representatives, had a voice. The idea of the Chapter as the supreme legislative authority did not originate with St. Dominic ; it was already in vogue amongst the Franciscans and others of the new orders : it was to some extent introduced by St. Norbert into the government of the Canons of Premontré. But St. Dominic was, I believe, the first religious legislator to carry what I may term the new democratic system of government *in its fullest extent* into a distinctly clerical order ; and it was certainly he who organized the representative system in the Chapters on the lines eventually adopted in all the mendicant orders. For the Franciscans at this period were not a clerical order

in the strict sense of the term, and their organization was as yet undeveloped when Dominic wrote his constitutions.

It was through the Dominicans and the influence they exercised on the mendicant movement that all the mendicant orders eventually became predominantly clerical ; and it was through them that what is sometimes vaguely termed the monastic element, though more properly it should be termed the canonical element, as derived from the Canons Regular, entered into the life and organization of the mendicant orders ; for instance, the ceremonial chanting of the Divine Office and the stricter attention to the liturgy of the Church. For the hermit-communities were mostly lay communities given to contemplation and manual labour ; whilst in the penitential associations the clostral element had no part.

We have seen that the Carmelites and Augustinian friars grew out of the hermit-communities. In the formation of the Franciscan Order both the hermit-community and the lay penitential association had a direct influence.

In the first days of the Franciscan fraternity the friars were simply known as "Penitents of Assisi" : that was the first name given them by St. Francis ; and in all essential points of their primitive life, except one, they differed little from other penitential associations. The one point of difference was that they took the three vows of religion, thereby separating themselves more completely from the common life of the world. In a word, they were religious in the technical sense of the word. It would be incorrect to say that they were a lay order, as distinct from a clerical order, since from the beginning there were clerics as well as laymen amongst them. But they were not a clerical order. The lay brethren and the clerics were on an equal footing as members of the fraternity. Lay brethren could even be elected superiors, and often were. In their community life they approximated to the simple fraternal bond of the earlier hermit-communities ; and the eremitical ideal entered largely into their primitive organization. In fact their earliest dwelling-places were commonly known as hermitages. But from

the beginning they united with the eremitical life the active apostolate, "preaching penance" as the phrase was, that is, exhorting the people wherever they went to return to the life of the Gospel. In this they were but doing the work common to all the penitential associations. In the interaction of ideas between the Dominicans and Franciscans which produced a sort of common norm for all mendicant orders, the great contribution of the Franciscans was the ideal of evangelical poverty and simplicity. It is true that the Franciscans alone maintained the law of corporate poverty, that is to say, the absolute renunciation even of corporate dominion over the goods they used. St. Dominic indeed, influenced by St. Francis, imposed corporate poverty upon his order, but a few years after his death this law was abrogated by a General Chapter; nor did the other mendicants at any time profess corporate poverty. Nevertheless, in the use of worldly possessions the ideal of poverty became a note of the mendicant orders, restricting their possessions and use of things to what was necessary for their own sustenance: thus did the Franciscans hand on the cult of evangelical poverty which loomed so largely in the Mediæval Reformation.

So far I have traced the genesis of the mendicant orders of the thirteenth century through the earlier religious reforms of the twelfth century.

But the history of the religious orders in the Church reveals this fact, that they are born in part by the social conditions of the time in which they arise, and the influence they obtain in the world is in proportion to the measure in which they sympathetically respond to the call of the world around them. From this point of view Benedictine monachism, the mendicant orders, and the Jesuits—to mention outstanding instances—have a place in the history of Christian civilization which cannot be ignored by any serious student of history. They represent the religious consecration of social and political ideals by which civilization has been carried forward in successive ages.

As I have already remarked, the mendicant orders were wholly in sympathy with the renaissance spirit of

the later Middle Ages ; they were wholly in sympathy with it because, in part at least, they were born of it. It is no exaggeration to say that they summed up all that was best and most vital in the second spring of mediævalism. Professor Harnack in one of his moments of insight wrote that the mendicants consecrated "the new individualism of the West"—that newly awakened spirit which was in revolt against the feudal conception of society and the dominance of traditional modes of thought. In literature and in speculative thought, as well as in social ideas, the new mediæval spirit pitted itself against the older. Now, given a new world of ideas and feelings, it is certain that those who belong to this new world, and in whose life-blood, so to speak, the new ideas and emotions run—that they, if they seek the religious life, will not find their spiritual home in a traditional system imbued with the very spirit against which they are in revolt. Thus when the cardinals suggested to St. Francis that he should join an old established order, they were suggesting the impossible, apart from any question of a special mission ; for St. Francis was too alive with the new spirit of his age. In him, if in anyone, "the new individualism of the West" was incarnated. If he must be a religious, his religious life must give scope and freedom for the expression of the new spirit in the service of God. If he might not be a secular knight-errant, he must be God's knight-errant. And so we get the Franciscan Order. It was in its romantic aspect that the new time-spirit moulded St. Francis and passed into his order. In more sober and practical guise the same spirit moulded the Order of St. Dominic into an army of crusading friars who were to subdue the heretics with their own weapons of the intellect. The Cistercian abbots with whom St. Dominic was associated in his early campaign against the Albigenses saw in the critical temper of the heretics nothing but pride. St. Dominic, in his sympathy of spirit, saw deeper : he saw the enquiring critical mind without true leadership, and he set himself to give the needed leading.

It is, then, not surprising that the new mendicant orders

drew to themselves the most enterprising spirits of their time when these were drawn to religion. Mostly the mendicants were recruited from the towns and universities where the anti-feudal spirit—or the new individualist spirit—was strongest. But they also drew to themselves, either as members of their order or as their spiritual friends, that section of the feudal nobility whose sympathies were with the changing secular order of things. Thus in England we find Simon de Monfort seeking spiritual counsel from the friars in his long struggle with Henry III, and most of the nobles who sided with him were friends of the friars. Without being political partisans the friars naturally found themselves in sympathy with the progressive movement of their time in the secular world, just because they themselves were born of the new progressive movement, themselves children of the age in its newly found freedom of spirit. So when they entered into the eager intellectual life of their time it was as men born to it. They had no traditional prejudice against the new speculative form of thought in theology ; they did not scent a necessarily rationalistic tendency in everybody who asked the question, *An sit Deus?* To them it was the problem of an enquiring mind ; it might betoken a rationalist, but they were prepared to take it as the questioning of a believer wishing to give an intellectual reason for the belief he held. The mind of the Mediæval Renaissance was full of "whys" and "wherefores"—as is the active youthful mind at all times ; and the mediæval world was again very young in spirit in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Life to the more active spirits was like entrance into a new world : it was a wonder-world, and set men asking questions.

But it was not only in its secular aspect that the Mediæval Renaissance moulded and formed the mendicant orders; even more deeply it gave a character to their religious piety.

One of the notable things about the mediæval revival was its feeling for the human personality. The mediæval romance, it will be remembered, had for its theme the glorification of the knight of doughty deeds and

marvellous endurance. The Charlemagne epic and the Arthurian legends all sing of the Man : the social setting is but accidental; it is the man who counts as he is bent on achieving his manhood in honourable service for glory or love. In the romances of chivalry the new individualism received its purest ideal secular expression. By the religious spirit the new romanticism was carried over into Catholic piety. What Charlemagne and Arthur and their followers were in the secular romance, Christ and His saints became to the more religious souls—the ideal exemplars of the life of personal endeavour and achievement. Thus arose that intense devotion to the Sacred Humanity of our Lord, to our Lady and the Saints, which was to vivify the dying faith of the Middle Ages—a devotion in which the new individualism of the Mediæval Renaissance vowed its homage to its liege-Lord, the God-Man. St. Bernard of Clairvaux, fleeing from an alluring world, carried with him the budding romantic spirit into the Cistercian cloister, and there voiced a new devotion to the Sacred Humanity of our Lord in lyrical rhapsodies which were caught up and repeated with conviction by thirsty souls within and without the cloister. St. Francis of Assisi in particular, and the mendicants generally, were nursed in that devotion : for them the Christ-life of the Gospel was their rule of life ; their ideal was the divine Redeemer in His earthly mission spending Himself to bring back men to God.

It was from this devotion that the mendicant orders drew their spiritual strength and the motive which shaped their life. One may say that they were born of the secular individualism of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, wedded to the worship of the divine Redeemer—God made Man for our sake.

FR. CUTHBERT, O.S.F.C.

ART. 8.—PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR'S GIFFORD LECTURES

The Faith of a Moralist. By A. E. Taylor. (Gifford Lectures, 2 vols.) Macmillan, 1931.

THE connexion between morality and religion is obvious and unquestionable, but its precise nature has been and is the subject of endless discussion, and still more the degree of authority to be attributed to each respectively. The problem is attacked from several different points of view, but that which is based upon the study of origins seems, on the whole, to have been the most fruitful, fragmentary as it necessarily has been. Some few definite conclusions have been reached by such researches as those of E. B. Tylor, Sir J. G. Frazer, A. Lang, the late Professor Westermarck, and a great number of others ; and their results, curiously enough, have given much support to the doctrines of philosophy, and of Catholic theology. These investigations into the facts of primitive history, and into the moral and religious ideas of the most backward races of the present day, have resulted in the opinion that morals and religion, though in themselves perfectly distinguishable, and envisaged from the first as distinct, have nevertheless a common origin. Both are manifestations, incomplete and irregular, of the vast field of the unknown which lies beyond all human experience, and which recedes slowly and more or less spasmodically as the knowledge which man acquires of his surroundings becomes more and more extended and precise. Both morals and religion thus depend upon something stable and determined, which acts regularly and produces results that can to some extent be foreseen, and the action of which can to some extent be modified by human endeavour. The first method by which this foresight was sought to be attained, and this modification brought about, according to men's needs, was magic—the germ from which were ultimately developed science, philosophy, and religion, to all of which magical presuppositions clung until a comparatively very recent date, if even yet they can be said

to be wholly discarded. The perfectly true, though exaggerated and often misplaced, theory of "animism" gave a personal aspect to the objects to which magical rites were directed ; the natural properties of things were first perceived as inexplicable and magical qualities ; rough and ready comparisons, and generalizations were involved in such practices as those of sympathetic and contactual magic. Thus the dim outline of religion, science, and philosophy can be traced in the most primitive observances ; and the distinction between acts which were in themselves beneficial or harmful, and those which were so only because of the favour or disfavour of the unseen powers, is a foreshadowing of the Church's distinction between moral philosophy and moral theology.

These are reflections which naturally occur on reading Professor Taylor's Gifford Lectures. He takes morality, as it exists in theory and practice, as his starting-point, and proceeds to enquire into the nature and extent of its relation to religion and theology, both natural and positive. Does morality, as a factor in the scheme of the universe, necessarily imply the existence of something beyond itself or its immediate subject-matter ; and, if so, what and how much ? The enquiry is not concerned with the content of morality : it takes no account of either Nietzsche's demand for a changed moral system to accord with a changed metaphysic, or of the late Dr. Bradley's admission that such a change may at some time be found desirable and possible. It deals simply with the basic fact that moral ideas and systems do, and apparently must, exist among mankind. Mr. Taylor's method is in fact identical with what is called the "deontological" argument for the existence of God. There is, that is to say, in man an ineradicable consciousness of a law which he is bound in the exercise of his freedom to obey, and which he recognizes as universal, eternal, and absolute; and the source from which it proceeds cannot be either utility, since its precepts are often the reverse of useful, or positive law, which it evidently precedes, or custom, which cannot of itself impose a strict moral obligation. It is indeed made

known through experience, like all man's mental equipment ; but he is consciously and definitely not himself the author of it. It cannot, either, be a mere ideal, without actual existence in any form. If it were so, it could not have the actual value which it obviously has in human affairs ; for value can be attached only to what is real. If *ens*, *verum*, and *bonum*, the three "transcendentals", are convertible, it is evident that *bonum* (or value) can be predicated only of what actually is. Value cannot belong to what is morally evil, notwithstanding that much that exists is bad. But this is not to deny the reality of evil things ; which is only to attribute the value they have to the evil in them, and not to the things themselves, which are good. Mr. Taylor, rather oddly, does not mention St. Thomas's conception of evil—which was also that of the Neoplatonists—as the defect or want of something necessary to perfection. Evil exists, but not as a substantive thing ; it can exist in fact only by inherence in what is itself good. Thus, though evil in itself has neither reality nor value, the various kinds of bad things mentioned by Mr. Taylor—bad art, bad morals, bad philosophy, and so on—can and do have both, in virtue of the good substratum which alone makes it possible for badness—or defect of some kind—to exist at all.

There is therefore no difficulty in accepting the argument for the existence of God derived from the simple fact of the existence of morals : or in identifying the source from which the moral law derives its authority, and the corresponding sense of duty, or the idea of "ought"—its place in human consciousness. The authority is nothing else than the authority of God, since nothing else can be found that will satisfy its requirements.

This moral argument, like the metaphysical arguments expounded by St. Thomas, is no doubt subconsciously in the minds of all men, even when it exerts little or no practical influence. But Mr. Taylor well points out that moral arguments, from their greater intimacy and personal bearing, have a cogency that belongs to no others ; and it is quite certain that a recognition of the

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fundamental difference between right and wrong has in some cases been the first step in a progress from unbelief, not merely to theism, but to the Catholic Faith. In all probability it has seldom or never been entirely absent from the minds of those who have made the transition.

Upon this foundation is built up a remarkable superstructure of religious and theological inferences. The moral life is a progress towards an ideal perfection (not merely a correction of defects) which must necessarily be identified with the vision of God; because it is necessarily more than temporal in its outlook, it cannot be fully achieved under temporal conditions, which require that gain should constantly be counterbalanced by loss. The perfect life to which moral action tends is shown to be essentially incompatible with temporal successiveness: it requires the simultaneous life of eternity in order to be complete. This is to be found only in the presence of God, and the goal of morality is shown to be not any quality or set of qualities, still less the possession of any transitory good, but God Himself.

Further, the motive for entering upon the moral life is supplied by the initiative of God. We do not make the moral law, but discover it, and its cogency makes itself felt in the act of discovery. So the life of morality comes to be unselfish in character: in following the attraction it exercises we look away from ourselves to God, and learn to regard Him as the Redeemer and Sanctifier and lover of man, and as communicating Himself to those who desire Him, by a necessity of His nature.

Of this it is necessary to say that, though actually true enough in our present circumstances, it seems to go considerably beyond what can be inferred from the consideration of morality alone. One cannot help suspecting that the Christian influences which still permeate our thought have had a considerable though unrealized part in the above conclusions. Mr. Taylor, though he strictly observes the limitations imposed on Gifford Lecturers, writes avowedly as a Christian, and must suffer more or less from the difficulty of excluding

Christian concepts from a survey of purely natural religion. It may be said, indeed, that Plotinus, and even Plato, show a similar affinity with Christian doctrines. But Neoplatonism certainly, and Plato himself possibly, were in contact more or less direct, the one with Jewish, the other with distinctively Christian, ideas. In regard to the last of the above three points, it is true that the good is "*diffusivum sui*": but it is also significant that Mr. Taylor illustrates his meaning by reference to the doctrine of the Trinity. It seems unnecessary to bring into natural religion words of "accommodated" meaning which belong properly to a far more precise and technical system; the purpose of the present book, which is, the author tells us, to reinforce by purely natural considerations the credit and influence of religion of a positive and definitely supernatural kind can only be compromised by recourse to such an expedient.

In the second series of lectures the author passes from natural to positive religion, and enquires whether the arguments drawn from the study of ethics entail not merely the acceptance of natural religion in the fullest form of which it is capable, but also that of positive or revealed religion as well. Here positive religions are grouped together, as forming a single class or genus, in virtue of certain features which are common to them all. These are the supernatural ideas deducible from the principles of the moral life, namely God, grace, and eternal life. "Grace" is perhaps too precise an expression to be applied indiscriminately to the highly technical meaning which it holds in Christian theology and to the vague and undefined concept of divine favour which belongs to the older religions. So used, it can be understood only as the general idea of divine assistance in some form or other. "Graces" are indeed recognized as the providential overruling of human affairs and the consequent favours bestowed upon the worthy. But the idea of grace as internal to the soul, and a created quality connoting spiritual powers of various and clearly definable kinds, is distinctively Christian, though in some degree foreshadowed in the beliefs of Judaism. Part of

the present enquiry, indeed, is concerned with the credibility of the somewhat intricate Christian doctrines of grace, about which so much controversy has arisen in the past.

Apart from this consideration, the treatment of positive religions as all fundamentally in agreement is difficult to maintain : the differences so far outnumber the points of agreement as to suggest that the latter are due merely to their possession of a common subject-matter rather than to any real identity in its treatment. This indeed is the obstacle, apparently an insuperable one, which has hindered the progress and completion of the theories of "comparative" religion. But it is possible that other religions than Christianity are introduced here mainly to meet the objection frequently made to the claims of Christianity, that the choice of a religion is not merely between Christianity and no religion, but that there are many other religions which may, at least on an *a priori* view, be supposed to have a stronger title to acceptance. At any rate, non-Christian religions are here allowed to fade into the background of the discussion, and the arguments are mostly directed to the consideration of the points of Christian belief which are most commonly made subjects of criticism, or of internal controversy. In regard to these, Professor Taylor shows that the results of the enquiry into the religious aspect of morality do not justify any *a priori* assertion of the incredibility of Christian doctrines, or require the rejection of any of them.

Due emphasis is laid on the important fact that all who have been eminent for religious faith and practice have been devout adherents of some positive religion. Religion historically first meets us as positive—as embodied in facts of experience—apparently, in most cases, as an interpretation of the processes of nature. Natural religion is formulated by dialectic : but the direct precursor of dialectic, according to Plato, was mythology, and there is much to be said for the contention that if positive religion had never existed, natural religion could never have come into being. Purely "spiritual" religion is not for man in his present condition, hence the

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necessity for "institutionalism" and "sacramentalism". In regard to the latter, the natural symbolism involved in Sacraments is made perhaps of too much importance. Professor Taylor, however, clearly perceives that, however much of it may in his view be represented by the Christian Sacraments, it is upon divine authority, and not on anything merely natural, that they ultimately depend. "The question is not how God must act, but how in fact He does act."

The chapter on Authority is naturally the least satisfactory part of the book to Catholics. The absolute necessity of authority for any dogmatic or disciplinary religion is clearly recognized, and the claim for the supremacy of individual reason and conscience in all questions is admitted to be incompatible with any pretensions of a religion to be final or universal, or to be a trustworthy guide to conduct. But the reason suggested is that religious experience is more than individual, and cannot be exhausted by any one person, but requires the consent of the whole number. The consequence of this view is necessarily the denial of all finality to religious belief—we are to be "ever learning and never coming to the knowledge of the truth", as St. Paul puts it, or, as it is put here, progressively distinguishing between the inner reality of truth and the dogmatic integument in which it is contained. This is obviously a complete negation of all religious authority: the best that can be accomplished in this way is Syncretism. Professor Taylor illustrates his theory of Authority as against the Catholic doctrine of Infallibility by a reference to the authority of conscience, which is not infallible, but cannot be disobeyed without sin. Surely no illustration could well have been more unfortunate for his purpose. For the fallibility of conscience is, as Professor Taylor himself says, "an ever-potent source of moral mistakes": and it is because of the inability of conscience alone to be a trustworthy guide to truth and life that, as we may well believe, the Infallibility of the Pope and the Church was instituted. The vital difference between the two is that one is external, the other internal. Conscience is merely the moral judgment of reason—that

is, of the individual: it is essentially autonomous. It is not, like the categorical imperative, a natural endowment of mankind, but has to be "formed" on questions of duty as they arise. A man may form his conscience wrongly, and may sin in doing so. But he is still bound to follow it in action, because it is his only guide, and in rejecting its conclusions he would perpetrate a moral self-contradiction. But the infallibility of ecclesiastical authority is external, and depends solely on the overruling providence of God, which, within the narrow but all-important sphere of infallibility, protects the Church from error. It is only by a figure of speech that conscience can be called an authority: the mental faculties are not independent entities struggling together, but merely the powers by which the man acts. Therefore the "authority" of conscience is merely the ability of the individual, as a moral agent, to do as he thinks right. He can—if civilized he must—submit his conscience to external guidance, but when he does so he is still "obeying his conscience". He "disobeys" his conscience when he acts otherwise than as he thinks right: but nothing is easier than to persuade oneself that the easiest or pleasantest course is the right one, and hence the misinformed, or false, conscience is the "source of moral mistakes". But the point is that the conscience is the *ego*, the man himself, not an authority, like the Pope's, by which he is to be directed. Professor Taylor has really mistaken a figure of speech for a psychological fact—a mistake which lies at the root of Anarchism.

A still more serious mistake occurs in Professor Taylor's enquiry into the true meaning of God's "immutability and impassivity", as a result of his speculations on the relation of time and eternity. He proposes, instead of merely "explaining away" the anthropomorphic language of the Old Testament, to supplement it by a far more positive anthropomorphism of his own. God, he says, cannot be entirely "immutable and impassive", but must be subject to emotion and change, though in some way immeasurably purer and higher than ours: and he accuses of "ditheism" those pietists

of an early day who "transferred all real feeling to the human Christ, and at heart thought of the Father as looking on at the Passion from outside". That is to say that God is not *actus purus*, nor immaterial; and the truly orthodox belief is that of Patripassianism—a heresy with which some sympathy is expressed elsewhere in the book. It is true that the inward experiences of the incarnate God cannot be analysed by us, but the Christian faith makes it clear that there are some things which cannot have been included among them. One of these certainly is any suffering on the part of the divine nature. Though God died on the Cross, it cannot be said that God's divinity died; and if it is "ditheism" to distinguish between the impassibility of the nature of God and the dereliction of the God-man, then our Lord must Himself have been a ditheist.

The book, though it contains much that is good and useful, as well as interesting in style and matter, cannot, it is to be feared, do anything considerable towards re-establishing religion among us.

*Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,
Tempus eget.*

A. B. SHARPE.

ART. 9.—THE HIDDEN HAND IN THE CONCLAVE

1. *Il Conclave di Leone XIII.* By R. De Cesare. S. Lapi, Editore. Città di Castello, 1887.
2. *Mémoires du Chancelier Prince de Bülow.* Traduction Henri Bloch. 4 vols. Librairie Plon Éditeurs. Paris, 1930-31. (References to vols. ii and iv.)
3. *Souvenirs de la Princesse Radziwill, née de Castellane.* Préface de Jules Cambon, 1840-1873. Librairie Plon. Paris, 1931.

THE reign of Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) marks the commencement of a new order in the relations between the Church, the Catholic Powers so called, and those other States, like the German Commonwealth, which number a large proportion of Catholics among their citizens. His consistent adherence in essentials to the course set by his august predecessor with regard to the independence of the Holy See proved, moreover, the practical futility of the right—granted as a privilege in days past to obedient sons of the Church, i.e. the Crowns of France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire—to enter a caveat in conclave against any candidate for the Papacy whose antecedents and political opinions were deemed inimical to their interests. That veto had degenerated into a mere abuse, opening the door to compromise, transactions, to put the issue no higher than the level of humiliating intrigue. The conclave of Pope Leo XIII, was the first occasion in the century when pressure was put only indirectly and to avert a hypothetical issue at this juncture improbable: the choice of a non-Italian Cardinal. The line of Pontiffs from Adrian VI onward (1522) had been exclusively Italian. No departure from century-long practice was likely to occur in the Sacred College, numbering Italian and foreign Cardinals in a virtually equal proportion; whilst the neutral attitude taken up by the Powers, as well as the rapidity of the conclave's decision, made it plain that the continuance of old-time methods would no longer be countenanced even *pro bono pacis*. The brief

duration indeed of Pope Leo's Conclave (February 18-20) lent support to the eventual formal abrogation of the Veto; and the right claimed and enforced by Austria to forbid the candidature of Cardinal Rampolla del Tindaro at the Conclave of 1903, which elected Cardinal Giuseppe Sarto, Pope Pius X, in succession to Leo XIII, proved the occasion for the passing of outworn methods in history.

The Conclave called to elect a successor to Pope Pius IX (†7th February 1878) met under circumstances unprecedented in the history of the Church. It was the first assembly of the Sacred College to be held in Rome after the transfer of the Italian capital to the Pontifical City. The scrupulous respect shown by the Government towards the privileges of the Sacred College throughout the duration of the *Sede Vacante*—the preliminary Congregations were unhindered—dispelled the not always disinterested, albeit intelligible, apprehension that some pretext might be sought (a display of authority not warranted by present conditions in Rome, for instance) which might constrain the Cardinals' dispersal, inducing choice of a foreign seat for their assemblage.

The Conclave was therefore held in Rome, without let or hindrance from Italy. The praiseworthy attitude of the Government was, however, dictated less perhaps by regard for the Church (denied by the sectarian spirit informing the Law of Guarantees) than by the avowed eagerness to show public opinion at home and abroad that the military conquest of the Pontifical State and its annexation to Italy, followed by the occupation of Rome stressing the union of all the Italian States under the crown of Savoy, in no wise implied a curtailment of the fundamental liberties of the Church and her spiritual, indeed her material, freedom apart from territorial independence of the Holy See. The correspondence of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs with their representatives at foreign courts, published by Sig. De Cesare, makes the determination of the Cabinet clear: that, taking time so to speak by the forelock, those Courts should be placed in possession of the Italian point of view, prior even to the eventual issue. The instructions

addressed by Sig. Depretis to the Italian Ambassadors at Madrid, Paris, and Vienna, and at Berlin and London, so far back as December 1877, direct them to learn the opinion of the first-named three Powers concerning their eventual exercise of the veto at the Conclave deemed imminent in view of the aged Pontiff's rapidly declining health. Similar instructions addressed to the Envoys at other Courts included the assurance of the Government's determination to respect and uphold the prerogative of the sacred college throughout the period of vacancy of the Holy See, provided no attempt was made to remove the Conclave from Rome. Moreover, doubt yet prevailed in the Italian Cabinet whether mentality rooted in the traditional outlook of the three major Catholic Powers—Spain, Republican France, heir to the French monarchy, and Austria, heir to the Holy Roman Empire—would find expression once again now.

Two previous Conclaves of the century had witnessed both the Spanish and the Austrian veto, the former actually launched, the latter frustrated by accidental delay. The Conclave of 1831, summoned at the Quirinal and lasting no less than fifty days, had accepted the Spanish Crown's exclusion against Cardinal Giustiniani, suspect of Carlist sympathies; and Cardinal Mauro Cappellari, a personal friend and sharing the same views, had been chosen. This choice of Pope Gregory XVI demonstrated the substantial futility of the veto as a menace and leverage likely to bring about any practical results. The Austrian attempt to exclude Cardinal Mastai Ferretti at the Conclave of 1846 proved abortive through accidental delay. The Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Gaysbruck, was the bearer of the Imperial veto against the Bishop of Imola, whose friendship with Count Giuseppe Pasolini and appreciation of the Italian patriot Gioberti's writings made him suspect in the eyes of Prince Metternich, desirous to keep Italy as a geographical expression within the sphere of Imperial family interests. The Cardinal, having reached Rome too late to be present at the very brief Conclave which elected Cardinal Mastai by the name of Pope Pius IX, was destined by the hidden hand of Providence to avert the

blunder which another generation of Austrian statesmen were to perpetrate after a lapse of fifty-seven years. The Government of King Louis Philippe had refrained in their turn in 1831 and 1846 from the exercise of a right which in the opinion of the French Republican Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1878 was of doubtful expediency and impossible enforcement.

Those explosions of proven inefficacy necessarily influenced present-day opinion with regard to the "veto" which the Powers so privileged might conceivably exercise at the conclave of Pope Leo XIII. Sig. De Cesare quotes Dr. Döllinger's views expressed to an Italian statesman, unnamed, prior to the conclave. Their author's antagonism against the Church, colouring their language, does not detract from his acumen in anticipating the course of events prior to their occurrence. "The conclave", he observes, "would, if held abroad—in France, for instance, as has been mooted in certain quarters—prove a grave tactical error . . . one that could conceivably give Italy a free hand . . . to modify the Law of Guarantees in a restrictive sense. In the event of the Conclave meeting in Rome, the session will be so brief as to preclude the possibility for any Power to assert the attitude which their particular interests may appear to demand." Dr. Döllinger proved a true prophet. The Conclave *was* held in Rome, although at the first Congregation, Pope Pius IX's constitutions, dated 23rd August, 1871, 8th September, 1874, and 10th October, 1877, recalling the Bull of Pope Pius VI, "Attentis peculiaribus et deplorabilibus circumstantiis", having been read in the presence of thirty-two Cardinals, only eight registered their vote in favour of that venue. Dr. Döllinger, moreover, contested not only the opportunity of the veto, but also its practical value, in the hypothetical case he suggests. "Let us suppose for the sake of argument that a State has launched their veto against the Conclave's choice of a certain candidature, what course more natural, then, is there for the Cardinals than to put forward another belonging to the identical grouping? The position remains as before *in statu quo ante*. . . ." Action concerted in advance, he continues,

such as that which weighted the scales against more than one Cardinal and assured the election of Pope Clement XIV, could alone effect this to-day and secure the choice of a favoured candidate for the Papacy. . . . Nevertheless, he concludes, not without sardonic humour, even were the Conclave, acting in protest, to elect the very Cardinal against whose nomination the exclusion had been pronounced, such an election would be valid ; inasmuch as the denial of recognition to the Conclave's choice is the prerogative of the people and does not appertain to their rulers. All Catholics indeed, the clergy and laity alike, would not be deterred, and without exception whatsoever, from tendering obedience to the Pontiff elected canonically by the Sacred College. He concluded his survey of the question with an observation coloured, it is true, by the "Old Catholic" prejudice against Roman centralization, nevertheless containing a sound judgment of the case. "If any Power be so situated as to influence a Pontifical election, that State can be none other than Italy herself, whose tacit and open recognition of the Papacy alone renders possible that permanence in Rome of the Holy See which enables the Pope to govern the Church from thence."

Dr. Döllinger's survey implies a trenchant critique of the veto as an outworn and henceforth ineffective institution. His words emphasize the timeliness of Pope Pius IX's declaration at the Vatican Council nine years before, that the Holy See would brook no interference in matters spiritual restrictive of Pontifical supreme authority upon the part of any foreign Power, whether expressed directly or through the channel of Ambassadors, be they ecclesiastics or laymen presuming to dictate a course to or join issue with the Holy See upon matters submitted to the Council. Dr. Döllinger's argument, moreover, in 1878 can be compared with the shadow of coming events which he was not destined to witness (†1890). The veto, the continuance of which, he had deprecated on account of its fundamental futility *was* launched by Austria against Cardinal Rampolla at the Conclave which in 1903 elected Cardinal Sarto Pius X, and *was* abrogated formally by the Pope, alive

to the knowledge of the tares ready to the sower's hand finding a fruitful seedbed in human frailty.

That the pronouncement by Pope Pius IX was a timely gesture is made clear by the very interesting journal kept by Princess Radziwill during her sojourn in Rome through the first months of the Council session, illustrated further by correspondence, after her departure 15th December, 1869, covering the duration of the Council; adjourned after the promulgation of Pontifical infallibility in questions of faith and moral as a binding doctrine upon Catholics. The profound cleavage in ecclesiastical opinion apparent from the outset endured throughout the session with regard to the terms of the dogmatic definition as well as to its expediency at the time. Opposition was sincere, in many instances founded upon episcopal diocesan experience, whilst other convictions, largely, perhaps inevitably, vitiated by political opportunism, strengthened by preconceived traditional opinions, were influenced also by the tactics of politicians of high and low degree, who gathered like stormy petrels, so to speak, upon the waste of much troubled waters. An influential minority led by the Bishop of Orleans disclosed a persistent, albeit respectful and loyal, spirit of Gallicanism opposed to a closer knitting together of centralized authority in the Church. The Austrian and German Bishops held similar opinions, and Cardinal Schwarzenberg, Archbishop of Prague, their spokesman, is recorded by Princess Radziwill to have used at his first audience with the Pope language such as the bearer of an imperial veto might have adopted. "He spoke his mind very bluntly to the Holy Father about the treatment which Austria expected. His Eminence explained the length they [i.e. the Holy See] might go, and the line beyond which no advance would be countenanced by them [i.e. Austria]". Other episodes related by the diarist substantiate her sorrowful exclamation, December 7th, a week prior to her departure: "Comme il faut que l'Eglise soit assise sur des bases solides, pour résister et triompher dans ce dédale de tristesses et de plaies profondes!"

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as a body at the Vatican Council, several Bishops having left Rome before the promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility, abstention seeming to reconcile individual opinions with their ordination vows, is mooted by Princess Radziwill as the wedge—alleged incompatibility of episcopal loyalty to the Pope and their subjects' allegiance to the State—driven by Prince Bismarck to enforce the supremacy of the latter. The Kulturkampf was thus opened. Failure was anticipated from the outset by intelligent observers, who, Prince Bülow recalls in his early recollections as a law student, regarded the challenge as a gambler's throw, "the Church having seen worse days and always emerged triumphant". As a cavalry subaltern in those days, moreover, he notes his own and his comrades' concern as they watched priests pacing the prison yard, "merely for fulfilling the duties of their ministry as they were bound to do". The removal of Bishops from their see, the incarceration of priests, the banishment of religious orders, and the vexations to the laity that signalized the enforcement of the Falk Laws (May 1873) called forth a condemnatory Encyclical two years later couched in trenchant language. The effort then made by Prince Bismarck to enlist Italian support for a gesture *manu militari* in Rome seems comic in the light of the future event. . . . Young Bülow had come to Rome, his first post, an attaché at the German Legation. His chief, Baron Keudell, desired his attendance at the interview with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which this singular suggestion was to be propounded. Marquis Visconti Venosta received the communication in silence, contributing no little to the Minister's embarrassment, and wound up his reply with the ironical remark that if Prince Bismarck persisted in his demand, he could only advise the Prime Minister and the King of Italy to evacuate Rome and transfer the capital to Naples, since, bound as they were by the Law of Guarantees, they declared the person of the Supreme Pontiff sacred and inviolable. Not content with this rebuff, Prince Bismarck instructed Herr von Bülow, Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Prince Bülow's father), who had accom-

panied the Emperor to Ems to welcome King Victor Emmanuel, to press Sig. Minghetti, in attendance upon the King once more. The move met with as little success, and Sig. Minghetti, after surveying the position by the light of the millenary Italian relation with the Papacy, concluded his statement with prophetic words. "Our relations", he observed, "with the Vatican will remain as they stand to-day, i.e. a working footing, free at once from debility in essentials and useless vexation or violence, long after a mighty Bismarck shall have revised the May Laws and consequently beaten a retreat." The interview at which Minghetti sought to bring home to the German mentality the quality which a French wit has defined as the Italian genius for juxtaposition ended upon the repetition—not less prophetic—of Cavour's dying words to the Friar who brought him absolution: 'Frate, Chiesa libera in Stato libero.'

The course to be followed, adumbrated through the imminent change in the Pontifical succession which should bring other minds to the study of the issue—the Conclave, untrammelled in their deliberations, to meet in Rome—absorbed the attention of the Italian Government throughout the last four months of Pope Pius' life. The Cabinet (Francesco Crispi, President of the Council; G. Depretis, Minister for Foreign Affairs) sought an exchange of views with the three Catholic Powers possessing the right of exclusion at the Conclave, the other Catholic States, the great European Protestant Powers, and Russia.

The response was typical of each. The Spanish Government "desired the election of a Pontiff inclined to reconciliation and imbued with moderate sentiments". The Foreign Minister, Señor Canovas del Castillo, stated, 24th December, 1877, that "the Spanish veto would in any case be exercised only to assist the election of a conciliatory Pontiff; and, although corresponding instructions would be given to the four Spanish Cardinals, their preference lay with the late Nuncio at Madrid, Cardinal Franchi. The choice of the Sacred College resting ultimately with a candidate upon whose political moderation hopes of future understanding might

be built governed the French Government's attitude. Although Marshal MacMahon, President of the Republic, was at heart no republican, his cabinet comprised a liberal, yet non-sectarian, majority. Both were averse from action likely to arouse the animosity of Germany, such as the expression of the veto. On December 16th, 1877, therefore, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Waddington outlined their views to the Italian Ambassador, General Cialdini, who, under instructions from Rome, reported his Government's "mastery of the situation and their ignorance of any move to carry the Conclave session out of Italy". This was followed by M. Waddington's declaration, December 24th, that France desired the Conclave to be held in Rome, free from any constraint whatsoever, and conformably with established usage in order that under no circumstances should the new election be contestable. They desired, moreover, the selection of a moderate-minded candidate, of Italian nationality. M. Waddington's concluding remarks are significant with respect to the ultimate fate of veto. "I am not aware so far of the limits within which our right of exclusion may be exercised, and I do not conceal from myself the difficulty of upholding such a right; but I think that in certain eventualities we should not hesitate to claim it, notably were the risk present of a foreign Cardinal's election." The Archbishop of Prague, Cardinal Schwarzenberg, whose attitude at the Vatican Council had aroused resentment, was regarded as a possible candidate, had the selection of a foreign Cardinal lain within the realm of practical politics. The Austrian Government, however, entertaining neither preference nor prejudice at the time, refrained from putting the veto into practice, Cardinal Pecci, on whom suffrages eventually centred, being a friend of the first named. The other Catholic States consulted were content with the Italian Government's assurance.

Foremost among the Protestant Continental Powers, Germany was smarting under slings and arrows and the Kulturkampf boomerang; two equally intractable personalities stood face to face; and it was becoming increasingly

evident that the desired solution lay behind the doors of the Conclave. The German Government had no accredited representative to the Holy See, and the single German Cardinal, Prince Hohenlohe, was not *persona grata* in the Sacred College. The Archbishop of Posen, Mgr. Ledochowski (afterwards Cardinal), recalled Pope Pius IX's rejection of the proposed nomination of Cardinal Hohenlohe as Prussian Envoy to the Holy See. No course then was open to Herr von Bülow other than to accept the Italian assurances whilst emphasizing their wish that, whoever the Pontiff-elect might be, "he should please to remember that Germany entertained no inimical feeling against the Catholic Church, but insisted that the regard due to the State be shewn for their sovereign prerogative also". Russia followed the German lead; conditions were not dissimilar; the policy pursued against the religion of her Catholic subjects had stimulated the dangerous ferment of long standing in Poland and Southern Russia. England took no special part in the Cardinals' conferences, and the two Englishmen, Cardinals Manning and Howard, represented the nation creditably, although without marked influence, in the conclave of Pope Leo XIII (February 18-20, 1878).

The election of Cardinal Pecci to St. Peter's Chair dispelled the illusions of those ingenuous souls who believe that Time the Healer's step can be hastened, and the sectarians' purpose that the Papacy be either ended, or mended according to their pattern. The events of the reign—twenty-five years, during which relations with Germany (Austria already by this time a brilliant second upon the ground) swung with pendulum regularity through alternating phases of mailed fist and velvet glove towards the recognition of the Holy See as the supreme moral force—lie outside the limits of this study. The hidden hand, which had indeed refrained from laying its shadow upon the Conclave, had not lost its cunning, as the following excerpts from Prince Bülow's record of their own and the Austrian action at the Conclave of Pope Pius X, 1903, disclose.

The German Chancellor, as the sequel shows, "doth

protest too much" when he tells us: "The statement is altogether false that I had contributed in any way to the pronouncement of the Austrian veto against Cardinal Rampolla." "I had, as a matter of fact," he continues, "told Cardinal Kopp at our last interview before the Conclave that our attitude, so far as might be, should be neutral." "My personal relations with Rampolla had been very good, and I believed we should get our way with him. Moreover, as the Italian adage has it, anyone who goes into the Conclave black may come out white, and contrariwise sometimes."

Prince Bülow remarks, justly, that the permanent historic interest of Cardinal Kopp's secret report addressed to him on August 4th, the date of the final scrutiny which raised Cardinal Sarto—Pope Pius X—to the Chair of St. Peter—led him to include the document verbatim in his memoirs.

Rarely has a mass of wire-pulling been disclosed with such naïve incomprehension by its reporter, Cardinal Kopp, who writes: "The Pontifical nuncio at Munich invited the two German Cardinals (Fischer, Archbishop of Cologne, and Kopp, Archbishop of Breslau) to proceed with all possible diligence to Rome, after the demise of Pope Leo XIII. The other foreign Cardinals were similarly notified, and they arrived for the most part in good time for attendance at several among the Congregations held daily at 10 a.m. for the dispatch of urgent business. The agenda included the question where the Pontiff-elect would make his first appearance in public to bless the people. Usage prior to 1870 had sanctioned the loggia overlooking the Piazza for that purpose. Pope Leo XIII, however, abiding by certain Cardinals' counsels, had given the blessing from the inner portico opening upon the nave of St. Peter's, thereby marking his attitude towards the new order in Rome. The assembled Cardinals regarded departure from precedent to be undesirable in Pope Leo's successor, lest on the one hand unwarranted hopes be stimulated, and suspicion on the other be aroused. The Italian Cardinals took occasion meanwhile to agree upon the choice of a successor (to the Papacy). The more

numerous group favoured Cardinal Rampolla. The other candidates were, Serafino Vannutelli, Di Pietro, and Gotti. The foreign Cardinals saw no course open except to attempt to form similar groupings and gain as many adherents as possible. The Austrian (five) and German (two) Cardinals consequently met together and endeavoured to influence their other foreign colleagues. They succeeded with Cardinal Gibbons (U.S.A.), who voted with them, although declining formal association. Cardinal Goossens, Archbishop of Mechlin seemed desirous to approach the Austro-Hungarians, but later on he appeared to have leaned rather to the French side. Contact with the French Cardinals was not successful. Cardinal Langénieux was at their head, but Mathieu, the French Cardinal *di Curia*, was their actual leader. They had been instructed by Delcassé to vote all together for Rampolla, and, in the event of his candidature making no headway, to cast their votes for Serafino Vannutelli. The Spanish Government had invited those Cardinals to join forces with the Austrians. Cabinet changes at Madrid occasioned hesitation among them, yet, led by Vives y Tuto, the Spanish Cardinal *di Curia*, all five joined the French grouping. Cardinals Netto, the Portuguese, and Logue, Ireland, took no side."

"The Conclave grouped as described above opened on the evening of July 31st. The Austrian Cardinals had decided at first to vote for Cardinal Serafino Vannutelli, the Austrian Ambassador having meanwhile informed Cardinal Puscyna, bearer of the Austrian *Veto*, that the candidature neither of Cardinal Rampolla nor of Cardinal Gotti met with the Austrian *placet*, both candidates having shown hostility towards her interests, whilst Cardinal Gotti had distinguished himself quite recently by manifest ill-will or incapacity in the treatment of an Albanian question."

"Cardinal Fischer, however, at the last conference held by the Austrian and German Cardinals prior to the Conclave, also put forward so many valid objections against Cardinal Serafino Vannutelli that the majority agreed in spite of the notice above-mentioned to cast their votes for Gotti. The course of debate concerning

Cardinal Rampolla's candidature unfortunately prompted the expression of unjust and unmeasured judgments and accusations concerning the ecclesiastical administration and policy of Pope Leo XIII; which, though sternly rebutted, yet obscured that great Pontiff's memory that day."

"The first ballot took place in the forenoon, 10 a.m., of August 1st. Rampolla had 24 votes; Gotti 17; Sarto 5; Serafino Vannutelli 4; Di Pietro 2; Oreglia 2; and Agliardi and the others (present) one vote apiece. The second ballot, at 5 p.m., gave Rampolla 29 votes; Gotti 16; Sarto 10 votes; the remainder were dispersed. Cardinal Agliardi called upon this writer (i.e. Cardinal Kopp) and described the position as very serious. His general survey stressed the point that Rampolla had hold now of the tiara, although he (Agliardi) knew that the former would merely prove a pope by the grace of Loubet and Combes. He was, moreover, Austria's mortal foe, and certainly no sincere friend to Germany, which he indeed feared and none the less detested. Gotti likewise was not commendable, involved as he had been in the Pacelli bank affair. He (Agliardi) recommended the Sarto candidature, all round deserving of confidence."

"I hastened to report all this to Cardinal Fischer, and we both convened a meeting with the Austrian Cardinals to discuss the state of affairs. We reached the decision after a protracted debate to drop the Gotti blind-alley candidature, and cast our votes for Sarto; while Cardinal Vaszary, whose eccentricities moreover singled him out for amazement, put in a demurrer. A resolution was furthermore adopted pressing Cardinal Puscyna to proceed with his mission to hand in the veto against Rampolla. The evening found Puscyna still in doubt whether or not to act."

"My counsel, however, to the Austrian Ambassador had led him prior to the opening of the Conclave to inform Cardinal Oreglia that, in possession of a communication from his sovereign, he prayed for an audience to acquit himself of his mission. But as he could then no longer hope for a hearing, I suggested that he advise

the Camerlengo in writing that Cardinal Puscyna had charge of the Emperor Francis Joseph's commission to notify the exclusion against Cardinal Rampolla. Oreglia, nevertheless, had not so far communicated this fact to the College of Cardinals."

"On the morning of August 2nd, Cardinal Puscyna reported to me that he had handed the written notice of his commission to Cardinal Oreglia; the latter, however, had refused to bring the matter to the knowledge of the Sacred College. Whilst we were about on that morning to assemble in the Sistine Chapel for the third ballot, Cardinal Puscyna came to my side and whispered, "What are we [i.e. the Austro-German Cardinals and I] to do?" I replied, "Sarto; and as for you, go ahead." This incident passed off unheeded by anyone. The session being opened, Cardinal Puscyna begged the Camerlengo for leave to speak, and proceeded forthwith to make the matter of which he had apprised him known to the Sacred College. Oreglia was now unavoidably forced to lay the veto of the Austrian Crown against Cardinal Rampolla before the Sacred College, and to order the Puscyna letter to be read. The impression was borne in upon me that the communication had aroused a far milder reaction than I had feared. Danger had doubtless been present that now a larger number of Cardinals averse from foreign interference with the choice of a Pope would take sides with Rampolla and support his candidature. Not one, however, rose to protest against the Austrian veto, except Rampolla himself, who stigmatized the proceedings with impassioned emotion as this fresh *ictus contra libertatem Ecclesiae*."

"His words, nevertheless, made no impression upon the Conclave. The third ballot left him with the selfsame 29 suffrages, while Sarto received 20 votes, and Gotti's number dropped to 9. The fourth ballot, held in the afternoon, 4 p.m., increased Rampolla's votes by 1 only, namely to 30; Sarto had 24, and Gotti 3, votes. The fifth ballot, taken at 10 a.m., August 3rd, gave Rampolla only 24 suffrages, whereas Sarto already obtained 27 votes, and Gotti's number rose to 6. At the sixth ballot, which took place in the afternoon, Sarto rose

to 37, Rampolla dropped to 16, and Gotti obtained 7 votes."

"At this juncture Sarto had stepped forward and begged insistently and feelingly to be passed over. All were moved by his distress; but none took account of his opposition. His friends, indeed, pressed him earnestly to withdraw his refusal. The seventh ballot proved decisive. On August 4th at 10 a.m., Sarto received 50 votes, Rampolla 10, Gotti 2 votes. Sarto had thus been elected. To the question put by the Camerlengo whether he admitted the choice, he answered that he must submit to God's will, if the cup could not be averted from him. He thereupon took the name of Pius X. The Pontiff's presence makes no especially prominent impression; his character is modest and lowly, amiable and kindly; he is, however, generally regarded as an energetic Bishop, having governed his dioceses, Mantua, and subsequently Venice, with masterly ability. Born in 1834 in the vicinity of Treviso, at the time under Austrian dominion, the Pope retains a certain leaning to the country of his origin (Austria) and some recollection of the German language. He has maintained good relations with the Italian Government. The widowed Queen Margherita entertains sentiments of profound veneration for his person. He was presented once to the German Emperor upon the occasion of His Majesty's visit to Venice. In accordance with the precedent set forth above, Pope Pius X gave the Apostolic blessing from the inner loggia."

"It behoves me now to place upon record that in the last seven years repeatedly, and again this winter at the Samossea discussions, I had foretold the Austrian menace against him to Cardinal Rampolla. And on July 23rd, the day of my arrival in Rome, when I took occasion to lay the fate about to overtake him clearly before his eyes, he stated that he sought only absolute tranquillity. His desire to secure election was nevertheless patent, and he felt so certain of the event that he lent no credence to my words. I took no part in the campaign against his candidature.—Signed, Cardinal G. Kopp."

Prince Bülow is judged out of his own mouth. His

is the hidden hand in the Conclave, but the most charitable interpretation of Cardinal Kopp's part cannot absolve him from the charge of wire-pulling. *He* is made acquainted in advance with the Austrian purpose, and he foretells it to Cardinal Rampolla; *he* suggests delay to the Austrian Ambassador, lest outside pressure prove abortive; and when within the Conclave the bearer of the Austrian veto, Cardinal Puscyna, finds himself nonplussed, his German colleague tells him simply "to go ahead", and provoke the scene that shall determine the Sacred College indeed, *pro bono pacis*, to bow their heads; but also, though Cardinal Kopp does not know it, to raise one of God's children of light to the Papacy. His action can find justification at the hands of students of this singular missive to Prince Bülow only in the belief of that hour in necessary German dominance, omnipotence, and—world-omnicompetence. She is the master whose word now and anon gives Austria the lead she would not take by herself.

But the writing upon the Sistine Chapel wall is traceable already; not only will the first constitution of the reign abrogate the Veto, but the war which ended Pope Pius' days in grief in 1914 has shown once more in human affairs that the wheels of the Lord move slowly but grind exceeding small.

M. MANSFIELD.

ART. 9.—JOSEPH CONRAD: AN APPRECIATION

WE are very often inclined to think that any kind of fiction which appeals to the many must of necessity be of a superficial nature. We laugh at the best seller, and are quite convinced that at least there is in such a book a very pronounced germ of superficiality. Now up to a point we are, I think right in such an assumption. That which appeals to the many is superficial in that it is understood without a rigid examination. The masses do not demand intellectual fiction, and they do not get it. Thus immediately the question suggests itself to the mind, Is it a fact that most of the novelists who appeal to the great mass public are in no sense great except that they are great sellers? I am going to attempt to answer this general question by means of the cowardly subterfuge of giving the answer by a particular example, and this particular example is Joseph Conrad. Conrad was a great novelist, and he was a very popular novelist. How, then, did he attain to this unusual dual position? By a really rather simple process of reasoning which postulated at once that, whatever he did *not* understand, he did understand human nature. He realized that if his fiction was to be great and popular it would have to be both superficial and subtle. It would have to catch the popular fancy, and at the same time waylay those who demanded that fiction should satisfy the reasoning faculties which a great many people find unsatisfied by many of our novelists. He was universal *and* exclusive—if I am not stretching a point, I would say he was in this combination eminently Catholic.

Conrad, although he was to a certain extent a philosophical novelist, was not really a philosopher. He did not appear to consider that the universe was so profound that none could ever hope to understand it. He would have had little sympathy with a philosophy which marshalled everything into an elaborate system and applied a fancy title to it. He considered that the process of life in itself was simple. If Plato concluded that the reality of the world lay in the sphere of ideas,

Conrad considered that reality lay in the sphere of simple ideas. It was not, I believe, a mere pleasing coincidence that a Catholic novelist like Conrad should put in the forefront of his outlook the inestimable value of faithfulness to an ideal. He brought to bear on his writings a logical mind—a mind that knew that if life was best understood by mastering simple ideas, these ideas must follow each other reasonably and have connecting links. To a limited extent Conrad did what was expected of him. He did not carelessly lay on one side tradition. He wrote of the sea. If he wrote of the sea, he was quite certain he must write of storms. If he wrote of storms, well, storms at sea were something like storms in the human mind: expected and unexpected—to be beaten—to be shown no mercy and crushed. One side, then, of Conrad was to a limited extent superficial—something like an adventure book which a boy would open. And then I am sorry to say that he would shut it. For we soon discover that Conrad is not a bit content with outside adventure, he must have recourse to inside adventure. In other words, Conrad began to think about psychology. He knew that the only part of man that really mattered was the soul. The soul expressed itself by physical actions, and physical actions denoted the evolution or devolution of the soul. Man was to him a sacrament visible and invisible. As a Catholic, Conrad could not ignore the fact that man must tread a faithful and a difficult path. He gives to the soul a strange reasoning faculty. It is hurt; it is pleased; it shivers at the blows man gives it; it is bold and refuses to be conquered. Like the Faith, when it seems to be most in danger of dying, it is the more certain that it is gaining more and more strength for a battle for Life. Thus he is in the best sense a symbolic novelist. His physical facts are symbols of mental and spiritual facts. Anyone who takes the trouble to study Conrad with a view to getting at his genius must become aware that no writer can describe a storm more admirably. If the student will go a little further, he will see that these atrocious storms are indeed quite useful to Conrad. The storms that thrash the oceans into mountains of

angry waters are symbolic of the storms that race down upon the waters of the soul and turn them into conflicts both subtle and superficial. To Conrad man is something like a ship. He ploughs his way through the still waters; he comes into the troubled seas; he is almost engulfed in the undercurrents; and then, when he is almost lost, there shines in front of him the Lighthouse. And once again for Conrad this Lighthouse is the Church —the Church which is not surprised at receiving a battered being bruised and almost hopeless, but still Captain of his own Soul.

Conrad is ever most insistent that man, although he is so individualistic as to be *ipso facto* lonely, is at the same time intensely socially responsible. As every man is necessary to the proper passage of a ship so every man in some way is necessary to the proper passage of mankind through the world. So if he is not faithful in life, not only his own "ship", but other "ships" also will sink. Life thus resolves itself into a dire conflict between loyalty and treachery. We must be loyal because disloyalty hurts others; we must hate treachery because it is throwing away a gift lent to us, the gift of life. The villainy of Conrad's villains consists in their abuse of this gift of life. They are traitors and even blasphemers, not only in word, but also in action.

This consideration that man is eminently a social being leads us to the fundamental background of Conrad's work. It is that ultimately each one of us is alone. As he says so sadly and yet so boldly, "We live as we dream, alone." We move in the midst of the busy throng, and yet we are as much alone as though we moved through an isolated desert. Our contact with others is in reality again both superficial and subtle. It is superficial in that it is a clash of fringes; it is subtle in that one soul receives from another impressions that are either hurtful or helpful. Conrad is both a mystic and a collectivist. He seeks reality by means of probing his own soul, by means of taking it almost unannounced into the Divine; yet it must join in collective worship, yet again it must be exclusive and universal—individualistic and Catholic.

Always, together with Conrad's demand that faithfulness is necessary, we find that man has to make his life-journey alone. And yet, though he is alone, he is always striding along with his conscience. There is an excellent instance of this in *Lord Jim*, one of the most fascinating of Conrad's novels. Here is a man pursued all through his life by the memory of a brief dishonour, and yet a dishonour the memory of which is never to leave him while he lives. Then in another book, *Victory*, he goes much further. Some men by their very involuntary nature draw themselves apart from man, when they would in reality wish to be both friendly and sought by friends. Yet that curious character Heyst, in even his most "human" moments, is detached, alone, possessed of a nature which wars against his humanitarian ambitions. There is also that remarkable figure Kurtz—an ardent idealist pushing his way through all opposition; a champion of the good, warring forward alone among evil and hostile forces; a symbol of the Catholic keeping to his Faith in an age and atmosphere both faithless to God and faithless to Man. Nor must we forget that splendid figure Captain Whalley, who in *The End of the Tether* shows us how a man can prove invincible no matter from how many quarters savage assaults are made upon him. All these characters have to fight alone, all are faithful, and yet all in some way are vitally dependent upon others.

It will be well at this stage in our brief consideration of Conrad to say something about his technique, for unless this is discussed we are in danger of losing sight of his strength and also his weakness. The strength of Conrad's prose lies in its fine cadences, which are both definite and sensitive. And yet, as I have already said, there is a certain weakness about his style—it tends to repetition, and we are sometimes given too much colour. But when all is said and done, his style does what it ought to do: it brings out with full force the impression he wishes to put before his readers. Also it is as well to recall that Conrad was by birth Polish, and English is not an easy language to learn and write. What I think is very important to realize in attempting to make any

estimate of Conrad is that he was a *natural* writer. He could no more help writing than could Carlyle or Stevenson. He simply had to express himself in words. His outlook could not be seen except through the medium of prose. And it is of course of supreme interest to English people that Conrad tells us that it was his life with the stolid English sailor which made him first turn to literature. He must have seen in the sailor the faithful servant ever driving onwards, ever assailed by all the hideous temptations of the land, ever looking ahead to strange countries, and yet never really surprised at anything they had to offer. His English seamen are a splendid gallery of pictures: they are painted by a supreme artist; they have no details left out; they are eminently lifelike.

If we ask which is the most brilliantly drawn seaman character of Conrad's, we may well hazard a reply: Captain MacWhirr. It will be remembered that this captain appears in *Typhoon*, and is master of the *Nan-Shan*. The captain is stupid; he is unimaginative; he is not going to alter the course of his ship for anyone; if he is going straight into a typhoon so much the worse for the typhoon when it hits his ship. The *Nan-Shan* may be out in the China Seas, but she is navigated by an English sailor, and she will do what she is told!

It cannot be said with any truth that Conrad is always an easy writer to follow. He moves about all over the place, now straight ahead, now to the right, now to the left. And although Conrad has a habit of pushing a spokesman into the narrative, the difficulties of connected narrative are not entirely overcome.

Much stress has been laid by critics about the altruists that Conrad created for us. I think it would be as well if these critics would also make it quite clear that these altruists are paradoxically egotistical.

There is an excellent example of this when Captain MacWhirr treats the coolies in this ship fairly in spite of the fact that they made matters more difficult by fighting when the storm was at its height. Captain MacWhirr, it seems to me, does think his action will look well! But of course I do not wish to give any

impression that by this feeling of well-being he is any the less humanitarian. Rather the reverse. Captain MacWhirr knows how people should be treated, and he knows that humanity in its essence demands the fair treatment for coolies that would be given to more exalted personages. Or in *The Nigger of the Narcissus* the men, while detesting the nigger, risk their lives for him partly because man does believe in self-sacrifice, and partly, I fear, because such a course of conduct is good form. At the back of it all Conrad did feel that men wanted to put others first, even if they did not always succeed in this noble ambition. It was quite true that men liked to do what was right because it looked right, but they also liked to do what was right because it was right. Conrad had that standard of right for its own sake, that standard which quite naturally must appeal to him as a Catholic.

For instance, it is very typical of his Catholic outlook, always implied if not actually stated in his fiction, when he makes the young engineer in *Nostromo* say :

"Upon my word, doctor, things seem to be worth nothing by what they are in themselves. I begin to believe that the only solid thing about them is the spiritual value which everyone discovers in his own form of activity."

There is another part of Conrad's technique which displays his genius as much as his characterization does. It is that truly marvellous power that he possesses of creating atmosphere. Here is an example of this taken from his *Heart of Darkness*. A few lines will show his rare skill in this kind of description, so typical of him.

"And then I saw the men of the East—they were looking at me. The whole length of the jetty was full of people. I saw brown, bronze, yellow faces, the black eyes, the glitter, the colour of an Eastern crowd. And all these beings stared without a murmur, without a sigh, without a movement. They stared down at the boats, at the sleeping men who at night had come to them from the sea. Nothing moved. The fronds of palms stood still against the sky. Not a branch stirred along the shore, and the brown roofs of hidden houses peeped through the green foliage, through the big leaves that hung shining and still like leaves forged of heavy metal."

This is, I believe, almost perfect description, neither exaggerated nor underestimated. There is all that stillness of the East together with the premonition of a sudden and violent movement at any moment.

Conrad is never really quite content that his reader should see what he is trying to describe from only one angle. He moves him about from pillar to post. In *Typhoon* the "reading passenger" gets about all over the ship. Sometimes he is on the bridge and knows what it is like to command a ship that heaves and plunges beneath one's feet. At another time he is in the engine-room and can almost smell the hot oil and long for the wild winds that will meet him as soon as he goes on deck. He may even go down into the coal-bunkers. He feels the storm in all parts of the ship, just as Conrad's characters feel the storm of life in all parts of their lives. Conrad is ever anxious that those who read what he writes shall have as much and varied information as is possible. He is not satisfied that we should merely see a thing—he desires to make us see to some purpose. Again, without wishing to stretch a point, I would suggest that this desire to make us see the purpose that lies behind action does arise consciously or unconsciously from the fact that Conrad was a Catholic novelist. And what is just as important—he wanted his novels quite obviously to be Catholic in the sense of being as all-embracing as possible.

The whole of Conrad's physical world, as it appears to us from the pages of his fiction, is literally charged with personality. We are ever the witnesses of living flesh and blood. The criticism that can be applied to many quite good fiction-writers, that they tend to create puppets, can never be applied with any reason to Conrad. He almost goes out of his way to impart life to his characters. And if his animate creations are really animated, even so are his inanimate objects animated. For here is a really marvellous little picture of a ship, the *Nan-Shan*, coming in from a "hard sea, green like a furrowed slab of jade, streaked and splashed with frosted silver . . . she had about her the worn, weary air of ships coming from the far ends of the world. . . . She

was encrusted and grey with salt to the trucks of her masts and to the top of her funnel." If there is one rather disappointing feature in Conrad's fiction, it is that we are not perhaps quite intimate enough with his characters. Though they are drawn so minutely they are rather remote. We feel that we are dealing with a race of men who are apart, a race of men alone with their own problems, a race of men who will put up with no interference. We are spectators of a manipulation by Conrad. But dare we grumble with so brilliant a manipulator ? I do not think so.

The years that have gone by since Conrad passed from mortal sight are but few. We have yet to place his work. Literary permanence is ever the most elusive of pimpernels. And yet to the English mind the themes that are discussed and developed can surely never fail to be of interest. His philosophy gets us back to something that we have almost completely forgotten. It gets us back to that necessity of faith which seems to be absent from nearly all the non-Catholic novelists. His power of characterization is immense. He shows us men in unconventional surroundings, for he holds that in these man will best show of what he is capable. That he is capable of steadfastness and loyalty under all kinds of circumstances is brought out over and over again by Conrad. Conrad, in spite of a certain aloofness, which I have already mentioned as being an attribute of his characters, does really show us what lies behind. The things seen are important, not so much for themselves, as for the unseen things that they show or imply. If we would ask for the one great aim that lies behind Conrad's life-work in fiction, it is, I think, this : that the idea of faithfulness is the bedrock of all activity ; and, further, that the human spirit, alone though it may be, is unconquerable. And in this we may, I believe, trace the influence of the Catholic Faith that upholds a man so that material circumstances cannot beat him.

PATRICK BRAYBROOKE.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

PROFESSOR E. ALLISON PEERS in his *Studies of the Spanish Mystics* (London: the Sheldon Press, 2 vols. vol. i, 1927, pp. xvii + 472; vol. ii, 1930, pp. xii. + 478. 18s. each) has far more than fulfilled the great promise of his *Spanish Mysticism: a Preliminary Survey* (1924). He reveals himself in this new book a consummate master of his difficult and intricate subject, and brings to the work a sobriety of judgment, a temperance, and a tolerance, and at the same time an outspoken condemnation of error, which reassure and persuade.

Professor Peers has called his volumes studies of *mystics*. But, always mindful of the possibility of another view, he writes: "However conscientiously the historian may endeavour to circumscribe the term 'mystic', it is impossible in practice to restrict it to those who have written in set terms of supernatural prayer" (ii, 129). This would be to restrict the term "mystic" to writers, which the author has no intention of doing. For the mystic is not primarily a writer. Essentially he is a recipient of the highest favour which God has conferred on His creatures. The mystic is a natural man supernaturalized: his soul, by stringent purifications, active and passive, has been rendered capable of divine union in this world; his spirit receives the communication of God Himself without medium in the very substance of the soul. The priceless gift of the full mystical state has been given rarely, but it is possible to believe that it has been given to many who have never written about their experiences, and who have remained literally hidden from the world with Christ in God. On the other hand, it is also possible for one who has never been anywhere near mystical union himself to write of it after study of the written body of Mystical Theology, with the added knowledge which he may have gleaned from others who have experienced it, notably if he be a spiritual director. The number of real mystics which these studies of Spanish spiritual writers embrace is restricted, as Professor Peers' observations clearly demonstrate. "Only of St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross,"

he writes, "among the mystics considered in this survey, can it be said with entire assurance that they write from the summit of the mountain" (i, 288). Other real mystics there are in the work, as, for instance, St. Ignatius Loyola, not a mystical writer; St. Peter of Alcántara, whose priceless little book is not a set mystical treatise; St. Thomas of Villanueva, who taught mysticism from the pulpit; the Blessed Juan de Avila, perhaps, even though he is correctly described as "primarily an ascetic writer" (ii, 127); and perhaps also the Blessed Alonso de Orozco was a mystic, though his treatise on the *Spiritual Betrothal*, a mystical subject, is "frankly ascetic" (ii, 215).

Of the writers treated in these volumes who cannot be considered mystics is that very delightful and profitable spiritual writer, Luis de Granada ("one of the greatest names in Spain's golden age"), if only because of his belief in the impostor-priress, María de la Visitación of Lisbon (i, 38). No real mystic could fail so greatly in spiritual insight. But he was assuredly mystically minded. Francisco de Osuna, whose *Third Alphabet* on the subject of prayer so happily influenced St. Theresa in her early days, "had no conception of a higher mystic life than that of the Spiritual Betrothal, and not much more than a dim idea of that" (i, 116). Even the greatly attractive Juan de los Angeles gives us "no complete guide to the life of the mystic" (i, 359), and it is therefore permissible to ask if he had ever traversed the whole length of the three roads. The famous Exercises of García de Cisneros "belong in their entirety to the Purgative way" (ii, 26). Of Jerónimo Gracián, the most prominent figure in the troubled origins of the Discalced Carmelites, Professor Peers says most justly, and with an incisively illuminating touch, "it is only his writings that take us into the atmosphere of Contemplation" (ii, 151). Of Diego de Estella he says that he was "like Luis de Granada . . . an ascetic rather than a mystic" (ii, 227), and of Cristóbal de Fonseca, "he writes for the mystic . . . but academically, artificially" (ii, 265). But it is in his extremely fine chapter on the incomparable Luis de León that Professor Peers lets us see most clearly that we have not to do with one who has attained the

mystical state. He is "brilliant and not devoid of ambition" (i, 293), is not "disposed to mildness" (p. 294), is "far from closing the eye of sense that he may see with the eye of the spirit" (p. 307), and was "up to the very year of his death engaged in turmoils within his Order and without" (p. 296). Such a one cannot have been a mystic, and he himself rather sadly owns that he was not: *De quorum numero non esse me, et fateor et doleo* (p. 318 n.). A glorious spiritual writer, one of the greatest of Spanish stylists, humanly speaking a divine poet, he was not essentially even mystically minded, but probably had a perfect comprehension of Mysticism so far as it had been expounded by St. Theresa. Turning to Luis from St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross, as Professor Peers observes with great truth, we "are brought down to earth again", an earth, it is true, as lovely as Eden, and as variegated as the gardens of the quattrocento painters.

Professor Peers' goodly volumes are made doubly acceptable by a bibliography of 1964 items which is a marvel and a delight, besides being a model of enlightened inclusion and judicious exclusion. Professor Peers quotes the English translation of Père Poulain's *Grâces d'Oraison* in support of the fact that in his *De Fonte Lucis*, c. viii, Denis the Carthusian used the expression "acquired contemplation" (ii, 304). But in the ninth edition of his work (iv, 7) Poulain suppresses this statement altogether. There can therefore no longer be any doubt that the expression "acquired contemplation", subject of so much heartburning, is no older than 1610, or, at very earliest, 1608. This is important. Also St. Theresa did not "in her own person" found thirty-two religious houses (i, 144). In her own person she founded fifteen out of the seventeen nunneries; of the priories she has some claims to be considered the foundress of the first, Duruelo, but not of the remaining fourteen. This is unimportant; for it was she alone who obtained from the Prior-General of the Order leave for the institution of houses of Contemplative Carmelite friars, and to her belongs the merit and glory of such foundations.

MONTGOMERY CARMICHAEL.

France, meaning by that term the original central territory and the various regions that had been united with it by the end of the Middle Ages, is replete with interest for both the ecclesiologist and the ecclesiastical historian. For the former there are first of all magnificent examples of Romanesque and Gothic architecture, St. Gilles-du-Gard and the ruined Montmajour, Chartres and Amiens, to cite but a couple of each ; and then the no less magnificent sculpture of the school of Chartres, indigenous and original as that of the Greeks. For the historian not the least striking feature will be the large number of important religious institutes which had their origin in France. To mention but a few of the more notable, among the monastic orders there are the Cluniacs, the Cistercians and the Carthusians ; whilst among the canons regular we have the Canons of St. Victor, of Arrouaise, of St. Anthony of Vienne, those of Prémontré, and the Trinitarians. Of recent years there has been a revival of interest in these orders ; and on one of them, that of Cluny, there has been a large output of literature. English writers have taken their part ; first of all came Dr. Rose Graham, whose work has been noticed in these pages, and now comes another Oxford scholar, Miss Joan Evans, with a charming little book, **Monastic Life of Cluny 910-1157** (Oxford University Press).

Cluny is indeed worth all the attention it is getting, for during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, after the papacy, it was the most potent ecclesiastical force in the Latin Church, and its abbots were the counsellors of popes and kings. Its church was the largest in Christendom till the building of the New St. Peter's, and its community at one period is said to have reached the stupendous number of well over four hundred monks. Miss Evans deals in turn with the foundation of the abbey early in the tenth century, the growth of the Cluniac order, the monks of Cluny, the administration of the abbey and its possessions, and with the daily life of the community ; she devotes, too, a chapter to arts and letters at Cluny, a not unimportant side of the monastic life. She writes throughout most sympathetically, and it

is a pleasure to read what she has to tell us. The story is a striking one. Of the first six abbots of Cluny, five have been dignified with the title of saint; and four of these, Saints Odo, Majolus, Odilo and Hugh, find a place in the calendar of the present monastic breviary. St. Odilo deserves to be well known, for he it was who instituted All Souls Day, but St. Hugh was the most remarkable of the four. He was a son of Delmare, Lord of Semur-en-Brionnais, a cadet of the ruling house of Burgundy. That house had intimate relations with the royal house of Castile. There was more than one inter-marriage, and on p. 30 it is stated that St. Hugh's niece was queen of Castile. One wishes that Miss Evans had given a genealogical table showing how this came about. Before passing on it may be of interest to note that at Cluny every day three monks' portions of food were set aside for the poor, one in honour of the Emperor St. Henry, one in honour of St. Odilo, and the third in honour of "the king of Spain" (*sic*), the last of these, whichever king it may have been, being probably included on account of the relationship between the two houses ; incidentally it may be mentioned that a similar portion was set aside for every deceased monk of Cluny on the anniversary of his death, till the number became so large as to necessitate the rule that not more than fifty portions should be set aside on any one day.

To return to St. Hugh ; he has been described by a monastic writer as the first "Father General", and not inaptly, for under him Cluny and its numerous dependencies were so organized as to form a real order, the first in the Western Church, and of this order he was the supreme head. Till then every abbey had an independent existence, and the abbot was the father of his community ; but under the Cluniac system the largest of the associated houses—for example, La Charité-sur-Loire, or the English priory of Lewes—was nothing more than a cell of Cluny, and the profession of every monk had to be made in the hands of the Abbot of Cluny or of his specially appointed deputy. A mere glance at a map showing the French houses immediately dependent on Cluny in the middle of the fourteenth century must convince anyone of the

inherent weakness of this system, for it would be utterly impossible for anyone to administer rightly so huge an organization ; and it must not be forgotten that to the list of houses immediately dependent on Cluny itself must be added those dependent on its daughter houses. There were, too, houses in other lands ; and in regard to these the system was even more unworkable. The records of the English province show this clearly enough ; monks often had to wait for years before they could make their profession, and there was always the added danger of revenues being seized, or of actual suppression when war broke out between England and France, and one such war lasted a hundred years.

But one cannot pursue this subject here. The fact that the Cluniac administration was not in accordance with the rule of St. Benedict, and any other divergence from that rule, may perhaps raise the question as to their right to be styled Benedictines, but will in no wise interfere with their claim to be regarded as a great monastic order. Such, indeed, Cluny was, and so indeed it remained down to the time of the French Revolution, when the two branches of the order still numbered between them close upon ninety houses.

When the time for a second edition comes, Miss Evans would be well advised if she fell in with the general practice of calling the monastic head-dress a hood, reserving the term "cowl" for the ample garment which is worn over the tunic. In conclusion one cannot refrain from noting how refreshing it is to read a book of this kind at a time when a certain school of writers can hardly refer to monasticism without imputing something unworthy ; it is refreshing, too, to find a writer who, when describing monastic buildings, has the good sense to write of "refectory" and "infirmary", instead of following the present sham antiquarian vogue of calling those departments the "fratry" and the "farmery".

In his *English Monasteries in the Middle Ages* (Constable, 21s. net) Mr. H. Lidderdale Palmer proposes to give the general reader information regarding mediæval monastic architecture which must now be mainly sought in the publications of learned societies, together with

some account of the history of the various orders and their customs. This is an ambitious effort, hardly capable of realization in a volume of some two hundred pages. The author is an associate of the Royal Institute of British Architects, which prepares one for finding that the greater part of the book is devoted to architecture, which will appeal more to the specialist than to the general reader, to whom the disposition of the domestic buildings of a monastery is a matter of but little concern, his interest being with those who occupy the buildings. But there is one point which must be noticed in passing : the persistence with which Mr. Palmer, in common with other modern writers, makes use of the mediæval names for certain parts of the monastic buildings, which seems to suggest an idea, conscious or subconscious, that monasticism is a thing of the past, an obsolete mediæval institution instead of something very much alive. One reads of the "dorter", the "frater", the "laver", for what are commonly known as the dormitory, the refectory, and the lavatory : this to most of us seems pure affectation, though it may be that there are some so imbued with the spirit of and love for mediæval times that they commonly make use of Middle English terminology for the different parts of their own houses. The most defective part of Mr. Palmer's work is undoubtedly his "simple outline of the origins" of monastic orders. The only ones treated at any length are the Benedictines, the Cluniacs, the Cistercians, and the Carthusians : the rest for the most part have a simple date. Of the canons regular, for example, we are told that "about the year 1106 the Augustinian canons first appeared in this country" at Colchester : and that the Premonstratensians came to Newhouse in 1146. As a matter of fact, the Black Canons were here before 1106, and the most that can be said for the Colchester canons, if their whole story be not mythical, is that in their house the rule of St. Augustine was first introduced. There were plenty of canons regular before the acceptance of the Augustinian rule : and so far as this country goes the important house is not Colchester, but Huntingdon. That, however, is a point which cannot be discussed here. It may,

however, be suggested that in any work dealing with the religious life of mediæval England an order which had a couple of hundred houses, large and small, and among whose churches was one cathedral (Carlisle), and three others, now Anglican cathedrals (Bristol, Oxford and Southwark), to say nothing of Christchurch, Bridlington, and Hexham, is worthy of more than three or four lines of history!

Dr. R. A. R. Hartridge's **History of Vicarages in the Middle Ages** (Cambridge University Press) is the thesis which obtained for him the degree of Ph.D in the University of London, and it has the qualities and defects of that class of work. Such a thesis is an exhibition of the author's capacity for sustained effort in research; and as the author is more often than not a young man making his first excursion into unknown country, it would be absurd to expect either maturity of judgment upon what he finds or that extensive knowledge of collateral matters which is necessary for the proper handling of even a small subject; everything he finds is to him of importance, though to those more familiar with the subject in hand it is mere commonplace. Quite recently the head of a very important specialist library, one rich in German theses for the doctorate, was heard to declare that for the future he should reserve his money for works of real value and purchase no more academic theses, and this is surely sound reason.

The work before us is indeed a monument to the author's industry, but it does not contain much that is new to anyone who has any real acquaintance with the printed papal and episcopal registers; whilst it does contain much that is either altogether irrelevant or merely unnecessary detail. It is not quite plain what the examiners could look for in the history of vicarages; the history of a particular vicarage might be undertaken, but, as it stands, the subject is by far too vague. A vicar was a necessity when either the rector of a church was non-resident permanently or temporally, or when a corporation aggregate held the rectory. How the rectory came to be held by an absentee or by such a corporation has nothing to do with the history of vicarages. Still less has the history of tithes, to which a great part of the

first chapter is devoted, any real relation with the matter in hand. Nor again are the cases cited of churches being allowed to fall into grievous disrepair anything to the point ; churches held by vicars seem to have fared no worse than those held by rectors, and the neglect must be attributed to some cause peculiar to neither class, but common to both. The introduction of another matter is so forced that it is impossible to resist the conviction that it is mere playing to the gallery : the recording of cases in which a vicar was found guilty of immoral living. The delinquencies of particular vicars have no more to do with the history of the institution than would the distressing cases of immorality among the clergy of the Established Church, which come to light from time to time, have any bearing on the history of the rectories and vicarages in that Church. Anyone who made use of them in that connexion would rightly lay himself open to very severe criticism. The introduction of such matters is as marring to a good piece of work as is the slime of a snail to the beauty of a leaf.

With regard to the vicar, the only matter of real concern to his parishioners was that his income should be sufficiently large to enable him to carry out the duties of his position, including hospitality. Dr. Hartridge has given a lengthy list of the amounts allotted to the vicar, which varied considerably, and another lengthy list of the division of burdens and duties between rector and vicar ; half a dozen well-selected examples would have been quite sufficient in either case. The amount of the vicar's emoluments would naturally vary in different parts of the country and in relation to the burdens. What any particular one actually received depended absolutely upon the bishop, and there is certainly no reason for thinking that a mediæval bishop would deliberately provide for the underpayment of the vicar, at any rate when the rectory was in the hands of regulars. It would be futile to make any attempt to discuss the adequacy of any particular payment without a very deep knowledge of the local social and economic conditions.

If the irrelevant portions of the book were removed and the over-abundant detail relegated to appendices

this thesis would be reduced to slender proportions.

The natural expansion of the subject should be sought in an extension of the chapter relating to the service of churches by regulars ; that is, the really interesting question regarding churches held by monasteries, and the monasteries held by far the greater number of appropriated churches. But this is a subject which must be handled with a good deal of caution. It cannot be assumed, for example, that permission given to a great monastery to place members of its own body in its appropriated churches was necessarily carried into effect ; Dr. Hartridge, for instance, refers to such a permission having been given to Nostell, but the present writer, in spite of diligent search, has not found any instance of a canon of that great house having served any one of its churches. And there is the case of another English house which obtained permission to place its canons in six of its churches, and which went out of its way to get this privilege confirmed on two separate occasions ; and yet ordinarily, in later years at any rate, only one of the six churches was served by a canon. A fundamental necessity for handling this question properly is to have a very clear grasp of the essential distinction in mediæval times between a monk and a canon regular. Had Dr. Hartridge seen this clearly he would have been spared the necessity of considering on p. 17 whether on a particular occasion St. Bernard of Clairvaux had made a *volte-face* in supporting the appropriation of a church to a house of canons regular, after denouncing the appropriation of churches to monks. And here it may be said that those who know where to look for it can find much in present conditions to enable them to understand the working of the system of monastic rectorships in the Middle Ages ; for there are numerous examples of parishes so held by houses of canons regular, for instance in Switzerland, in Austria, and in what is now the Italian Tyrol. In England, too, there are numerous churches held not only by canons regular, but also by monks ; but naturally these are the last persons to whom most of those who write on these subjects would dream of applying, for there seems to be a tacit assumption that

the religious orders were mediæval institutions which long ago ceased to exist.

One does not like to end on this note. Dr. Hartridge's thesis is a very distinct testimony to his power of research, and it is to be hoped that he will pursue the subject. When the time for revision and pruning comes he will find some of the volumes published by the William Salt Society of considerable value, and also the *Liber S. Mariae de Dryburgh*, printed by the Bannatyne Club in 1847.

EGERTON BECK.

It is, to say the least, a coincidence that there should appear within a few months of each other, in France and in England, independent editions of a work written in 1741, and since that time almost entirely forgotten. At first we were inclined to assume that the one was a translation of the other ; but internal evidence shows that this is not so, and on enquiry we find that each editor worked in ignorance of what the other was doing. In 1741 Père Caussade, S.J., known to us all for his teaching of "Abandon", published, and that anonymously, the only complete work he ever wrote, entitled : *Instructions spirituelles en forme de dialogue sur les divers états d'oraison, d'après la doctrine de M. Bossuet, évêque de Meaux*. The book was in two parts. The first, more or less controversial, dealt with the problems of the time, surrounding and flowing from what was known as Quietism ; the second was more positive, giving definite instructions on Prayer, in the spirit and often in the words of Bossuet himself. Since Caussade's time the second part has been occasionally reprinted ; the first, as being mainly controversial, has been set aside. In March of this year Abbé Bremond brought out an edition of the whole work, which he entitled : *Bossuet, Maître d'Oraison* ; this has been immediately followed by a translation of the original edition, made by Mr. Algar Thorold, and entitled in its English dress : **On Prayer : Spiritual Instructions on the various States of Prayer, according to the doctrine of Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux**, by Jean Pierre de Caussade, S. J. (Burns Oates & Washbourne, Ltd.)

The importance of this book is both historical and doctrinal. Knowing the mind of Caussade as we may easily discover it from his letters published under the title *L'Abandon de l'Ame*, it is not difficult to realize how the bitter controversies of his time grated on his soul. To him there could be no bitterness arising out of any true teaching on prayer ; if it did, that alone would prove that there was false doctrine somewhere. Again, as his book sufficiently shows, he was convinced that much of the current misunderstanding was due to excessive attachments to ways and methods, not enough to the significance of prayer itself ; spiritual directors paid too much attention to the means, not enough to the end, as if the means were an end in themselves. Accordingly in his own book he cut across the path of them all. Caussade was an original thinker, and, like all original thinkers, he would not write a book unless he thought it was needed. But here there was a distinct need. He saw that Prayer was only one ; that though methods and ways might be many, yet they all tended to the same goal ; and that in reality there was far more agreement among the various schools than the controversialists themselves saw, blinded as they were by the tendency to narrow down everything to their own particular groove. Taking Bossuet for his main guide, by a process of elimination and then of synthesis, in a series of dialogues, of questions and answers, a method specially suited for his purpose, he first cleared away the errors of excesses then in vogue. Then, by a similar process, keeping prayer in view more than the method of it, he brought sweet reasonableness into the controversy, proving to all how fundamentally they agreed. It is significant that, while the Abbé Bremond sees in the work an attempt to harmonize Bossuet and Fénelon, Abbot Chapman, in an admirable introduction to the English version, discovers rather a harmony between Bossuet and St. Ignatius Loyola. But in either case the lesson is the same. Prayer is a gift of God, and the more we can place ourselves in His hands the more likely we are to receive it. It is not so much a process of climbing, as it is so often described ; it is rather a process of surrender, of "self-abandonment",

of "death to oneself that one may live in God", of faith and abiding in God's Presence. The lesson of Caussade is as needful in these days of revival as it was in his own time; and we do not wonder that two scholars on either side of the Channel should have thought his book of special value at this moment.

ALBAN GOODIER.

Education can be described as helping what is called a person to find what is called himself. Progress, for the Catholic "missionary", will consist in more and more intimate translation of his news into the terms of the nations and persons whom he is commanded to "teach". Only after such translation will the clear act of choice, on which (self-) loss or (self-) wholeness depend, become possible. (Mark xvi, 16). Very welcome, therefore, are two booklets of the "Light of the East" series, Calcutta, which seek, the one to understand certain Indian thinking, the other to present Catholicism to this and similar thinking.

"Grace", Father Dandoy explains in his **What is Catholicism?** is the free response of "God" to the friendship of rational appreciation for Himself which *changes* inside himself the agent who appreciates. He explains that heaven "merited" is not a superimposed reward, but a natural interior fulfillment (p. 15); and he opposes to this appreciation to what is perhaps a danger for some Indian minds, "love", which is blind, a vague overflowing of the sensitive heart seeking to expand itself in no matter what receptacle (p. 76). The richer, therefore, the meaning "God" for each person, the more vitally effective his interior acts of adhesion.

While Father Dandoy is content to describe Him as the "All Truth", for the thinker Samkara (A.D. 788-820), according to the interpretation of Father Johanns in his **A Synopsis of "To Christ through the Vedanta."** **Part I, Samkara**, "God" means, rather than Gaiety or Fortitude or Practicality, "absolute Identity and Selfness, in which Awareness and Self-subsistence are contained, but without any distinction". This absolute value he tells us to appreciate by attending to it. "We must gather all our mental rays and focus them on this Centre till we

disappear in it. Or, to look at it from another side, we must withdraw our light from our senses, intellect and heart, and remain in holy recollection until the Light flames up within us and transforms us in itself" (p. 46). In the first place, however, Father Johanns does not make it clear whether this process is inevitable, sooner or later, for each person. In Catholicism it is not inevitable. In the second place, it seems true indeed that to think God as pure selfness is strictly Thomistic (cf. Fr. Dandoy, pp. 12-13), and that any given personality in the valuations by which it commits and qualifies itself may have to withdraw itself from false diffusion (hence loss, confusion) of itself among what is outside, towards interior selfhood, and hence towards "God"; and, again, it is true that for Catholics, too, the meaning of the term "world" has to be shorn of the last shred of *false* independence of God. Yet Father Johanns does not here defend sufficiently his reconciliation of Catholic teaching with the teaching of Samkara. According to him, Samkara would have the soul know (rather than love) itself away from itself into God for His own sake totally, i.e. make absolute surrender to a distinct Other (cf. Fr. Dandoy, p. 5).

However, there are other interpretations of the Indian process (or of some Indian processes), according to which what is to be done is to think (and therefore to "become") back of *distinction as such*—since the latter is held to be the principle of illusion (*Maya*)—including the distinction of subject and object. Now here it would seem that the energy of the soul is focused wholly inwardly on itself, which "itself", thought through, is seen to *be* God, by identity. But in Catholic teaching the soul is seen as pointing other-ward, as pure constitutive reference.

Now it may well be that the Indian state ("this one second, an ocean, free from duality")^{*} is, as Father Johanns holds that it is, simply a living of *one half* of the true world-God relation, i.e. that half which consists in the complete *reduction* of all reality to God.

* From quotations given by Jung, *Psychological Types*, from the "Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad", iv, 3, iii, 5, and "Bhagavata-Purana", ix, 18-19.

On the other hand this state is described in the original texts as freedom, not only from vanity and delusion by self-discipline and forbearance (to which a Catholic would agree), but also as freedom, primarily, from "the frailty of dependence", and as the overcoming of opposites.* Does not this sound more like, not the Catholic union of distincts, but the "all-identity" of contentlessness, the primitive confusion of "*participation mystique*" which Lévy-Bruhl discovers as a strong tendency in the mentality of savages? It may be true, as Jung holds, that a new becoming may emerge as a result of the indrawing of a person into this, apparently, *less* than personal state, but it seems far removed from the Catholic teaching of clear relation with a richer Person.

Yet it is just such a clear relation that Fr. Johanns holds Samkara to teach. He describes the process of it as a complete self-reduction into the insideness of God (wholly in and for *Himself*). But he holds that on this is to follow the complementary becoming which is the "realization" of the other half of the true God-world relation, namely the "*deduction*" of oneself and the world *from* God.† Now this becoming, he says, Samkara failed to achieve because he just failed to see it to be metaphysically possible. But, in order to be integrated into Catholicism, he only needs to be completed by his successor Ramanuja, and by the doctrine of *Creatio ex nihilo*. It was the latter that his metaphysical imagination just missed; how should it not?

All that is "in itself" as set over against God he rightly sees to be pure illusion. God is *all*. Yet the relation is not reciprocal, he profoundly insists. God is unaffected, unincreased, unmanifested, even as He is in *Himself*, by what is only "illusorily" distinct from Him. No "pantheism", therefore (it is claimed). Again, the effect must come from the cause and be received into it, he thought. It seemed to him that causality must mean *transformation*, and hence be impossible for God. But

* Ibid.

† "Since thou dost no longer love thyself, but alone that Goodness . . . it has become necessary for thee again to love thyself, but with this love . . . into so great a unity hast thou been drawn by Him" (Jacopone da Todi).

must it, necessarily? Need the effect be received "into" the cause?—or, rather, into such a cause?

All that is "outside" God is unreal. Yes, argues Father Johanns, but could not what is *of itself* unreal be yet realizable by such a "Cause"? . . . Neither Indian philosophy nor Indian mysticism are India—the India of Sivaji, Nur Jehan, Asoka . . . and the Vedanta itself is perhaps but a minor stream within Indian thinking,* and Samkara is but one thinker on the Vedanta line or key of thinking. Yet for each of those lines and keys of becoming there must be point of contact with what is called "Catholicism". One of the results of Father Dandoy's attempt at a "systematic" simplification of the latter is to make one ashamed of oneself, set among so much aid and so many unassimilated truths, by the side of spirits such as Samkara, who in their short lifetimes lived through individual (and isolated) truths with such intensity and depth, and must have "become" therefrom (comparatively unaided) so interiorly changed in their selves.

HENRY JOHN, S.J.

In the course of the last twenty years or so experimental psychology has, in this country and more conspicuously perhaps in America, tended to break away from the traditional psychology, becoming instead increasingly biological in its outlook and methods. We turn to psychology now in the hope of finding guidance in the intricate business of education, industry, vocational guidance, and the general conduct of individual life. The human being is considered as a mind-body organism, living in vital contact with its surroundings, and needing some further insight into the forces which make for success or failure in the achievement of life-purposes. Hence greater importance is attached by psychologists of this school to the part taken by instinctual drives, feelings, strivings, and their physical concomitants than to the introspective analysis of the mind and mental events

* M. Guénon (*Introduction aux Doctrines Hindoues*) maintains, on the contrary, that India is a close metaphysical unity; that all the Hindu systems are so many *points of view* on non-conflicting planes, e.g. cosmological, psychological, etc.—among which the strictly metaphysical point of view of Samkara is the most profound.

characteristic of the so-called "Structural Psychology".

Father Lindworsky, S. J., who is Professor of Psychology in the German University of Prague, in his lucid and excellent treatise on **Experimental Psychology** (Allen and Unwin, 1931), takes us back to the traditional academic brand : the psychology with which one associates principally the names of W. Wundt, O. Külpe, Ebbinghaus, Titchener, N. Ach, Albert Michotte, and others of the same school. Among these, Prof. Oswald Külpe perhaps contributed more than any other to raise experimental psychology to the status of a true and independent science. Under his guidance and inspiration psychology advanced from the study of sensations to that of higher cognitive and volitional mental processes, setting aside the "sensationism" of E. Titchener and the associationism of other writers.

The notable contributions by Ach, A. Michotte, and others to our knowledge of volitional processes is the outcome of Külpe's work and influence—an influence which appears throughout the volume before us, the author being, we may state, a former pupil of Prof. Külpe. We may recall here that the fundamental method of this school consists in the extensive and intensive application of "controlled introspection" and "reports" of the events observed to occur in consciousness under the given experimental conditions. This method is, of course, supplemented by other procedures, without, however, losing its primary importance. The mental events disclosed through such introspection are of various kinds, and exist in the mind in various forms and degrees of complexity. There are mental acts as well as mental contents, and these in their manifold variety and relations form the essential subject-matter of experimental psychollogy.

Prof. Lindworsky presents with great clarity of exposition the principal results of this science. Dividing his treatise into five books, he commences with the study of the elementary sensations, or sensory experiences, and, following the usual divisions of Higher and Lower Sensations, proceeds in the next section to study Sensation complexes, such as Tonal Fusions, Visual and Tactual

Perceptions, and the difficult problem of binocular vision. Other sections are devoted to the consideration of images and their combinations with sensations and sensation complexes. From such sensory complexes we derive our elementary perceptions or knowledge of relations.

This introduces us to the problem known as "Gestalt" Perception, first mentioned by Christian von Ehrenfels in 1890, which of late has come into considerable prominence through the work of Kurt Koffka, Koehler, and others of the German school of psychologists. It includes the study of certain peculiar perceptual "wholes", as are involved in our perceptions of configurations of elementary sensations, perceptions of movement and of time.

Intimately connected with our sensory experiences are our elementary sensory feelings of pleasure and unpleasure and their various physiological accompaniments, as well as elementary volitional acts. These various elementary mental events furnish the basis on which rests our experience of higher mental achievements, an important preliminary condition of which consists in the capacity for the revival or renewal of images. In other words, past experiences tend to reproduce themselves through association, perseveration, substitution, and other means. These problems are discussed in Book II, which thus forms a natural transition to the questions treated in Book III, concerning the higher mental achievements of adults, such as comparison, apprehension of objects, perception, and the concept and meaning.

Thinking is of two kinds, namely inferential, concerned with the apprehension of relation, and productive thinking, with the solution of definite problems. Memory in the form of remembrance and recognition is another essential item of mental experience. It is subject to various illusions, such as that known as the "*déjà vu*" experience, or false recognition. Concluding this part with a chapter on the "I"-Consciousness, the author proceeds to the consideration of the higher feelings and the nature of volitional activity. Feeling-experience does not lend itself so readily as cognitive experience to introspective analysis, which at its best yields but meagre

results in this sphere, so that those who would pursue this subject further may profitably consult such works as that of Allen, *Instinct and Pleasure*, or F. Paulhan, *The Laws of Feeling*, in which this subject is treated more fully.

Under the section given to volitional activity the author reviews the experimental studies and the various theories of attention. Reflex and instinctive movements which are associated with external volitional acts come in for rather scanty treatment, for such phenomena scarcely come under the consideration of introspective psychology. Book IV consists in the first place of a short account of socially influenced mental achievements, principally that connected with language and its development, but we miss here any reference to Prof. Piaget's treatise on the subject. Further brief sections are given to Morality, Art, and Religion. The fifth and last book deals briefly, and we may say, perhaps, rather inadequately, with exceptional mental states, such as Sleep, Dreams and Hypnosis. We find scarcely any reference to the more recent literature, which is extensive, concerning Dreams. However, we must remember that this is an experimental study, and so is not concerned with either psycho-analytic research or psycho-pathology. The author dismisses the Freudian interpretation of dreams "as so frankly an invention that there is no special need for us to contradict it". Though he may with many others disagree with the Freudian interpretation, this is hardly a scientific attitude to take up towards a problem which by the use of psycho-analytic methods has yielded such valuable results.

From the nature of the task the author has set himself, and the tradition which lies behind it, we must not expect incursions into the field of the so-called New Psychology, which has an entirely different end in view.

Prof. Lindworsky's treatise comes to us as a refreshing reminder of what experimental psychology as a science really stands for. It is in the first place a pure science, and, as such, is not immediately concerned with practical applications. It is not a "psychology of life", hence readers must not be disappointed if the author appears

to treat this aspect of psychology in a manner which may seem somewhat inadequate.

The translation by Mr. H. R. de Silva, Associate Professor of Psychology in the University of Kansas, reads well, and is a valuable and original contribution to recent psychological literature. It is, however, to be regretted that there is so little reference in the bibliography to the English—both British and American—literature of the subject. This omission may, however, be partly accounted for by the fact that the bulk of the work on which the treatise is based is derived from original German sources.

G. A. ELRINGTON, O.P.

MR. WATKIN WILLIAMS has added to his other Bernardine studies **The Mysticism of St. Bernard of Clairvaux** (Burns Oates & Washbourne, 3s. 6d.), in which there is no falling off from his previous work, which is saying a good deal. We have here papers on the Personality of St. Bernard ; on his sermons on the Canticle ; on the treatises *Of the Love of God* and *Of Consideration*. In an appendix he reprints a paper that appeared recently in this Review, together with the two Papal briefs connected with the centenary of St. Bernard's declaration to be Doctor of the Church, an event which occurred last year. The little book is destined, we think, "to give glory to our Blessed Father", as the Abbot General of the Trappists writes to the author, for it directs towards, indeed it requires some knowledge of, St. Bernard's works, fundamental spiritual reading as the present Pope has declared them to be. We pick out one sentence for remark, "No monk has any right to prefer his own quiet, however necessary it may seem to be to his realization of the mystical life, to that of the world, his own personal tranquillity to the public tranquillity of his fellow men" (p.19). Quite true when hedged about with due distinctions. Without them, as here, they are calculated to empty any contemplative cloister : it would have drawn Mary away from her Master's feet and sent her into the kitchen to help her sister.

We are glad to notice that Mr. Williams does not subscribe to the view that St. Bernard had no sense of

beauty or that he deliberately stifled it. If the rippling waters of the Lake of Geneva and the mountain background passed unnoticed, it was because of his remarkable gift of concentration, of introversion, which shut him in as if by a cloister, while he journeyed up and down Europe as its arbiter, "embodying in his own person the League of Nations of the day in continuous session" (p. 17). Considerations of space unfortunately preclude the discussion of the wealth of matter this book contains. In a footnote to p. 21 there is what looks like a copyist's error: for "*St. Nicolas-aux-Bois in the diocese of Laon*" should be read, "*St. Thierry-les-Reims*". E. S. M.

In Some Problems in Ethics (Clarendon Press, 5s.) Mr. H. W. B. Joseph makes available in print the substance of the lectures on the Good which he delivered at New College in the Lent Term of 1930. His main concern is to establish what there is about a certain kind of action which we call a right action that makes the action right. I cannot see that he succeeds.

The rightness, he contends, must be a kind of goodness, and the goodness may be any one of three kinds. "An act," he says (p. 28), "may be right because productive of good results, and a man, knowing this about it, may see in this the reason why he ought to do it; if, seeing this, he does not do it for that reason, he will not be acting morally, and there are motives which would make his act immoral; nevertheless, the act would, in a defensible sense, have been right." Again, "A man," he says (p. 47), "who judges that he ought to do some act because it is right must have a sense of obligation; but he may at the same time be inclined to the act by some motive like gratitude, or affection, or benevolence, and its involving this motive may be what, in the situation in which he is placed, makes the action right." Or, thirdly and finally, the goodness which, according to Mr. Joseph, rightness is, may be that of a system which the action termed right forms with its context (p. 97). When the rightness of a right action is the latter goodness, the agent in performing it is also realizing the common good, which is inseparable from his own (pp. 116 seq.).

In support of the view that the rightness of a right action may be the intrinsic goodness of the agent's motive, Mr. Joseph claims that, in Ethics, action and motive cannot be separated. Professor Prichard having declared (cit. p. 18) that "there is no necessary connexion between doing what is right and bringing into being what is good except this, that doing what is right is itself good when I do it because I think it right", and Dr. W. D. Ross, that "a right act, merely as such, has no value in itself", Mr. Joseph submits (p. 38) "that these right but valueless actions do not exist". "No act," he goes on to say, "exists except in the doing of it, and in the doing of it there is a motive; and you cannot separate the doing of it from the motive without substituting for action in the moral sense action in the physical, mere movements of bodies." As an instance of what are claimed to be "right but valueless actions", he mentions payment of a debt. As an instance of actions divorced from motive, "mere movements of bodies", he speaks of keeping confidential papers confidential by locking a desk from habit, automatically. Obviously the second "action" is in no way akin to the first. Nobody can have alleged than an inadvertent act, such as this keeping of confidential papers confidential, would be a right action; nobody can have alleged that other than purposive actions were right. But in addition to the purpose which I must have in acting, there is usually a mediate motive. If, though loathing oysters (v. p. 45), I eat a plateful of them to spare my host's feelings, my purpose must be to spare my host's feelings. Yet also, unless I spare them, as Aristotle would have pointed out (v. *Ethics*, ii, iv; it is Mr. Joseph who calls attention to the passage, p. 53), from habit or unreflectingly at the suggestion of another, I must have a motive for sparing his feelings. When Mr. Joseph contends (p. 45) that the same act cannot be done from different motives, and (p. 46) that act and motive form an indivisible one, he can only mean by "motive" the immediate motive. But when he says (p. 47), "A man . . . may . . . be inclined to the act by some motive like gratitude, or affection, or benevolence", he is referring to the mediate motive of the act. And this

mediate motive is certainly distinct and separable from the act it inspires, as Mr. Joseph himself thinks when he says (p. 28), "There are motives which would make his act immoral; nevertheless, the act would, in a defensible sense, have been right"; and likewise when he speaks of "right actions" on, e.g., pp. 84 and 92. If an act is separable from its mediate motive when that motive is immoral, but the act nevertheless right—and the act must be for it to be, in any sense, right—then the same act can be performed irrespective of its mediate motive; and if ever an act can be right, it will always be right, irrespective of that motive, and even in its absence. If it is ever right for me to spare my host's feelings in regard to his oysters, my sparing them will be right whether I spare them because I am fond of him or because I hope later to touch him for a loan or because, it being my duty to do what is right, I desire to do what is right. It will be right even if I spare them from habit. Accordingly I cannot see that the discussion of act and motive has any bearing on the question whether or not "right but valueless actions" exist. The rightness of a right action is not to be found in the nature of its mediate motive.

However, the fundamental objection to seeking the rightness in this quarter seems to me to lie in the fact that an act inspired by kindness may be right and yet not a moral act. Asked whether any but moral actions can be right, Mr. Joseph must undoubtedly answer "Yes". He says (p. 47) that where a man had had the opportunity of doing either a particular act of kindness or some selfish act, and had done the former, he would think better of the man than if the man had done the other, "although he had never asked himself which he ought to do", and, accordingly, had not acted morally. Mr. Joseph deems that, although the man would not have acted morally, he would yet have done right. So when he speaks (p. 28) of motives which would make an act immoral, and adds that the act would nevertheless be right. If, then, we hold with Mr. Joseph that good may be achieved by an act which is not a moral one, we are giving to what is done in certain amoral, or even immoral,

actions the same name that we give to what is realized by moral actions. And I do not see that the two kinds of action can bring about something identical. To my mind there must be a distinction between what is realized when we act morally and what when we act otherwise. If, when we act morally, our act then achieves good, it cannot be that when, in certain situations, we act rightly yet amorally, or even immorally, what we do is also good.

This objection is an objection to regarding rightness as a kind of goodness, and if it is valid, it is so not only against seeking the rightness of a right action in its mediate motive, but also against seeking this in the goodness of the action's results or in the goodness of the system which the action forms with its context. For if goodness is something realized in moral acts and only in moral acts, there can be no goodness in an action's results nor in any system but one composed entirely of moral acts.

Incidentally, we may wonder if Mr. Joseph, in taking rightness to be of such various kinds, can be finding that "unity of principle" which he says (p. 67) he should seek.

Further, the objection, if valid, must lead us to doubt that he is referring to anything when (pp. 116-19 and 133-5) he uses the words "common good"; and we must ask, with Professor Prichard in his inaugural lecture (*Duty and Interest*, p. 33), "whether the phrase does not really involve a contradiction in terms". To view the world as a cistern or gasometer, and goodness as something to be poured or pumped into it, is surely wrong. Nor can we believe, since we regard moral and intellectual excellence differently (p. 128), that any poem is a "good poem" (p. 79) in the ethical sense of "good", but must consider instead that "good", as we use it, is an equivocal word.

I have naturally concentrated upon what Mr. Joseph offers (p. 27) as "constructive" in his very stimulating book; but I must at least mention several other important matters with which it deals—e.g. truth on a purely scientific account of the world (cf. his *Introduction*

to *Logic*, chap. xix), the teachings of analytic psychology, Professor Moore's views, Professor McDougall's theory of the rôle of reason, and Professor Prichard's "short way with dissenters".

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

When in the life of a genius probabilities abound but proved facts are scanty, only imaginative reconstruction will make it possible to depict his portrait. Miss Barclay-Carter has therefore been well advised to apply this method to the later life of Dante and the genesis of the *Divina Commedia*. Her brilliant and delicate study: **Ship without Sails** (Constable and Co.), is not an historical novel in the ordinary sense. Were it indeed no more than a work of fiction it could not be reviewed here. It embodies in language of singular distinction the results of years of laborious and detailed research, including a personal visit to every place where Dante is known or believed to have stopped in the wanderings of his exile. Nothing is here told of him for which there is not at the least a strong historical probability. By a penetrating imaginative sympathy the authoress has not only woven a consistent story of Dante's external actions and environment, but has given us a convincing delineation of his motives and sentiments. In these pages such figures as Gemma his wife, Dino Perini the Inquisitor, Fra Accorso, the Jew Immanuel, Can Grande, and the Emperor Henry VII live and assure us that, given the facts certain and probable, they must have felt and acted thus. Those for whom the drama and development of a soul, even the soul of a genius, possess little interest will probably relinquish Miss Barclay-Carter's story for the superficially more stimulating pabulum of sex and crime. But to such we may apply Dante's words, "*Non ragionam di lor ma guarda e passa.*" Those whose sense of proportion is adjusted more truly to the scale of values, while no doubt enjoying in their place the relaxation of a fiction which makes no demands on mind or spirit, will be glad to climb under Miss Barclay-Carter's able guidance those loftier, if more rugged, ways where walked the poet of eternity. It is indeed no less a journey than the ascent of Dante's spirit from hell to paradise, through

the gloom of disappointment and despair to the high serenity of mystic vision, that she traces in this book, but amidst scenes and adventures realistic enough. With her eyes we see the snow-clad forest around Camaldoli, the Casentino with those rills whose very memory was torment to Adamo of Brescia's thirst, the hallowed solitude of Alvernia invested as with a palpable atmosphere by St Francis' ecstasy of pain and love and joy, and that other forest by the Adriatic where the birds and breezes make music and in an earthly paradise Dante finds a foretaste of the heavenly peace. And from time to time we are treated to a beautiful translation of Dante's verse which makes one wish for a translation of the entire *Commedia* from the same hand. *Ship without Sails* may not be the best seller of a season; it will remain a permanent and indispensable contribution to the understanding and interpretation of Dante. For he has indeed granted the writer the petition he himself made to Virgil: "*Vaglia me il lungo studio & il grande amore che m'ha fatto cercar il tuo volume.*"

E. I. WATKIN.

IN the latest volume of the Many Mansions series, **The Franciscans** (Sheed and Ward), Father James, O.S.F.C., deals not only with the Franciscan Order, but with Saint Francis in relation to his epoch, to the Church and his followers—a formidable task for one small book.

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
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